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 The interaction among firms in the supply chain is necessary for business 
process execution and relationship success.  One phenomenon of great significance to 
buyer-supplier relationships is opportunism.  Opportunism is defined as behavior that is 
self-interest seeking with guile.  It is manifested in behaviors such as stealing, cheating, 
dishonesty, and withholding information.   
Opportunism negatively impacts relational exchange tenets such as trust, 
commitment, cooperation, and satisfaction.  Furthermore, perceptions of opportunism 
negatively affect firm performance.  In lieu of the known negative effects of opportunistic 
behavior on buyer-supplier relationships, why do agents continue to engage in 
opportunistic tactics with their exchange partners?   
A comprehensive examination is necessary in order to understand why sourcing 
professionals engage in acts of opportunism.  Understanding why opportunism occurs 
will reveal how to deter it, and this remains a gap in the literature.   
Based on theories in economics, marketing channels, supply chain management, 
decision science, and psychology, a comprehensive model tested a set of factors 
hypothesized to drive the use of opportunistic tactics.  Factors include buyer-supplier 
relationship-specific factors, environmental factors, individual personality-related factors, 
and situational factors.  Data was collected via internet survey of sourcing professionals 
from private industry and government agencies.  Common to many studies of ethics, 
respondents made choices based on two hypothetical vignettes.  Two logistic 
regression models were used to test the hypotheses.  Factors found to affect buyer 
opportunism included buyer power, corporate ethical values, pressure to perform, 
leadership opportunism, business sector, honesty/integrity, and subjective expected 
utility.   
This research contributes to theory by combining several disparate theories to 
best explain opportunism.  A comprehensive evaluation should determine which theory 
explains the most variance in decision making.  The study contributes to practice by 
identifying those important factors contributing to a sourcing professional’s decision to 
use opportunistic tactics.  The ability to manage these factors should improve the 
probability of relationship success.  Additionally, the identification of these factors 
should help leaders to make more accurate estimates of transaction costs - key 












With an effort of this magnitude a great many “thanks” are due a great many 
people, even institutions. But first, all praise is due to my Creator and personal Savior, 
Jesus Christ, who provides my family and I strength, endurance, continuous blessings, 
and above all, grace. Indeed, I have been blessed great influencers in my life - both 
family and friends. Included among them are my mother and brother. Gratitude is 
deserved to my brother for modeling selflessness. I thank my mother for endless 
encouragement and for demonstrating perseverance and hope. I also thank my brother 
and mother for their faith. 
Fortunately, I was also surrounded by good friends, co-workers, and bosses. I 
thank Kurt who was there when I needed him. I also thank my lifelong friend, Glen, for 
his counsel of reason and support. I especially thank my friend, Wes, for his counsel 
and support in surviving this rigorous feat, without whom, I would certainly not be writing 
this passage. I thank my previous bosses, Scott, Thomas, Jiley, Millie, and Tom for their 
leadership, trust, and faith in my abilities. I especially thank them for assigning me the 
tough jobs - a series of opportunities that seemingly miraculously led me to this point. I 
also thank my academic mentors for their dedication of time and for their patience while 
molding me into an academic. Especially deserving of accolades are Dr. Pohlen, Dr. 
Wittmann, Dr. Farris, Dr. Beyerlein, Dr. Prybutok, Dr. Lewin, Dr. Strutton, and Dr. 
Paswan. Notwithstanding, I am thankful to the United States Air Force (USAF) for 
sending me through this program and for developing and trusting me as a leader of 
tomorrow’s warfighters. I also appreciate the University of North Texas for forging a 
partnership with the USAF. 
 
 iv
Finally, words cannot capture the debt of gratitude due to my family - my wife and 
our three children - who have sacrificed during my entire military career. To my wife, 
thank you for your understanding, care, and nurture. Thank you for being a superb 
mother and my best friend. 
The views expressed in this dissertation are those of the author and do not 
reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of 
Defense, or the US Government 
 
 v
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................iii  
LIST OF TABLES........................................................................................................viii 
LIST OF FIGURES........................................................................................................ x 
Chapters 
 
I.  OVERVIEW ............................................................................................. 1 
Background................................................................................... 1 
Problem Statement and Research Questions ............................... 6 
Purpose of the Study..................................................................... 6 
Conceptual Model ......................................................................... 6 
Research Design........................................................................... 8 
Theoretical Implications .............................................................. 10 
Management Implications ........................................................... 11 
Scope and Limitations................................................................. 12 
 
II.  REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ........................................................... 14 
Theoretical Foundations.............................................................. 15 
Models of Ethical Decision Making.............................................. 20 
Buyer-Supplier Relationship Factors........................................... 24 
Environmental Factors ................................................................ 28 
Individual-Difference Factors ...................................................... 39 
Situation Factors ......................................................................... 44 
 
III.  METHOD ............................................................................................... 54 
Research Design......................................................................... 54 
Sample........................................................................................ 62 
Questionnaire Design and Construct Measurement.................... 63 
Buyer-Supplier Relationship Factors........................................... 66 
Environmental Factors ................................................................ 67 
 vi
Individual-Difference Factors ...................................................... 70 
Situation Factors ......................................................................... 72 
Manipulation Check..................................................................... 74 
Pretest......................................................................................... 75 
Pilot Test ..................................................................................... 76 
Measurement Assessment.......................................................... 77 
Full-Scale Survey Deployment .................................................... 81 
Measure Evaluation .................................................................... 98 
  
IV.  ANALYSIS ........................................................................................... 112 
Tests of Hypotheses ................................................................. 113 
 
V.  CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY ......................................................... 128 
Discussion................................................................................. 130 
Theoretical Implications ............................................................ 133 
Managerial Implications ............................................................ 136 
Limitations ................................................................................ 141 




A. U. S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) BID  
   PROTEST DECISIONS JANUARY 2004 - OCTOBER 2006............... 148 
  
 B.  INTERVIEW GUIDE............................................................................. 155 
 
 C.   MANIPULATION CHECK SURVEY..................................................... 163 
 
 D. COMPANY SUPPORT SOLICITATION............................................... 165 
 
 E. SURVEY INVITATION......................................................................... 167 
 
 F.  FOLLOW-UP NOTICE......................................................................... 170 
 
 G.  QUESTIONNAIRE ............................................................................... 177 
 
 H.  MISSING DATA MANOVA................................................................... 184 
 
 I.  TESTS OF NON-RESPONSE BIAS .................................................... 189 
 vii
 
 J.  UNIVARIATE DETECTION OF OUTLIERS......................................... 196 
 





LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
 
2.1 Summary of Factors Affecting Ethical Judgments ............................................ 23 
3.1 Participants’ Attitudes Towards Opportunistic Tactics ...................................... 58 
3.2 Participants’ Beliefs About Hypothesized Factors ............................................ 59 
3.3 Buyer Power Measure ...................................................................................... 66 
3.4 Relational Norms Measure ............................................................................... 67 
3.5 Corporate Ethical Values Measure ................................................................... 68 
3.6 Pressure to Perform Measure........................................................................... 69 
3.7 Leadership Opportunistic Behavior Measure.................................................... 70 
3.8 Honest/Integrity Measure……………………………………………………………71 
3.9 Machiavellianism Measure…………………………………………………………..72 
3.10 Subjective Expected Utility Measure……………………………………………….74 
3.11 Measurement Results - Pilot............................................................................. 79 
3.12 Pressure to Perform Scale - Item Replacements.............................................. 81 
3.13 Response Rate by Sample and Population ...................................................... 87 
3.14 Professional Certification.................................................................................. 87 
3.15 Age ................................................................................................................... 87 
3.16  Procurement Experience .................................................................................. 88 
3.17 Gender ............................................................................................................. 88 
3.18 Type of Organization ........................................................................................ 88 
3.19 Industry............................................................................................................. 89 
3.20 Annual Revenue ............................................................................................... 90 
3.21 Overclaiming Scale........................................................................................... 97 
3.22 Measurement Results..................................................................................... 100 
 ix
3.23 Measurement Scales:  Reliability, Factor Structure (Lisrel) Diagnostics, and 
Measurement Model Diagnostics ................................................................... 103 
3.24 Scale Reliabilities - H1, M4, M1, PP8 Removed............................................. 105 
3.25 Measurement Model Diagnostics - H1, M4, M1, PP8 Removed..................... 106 
3.26 Composite Reliabilities and Average Variance Extracted - H1, M4, M1, PP8 
Removed ........................................................................................................ 107 
3.27 Measurement Model Diagnostics - H1, M1-M6, PP8 Removed...................... 107 
3.28 Composite Reliabilities and Average Variance Extracted - H1, M1-M6, PP8 
Removed ........................................................................................................ 107 
3.29 Measurement Model Diagnostics - H1, M1, M4, PP8, H5, PP5, BP3, CEV1 
Removed ........................................................................................................ 109 
3.30 Composite Reliabilities and Average Variance Extracted - H1, M1, M4, PP8,    
H5, PP5, BP3, CEV1 Removed...................................................................... 109 
3.31 Construct Means, Standard Deviations, Scale Reliabilities and Correlations     
....................................................................................................................... 111 
4.1 Logistic Regression Predictors of Opportunistic Behavior - Weak       
Opportunism................................................................................................... 114 
4.2 Logistic Regression Predictors of Opportunistic Behavior - Strong      
Opportunism................................................................................................... 115 
4.3 Logistic Regression Predictors of Opportunistic Behavior - Weak       
Opportunism - Polar Extremes ....................................................................... 117 
4.4 Logistic Regression Predictors of Opportunistic Behavior - Strong      
Opportunism - Polar Extremes ....................................................................... 118 
4.5 Multiple Regression Results - Weak-form Opportunism ................................. 120 
4.6 Multiple Regression Results - Strong-form Opportunism................................ 121 
4.7 Summary of Hypotheses ................................................................................ 126 
 
 x




1.1 Factors Affecting a Sourcing Professional’s Decision to Behave Opportunistically
........................................................................................................................... 8 
3.1 Logistic Regression Model of Factors Affecting a Sourcing Professional’s  







 Interaction among firms in the supply chain is necessary for business process 
execution, and therefore, occurs frequently.  Such interaction is interdependent and 
dynamic.  Each decision or action of a firm affects other members of the supply chain.  
Notwithstanding, numerous internal and external factors constantly evolve and affect 
the interaction among firms.  Not only do firms interact, but fundamentally the interaction 
occurs among agents of the firms (i.e. individual employees).  Thus, there is firm-level 
interaction and individual-level interaction, each of which is explained by different 
antecedent conditions.   
One phenomenon in buyer-supplier relations that spans both levels of interaction 
is opportunism.  Opportunism is defined as behavior that is self-interest seeking with 
guile (Williamson 1975).  It differs from simple self-interested behavior due to its guile 
component.  Hence, not only is opportunism selfish, it also causes harm to another 
party.  Opportunism is manifested in behaviors such as stealing, cheating, breach of 
contract (Williamson 1993), distorting data, obfuscating issues, purposefully confusing 
transactions, making false threats and promises, cutting corners, cover ups, disguising 
attributes or preferences (Williamson 1981), withholding information (Wathne and Heide 
2000), deceiving, and misrepresenting (Anderson 1988).   
 
Background 
Specific instances of opportunistic behaviors (e.g., deceit and cheating) have 
been examined on an individual level in the ethics literature, where the unit of analysis 
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is the individual person.  However, opportunism, as a comprehensive construct 
encompassing many behaviors, has received little attention in the ethics literature.  
Opportunism has also been examined on an inter-firm level under the theoretical 
foundation of transaction cost economics (TCE), where the unit of analysis is the firm.  
Each level of analysis entails different antecedents and outcomes.  While firm-level 
analysis has been exhaustively explored in the channels literature, individual-level 
analysis has received scant attention (Romar 2004).  Similarly, while instances of 
opportunism have been examined in the ethics literature, buyer-supplier relationship-
specific factors have been ignored.  These two levels of analysis have not been 
integrated into a single study.  Researchers have called for an integration of ethics 
research with other areas (Loe et al. 2000).  More specifically, Robin and Reidenbach 
(1987) suggested that ethics be integrated with marketing strategy. 
Opportunism is an important phenomenon, receiving substantial research 
attention from many distinguished economics and marketing scholars.  Moreover, 
opportunism is embedded in several of these two disciplines’ most notable theoretical 
achievements in the realm of buyer-supplier relationships including: 
• Trust-commitment theory of relationship marketing (Morgan and Hunt 1994) 
• Relational exchange (MacNeil 1980) 
• Transaction cost economics (Williamson 1975) 
• Marketing channels  
 
As evidenced, opportunism is an important phenomenon in buyer-supplier relationships, 
one that has widespread implications for theory and practice.  It is not a stretch to 
conclude that continued pursuit of its understanding is not only warranted, but 
demanded.     
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The most common inter-firm-level determinants of opportunism include 
dependence (Provan and Skinner 1989; Ping 1993; Anderson 1988; Rokkan et al. 2003; 
Joshi and Arnold 1997; Achrol and Gundlach 1999; Deeds and Hill 1998; Joshi and 
Stump 1999; Lai et al. 2005), formalization (John 1984; Provan and Skinner 1989; 
Gilliland and Manning 2002; Achrol and Gundlach 1999; Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; 
Cavasgil et al. 2004; Deeds and Hill 1998), relational norms (Gundlach et al. 1995; 
Achrol and Gundlach 1999; Brown et al. 2000; Joshi and Stump 1999; Lai et al. 2005), 
and uncertainty (Sako and Helper 1998; Lee 1998; Schilling 2002; Skarmeas et al. 
2002; Joshi and Stump 1999).  More than 30 empirical studies support the effects of 
multiple antecedents to opportunism.  In all cases, the unit of analysis has been the 
firm, not the agent.   
In contrast, the ethics literature identifies individual-level determinants of ethical 
decisions, of which opportunism is an example.  These factors are assumed to be 
embedded within and influence the ethical decision-making process.  Broadly, these 
factors include social, cultural, economic, organizational, characteristics of the moral 
issue, significant others, individual-difference variables, situations, and opportunity 
(Jones 1991).   Hence, when deciding whether to utilize an opportunistic tactic, 
individual agents employ all four types of factors:  buyer-supplier relationship-specific, 
environmental, individual difference variables (e.g., traits), and situational factors.  As 
evidenced, multiple broad categories of factors affect the decision-making process of an 
individual contemplating an act of opportunism.  While the ethics literature offers 
comprehensive theories of ethical decision making, it thus far has ignored buyer-
supplier relationship-specific factors.  “Management and business ethics scholars…do 
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not address [opportunism] in depth, if at all” (Romar 2004, p. 663).  Research on ethics 
in a business-to-business context appears scarce (Reid and Plank 2000).  And, while 
the marketing channels and supply chain literatures have thoroughly examined (and 
continue to examine) the inter-firm factors driving opportunism, they have generally not 
considered the individual-level factors.  Thus, a comprehensive examination involving 
all relevant factors is absent.  This conclusion was confirmed by Das (2006), who called 
attention to an inadequate awareness of the antecedents of opportunism.  By bridging 
this gap, tremendous opportunity exists to enhance our understanding of supply chain 
dynamics.   
Although research exploring the consequences of unethical behavior is scant 
(Baker et al. 2006), the same cannot be said for research on opportunism between 
firms.  Research has demonstrated the negative impact of opportunism on relational 
exchange norms such as trust, commitment, cooperation, and satisfaction (Morgan and 
Hunt 1994; Kwon and Suh 2005; Lee 1998; Joshi and Stump 1999).  Additionally, 
relational exchange tenets are known to improve firm performance (Skarmeas et al. 
2002; Gassenheimer et al. 1996).  Furthermore, perceptions of opportunism directly and 
negatively affect performance (Nunlee 2005; Parkhe 1993; Rindfleisch and Heide 
1997).   In lieu of the known negative effects of opportunistic behavior on buyer-supplier 
relationships and firm performance, to behave opportunistically seems illogical.  But the 
current literature offers little guidance.  Why agents choose to engage in opportunistic 
tactics with their exchange partners is unknown.   
A comprehensive examination driven by the goal of understanding why agents 
engage in acts of opportunism appears necessary, and should yield theoretically and 
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practically significant insights.  Understanding why opportunism occurs will reveal how 
to deter it, and this remains a gap in the literature (Luo 2006).  Such a comprehensive 
exploration is important to business in general, and to the sourcing discipline in 
particular.  Sourcing professionals are frequently responsible for forging and managing 
supplier relationships.  Firms generally source a large majority of their revenue volume 
to purchase goods and services (Monczka et al. 2002).  With such a critical role in the 
supply chain, sourcing is an optimal boundary-spanning activity from which to study 
opportunism.  Though the ethicalness of sourcing professionals increased during the 
1990s (Landeros and Plank 1996), their use of opportunistic tactics remains a concern 
(Robertson and Rymon 2001).  
The proposed conceptual model addresses this gap in understanding the use of 
opportunism by examining the psyche of sourcing professionals when contemplating 
opportunistic actions.  Ultimately, an individual, rather than an organization, 
contemplates and decides for or against opportunism. Thus, the unit of analysis within 
this study is the individual agent in the context of an exchange relationship.  Examining 
individual agents’ rationale and behavior may provide insight into both levels of 
opportunisms’ antecedents, individual and inter-firm.  Based on a review of the literature 
and discussions with industry practitioners, it is posited that relationship-specific factors, 
environmental factors, individual-difference factors, and situational factors (Beu et al. 
2003) drive sourcing professional’s decision process regarding whether to utilize an 
opportunistic tactic.   
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Problem Statement and Research Questions 
It is important to understand the factors that might influence a sourcing 
professional to engage in behaviors that: (1) represent the organization to the external 
public, and (2) affect relationships with other supply chain entities.  Opportunism is one 
such a behavior, a crucial one at that.  The problem with the body of knowledge, as it 
stands, is that we don’t know why sourcing professionals continue to engage 
opportunistic tactics despite the obviously negative consequences that are frequently 
associated with the behavior.  This lack of understanding gives rise to the following 
research questions:   
• What factors contribute to a sourcing professional’s decision to behave 
opportunistically?    
• Which factors are most determinant in sourcing professionals’ decisions to act 
opportunistically? 
• Do differences exist in the factors that predict strong-form versus weak-form 
opportunism?  
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to enhance our understanding regarding 
why sourcing professionals engage in opportunistic tactics with their suppliers.  Factors 
explored are identified in the conceptual model presented below.      
 
Conceptual Model 
Herein, a comprehensive model is proposed that explains the behavior of 
sourcing agents seeking to further the interest of their principal.  The model integrates 
multiple theories from the fields of psychology, economics, marketing, supply chain 
management, and management.  These theories include:  the path-goal theory of 
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leadership, firm culture, goal-setting theory, the theory of planned behavior, decision 
theory, trait theory, social exchange theory, dependency theory (power and conflict), 
and transaction cost economics.  The basic premise underlying the model is that a 
sourcing professional, in deciding to act opportunistically, deliberately weighs:  (1) their 
firm’s power position within the supply chain, (2) the extant relational norms governing 
the relationship with the particular supplier, and (3) the expected utility of the 
opportunistic behavior under consideration.  Subconsciously, sourcing professionals 
should be affected by environmental factors such as corporate ethical values, pressure 
to perform, and opportunistic behavior demonstrated by the sourcing professionals’ 
superiors.  Characteristics of the sourcing professional also should impact his or her 
decision.  These individual-difference variables include Machiavellianism, 
honesty/integrity, age, and years of experience.  Certainly, other factors may weigh on a 
decision to act opportunistically; however, for the sake of parsimony, factors were 
restricted to the critical few likely to explain the greatest variance.   
Opportunistic behavior is a moral issue.  “The complexity of doing research on 
moral motivation is that more than one determinant may be operating in a person at any 
given point in time, and therefore the researcher’s task is not to prove one theory right 
and all the others wrong, but to figure out how to assess the motive strength of a 
particular source (or sources) in a given situation” (Rest 1986, p. 14).  This explains the 
necessity of the breadth of the conceptual model.  Although it may appear broad, given 
the four overarching categories of factors and the few, necessary constructs in each 
category required to examine buyer-supplier dynamics in an ethical context, the model 
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should achieve a reasonable balance between parsimony and providing value-added 
explanatory power.   
FIGURE 1.1 
 




First, qualitative methods were employed to facilitate the development of the 
conceptual model.  A thorough literature review identified the underlying theories and 




































government and industry experts were conducted to reinforce and validate the principle 
constructs thought to drive opportunistic behavior.    
Following the qualitative effort, a survey of sourcing professionals was used to 
collect cross-sectional data for later quantitative analysis.  Purchasing is an ideal 
discipline in which to study opportunistic behavior due to its interaction with suppliers 
and frequency of negotiations.  The survey was deployed on the Internet.  The sample 
consisted of sourcing professionals who were members of the Institute of Supply 
Management (ISM) and members of the National Contract Management Association 
(NCMA), as discussed in Chapter III.  The ISM membership population consisted 
primarily of private-sector sourcing professionals.  Though the ISM population is ample 
to generate a sufficient sample, the additional sampling of NCMA members facilitated 
data collection from government sourcing professionals, a requirement of the proposed 
hypothesis testing.  The survey was pilot tested on a small sample to bolster construct 
validity.   
Since survey response rates are deteriorating (Larson 2005), data was collected 
via two methods.  First, a population was selected randomly from ISM’s and NCMA’s 
membership lists.  These sourcing professionals were invited, via email (with an 
embedded Web link), to complete the survey online.  The second method utilized a 
convenience sample.  An email directly invited purchasing executives of the United 
States-based Fortune 500 firms to support the research.  This email message 
requested their support in forwarding an invitation to complete the survey to all of their 
sourcing professionals.  This method increased generalizability by enabling the 
inclusion of sourcing professionals who may not be members of ISM or NCMA – to 
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include international buyers who may be members of non-U.S. based professional 
purchasing associations (e.g., Purchasing Management Association of Canada).   
Following data collection, latent constructs were assessed for reliability and 
validity.  Specific elements of validity were assessed such as construct validity, 
convergent validity, and discriminant validity.  Additionally, threats to validity such as 
non-response bias and socially desirable responding (SDR) were assessed.  Next, 
hypothesized relationships were tested using two logistic regression models, one for 
each of two hypothetical vignettes.  The use of vignettes is explained in Chapter III.  
Each vignette posed a question to the respondent whose response indicated his or her 
likelihood of engaging in an opportunistic act.  Either the respondent was likely to 
choose the act of opportunism or was not.  This design is well-suited for analysis using 
a logistic regression model.  Notwithstanding, this approach is commonly used in ethics-
related research (Street and Street 2006). 
  
Theoretical Implications 
This study of buyer opportunism is important to the disciplines of marketing, 
ethics, purchasing, and supply chain management.  The findings should enhance our 
understanding of buyer-supplier dynamics as people and organizations interact with 
situations.  Several implications for theory are at stake.  First, this research effort 
examines, in one study, literature streams known to impact ethical decisions in context 
of buyer-supplier relationships – ethics, individual difference variables, environmental 
factors, power, & relational norms.  Second, the study supplements TCE theory by:  (1) 
analyzing opportunism at the individual’s psyche level and (2) determining the factors 
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that lead to a decision to employ opportunistic tactics.  The identification of drivers of 
opportunism should help senior leaders forecast the behavior when they detect the 
emergence of these factors.  With this enhanced awareness of risk factors of 
opportunism susceptibility, leaders should be able to make more-informed decisions as 
to whether to insource or outsource a product or service.  Hence, more awareness of 
opportunism will facilitate a more accurate explanation of firm boundaries since, as 
predicted by TCE theory, defending against opportunism drives the costs of activities 
and is thus a major deciding factor in a make or buy strategy determination.  Third, this 
research supplements the ethics literature by considering buyer-supplier relationship 
factors - whose potential effects are presently unaccounted for in the ethics literature.  
Fourth, this dissertation examined, empirically, the distinction between strong and weak-
forms of opportunism (Luo 2006).  Fifth, the study demonstrated whether an 
environment of high performance pressure coupled with high buyer power can 
overcome ethical values prompting a sourcing professional to behave opportunistically.  
Finally, the study examined differences between government and for-profit-sector 
sourcing professionals with respect to their propensity to engage in opportunistic 
behaviors toward suppliers.   
 
Management Implications 
In addition to contributions to theory, the practices of sourcing and supply chain 
management will benefit.  First, the identification of the factors leading to opportunism 
helps decision-makers make more informed judgments of what should be insourced 
rather than outsourced.  Organizations will engage in monitoring and controlling 
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activities in an attempt to mitigate or prevent opportunism, and these activities increase 
the costs of transacting in the market (outsourcing).  A more accurate estimate of the 
probability of opportunistic behavior, given conducive circumstances, should yield a 
more accurate estimate of monitoring and control costs.  A more-informed decision 
should help decision makers to determine whether it is appropriate to make versus buy.  
Second, an understanding of individual factors that influence opportunistic behavior 
helps in hiring and assigning sourcing professionals to manage particular groups of 
company spend.  Non-critical spend is conducive to transactional governance; whereas, 
strategic spend is suitable to relational exchange.  Third, the identification of specific 
individual and situational factors driving opportunism helps sourcing professionals to 
manage supplier relationships by knowing which factors to monitor.  Hence, maintaining 
a pulse on these factors should increase the probability of relationship success.  Fourth, 
this study highlights the important role of developing ethical values in employees, and 
explicates the importance of corporate ethical values.  Fifth, this research highlights the 
impact of a stressful workplace on sourcing professionals’ decisions.  Finally, the study 
reveals how leaders’ opportunistic behaviors affect sourcing professionals’ decisions.   
 
Scope and Limitations 
This research design faced certain limitations – some due to methodological 
limitations, and others resulting from the complex nature of ethical behavior.  
Correlation-based analysis was used to identify relationships among constructs and 
variables.  Thus, statistically-inferred relationships served only as distant indicators of 
causality.  Another limitation pertains to the population of interest.  The study primarily 
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involved sourcing professionals based in the United States.  Generalizations thus are 
restricted to sourcing professionals from the United States.  Finally, cross-sectional 
survey data was relied upon.  This limits the findings to a particular point in time, and 
does not capture any fluctuations in relationships among constructs attributable to time.     
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter II describes 
the relevant literature surrounding opportunism and ethical decision making and 
behavior.  Underlying theories are identified and explained.  Additionally, relevant 
constructs are introduced and defined.  From this, logical and theoretically-grounded 
hypotheses are proposed that identify factors that will help explain buyer opportunism.  
Chapter III describes the research methods and sample to be used in testing the 
hypotheses.  Chapter III also discusses how constructs and variables were measured, 
and how they were determined to be reliable and valid.  Chapter IV presents the results 
of testing whether the hypothesized factors affect a sourcing professional’s likelihood of 
behaving opportunistically.  Finally, in Chapter V, results are discussed.  This discussion 
addresses the theoretical and practical implications associated with the findings.  The 




REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Opportunism is succinctly described as aggressive selfishness due to its guile 
component.  At worst, the use of opportunism is intended to cause harm; at best, it 
completely disregards the impact to others (Lai et al. 2005; Macneil 1981; Williamson 
1975).  Opportunism has also been defined to “include behavior contrary to a party’s 
implicit understanding of an exchange but not necessarily contrary to any explicit 
agreement, which leads to a transfer of wealth from one party to another” (Gundlach et 
al. 1995, p. 84).  This definition strays from the overt forms of opportunism to allow for 
more benign forms such as withholding information, misleading, distorting, disguising, 
obfuscating, and confusing information.   Wathne and Heide (2000) categorized four 
forms of opportunism into a 2x2 matrix in terms of whether the behavior is passive or 
active and whether the circumstance is new or existing.  They classify acts of 
opportunism as either “evasion,” “refusal to adapt,” “violation,” or “forced renegotiation.”   
Examples of opportunistic behavior toward stakeholders are found in the well-
known cases of Enron, Worldcom, and Adelphia.  Another example may be found in a 
fraud case involving a Manhattan jewelry supplier, Cosmopolitan Gem Corporation 
(CGM).   CGM deceived their lender, Capital Factors, Inc., by overstating their accounts 
receivables, and thus, defrauded Capital Factor’s holding company of $20 million (Bray 
2004).  Conversely, a less-obvious example of opportunism may be found in Wal-Mart’s 
treatment of its suppliers.  Consider its price squeeze on Vlasic for its gallon jar of 
pickles.  Although the increased sales boosted revenue for Vlasic, the lower price of 
$2.97 (forced renegotiation) eroded margins for Vlasic pickles by 25% (Murphy and 
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Laczniak 2006, p. 65).  Other fouls of opportunism from a procurement organization 
have been documented in the procurement realm.  For example, during a source 
selection and following the receipt of proposals, buyers have altered the selection 
criteria without disclosure to the prospective suppliers.  Additionally, a recent purchasing 
practice has unilaterally extended the payment terms from net 30 days to net 45 and 
beyond to the supplier’s cash-flow detriment (Arminas 2001).   
Wathne and Heide (2000, p. 40) posit that “for a given behavior to qualify for the 
opportunism label, there must be a norm in place, in the sense that the parties share 
expectations regarding subsequent behavior.”  Hence, if a norm of sharing information 
and timely adapting to changes is established between trading partners, then if one 
party suddenly refuses to either share or adapt, they could be accused of passive 
opportunism.   Such norms may originate from one’s ethics or moral standards. 
To explain and substantiate these positions, Chapter II is organized as follows.  
First, the conceptual model depicting the factors affecting a sourcing professional’s 
decision to either behave or not to behave opportunistically is illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
Next, the underlying theories that explain why and how the particular antecedents affect 
the decision-making process are presented.  Finally, each hypothesized relationship 
among constructs is identified and discussed.   
 
Theoretical Foundations 
Research investigating opportunism relies primarily on transaction cost 
economics (TCE) and relational exchange theory (Lai et al. 2005).  Additionally, theories 
of ethical decision making are pertinent to the research questions.  Thus, TCE, 
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relational exchange (encapsulated in social exchange theory), and ethical decision-
making theories are discussed next.   
 
Transaction Cost Economics 
Opportunism is an important phenomenon in exchange relationships.  It is one of 
two key behavioral assumptions underlying TCE, an interdisciplinary (Williamson 1981) 
and highly-influential theory of economic organization (Hill 1990).  “The theory is a blend 
of institutional economics and organizational and legal analysis” (Heide and John 1992, 
p. 32).  TCE theory explains the organization’s boundaries by examining the transaction 
as the unit of analysis.  Hence, when it is too costly to transact within the market (i.e., 
outsource), the firm will make the product or service in its own hierarchy.  What is 
considered “too costly” is not determined by market price; rather, it is a function of the 
costs of guarding against opportunism from trading partners.   
The other primary behavioral assumption of TCE is bounded rationality – the 
concept that there are limitations on human cognitions, and that humans cannot 
possibly know all the facts (Williamson 1980).  Hence, contracts cannot be written that 
cover all possible contingencies; they are always incomplete.  Thus, throughout the 
relationship, the parties will face opportunities to take advantage of one another – to 
behave opportunistically.  TCE theory suggests people will behave opportunistically 
when it is feasible and profitable (John 1984).  Thus, reliance on suppliers is costly in 
terms of opportunism prevention (e.g. supplier monitoring costs, performance bonds, 
contract formulation and negotiation costs).    
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Social Exchange Theory 
 While TCE views governance structures in terms of safeguarding against costs of 
opportunism, social exchange theory (SET) relies upon relationship interdependence 
that develops over time (Lambe et al. 2001).  Two tenets of SET follow “that parties 
enter into and maintain relationships with the expectation that doing so will be 
rewarding” and that “parties will remain in the relationship as long as satisfactory 
rewards continue” (Lambe et al. 2001, p. 12).   “[Business-to-business] relational 
exchange is motivated by the mutual recognition of the parties to the exchange that the 
outcomes of such exchange exceed those that could be gained from either another form 
of exchange or exchange with a different partner” (Lambe et al. 2001, p. 12).  Other 
tenets include the pinnacle roles of trust, commitment, cooperation, satisfaction, and 
relational norms that develop over time and tend to govern the relationship rather than 
reliance on written contracts (Heide and John 1992).  The establishment of norms is 
particularly important in SET due to its constraining effect on uses of power by 
exchange members.  These tenets of SET are firmly established by empirical research.  
Lambe et al. (2001), in their literature review of SET, identified 23 empirical studies 
involving either trust, commitment, dependence, satisfaction, norms, cooperation, or 
long-term orientation.  Finally, SET refutes universal opportunism.  Instead, humans will 
use discretion in deciding to behave opportunistically, and included in their evaluation 
processes are behavioral norms that have developed.  SET explains the continuous, 
satisfactory exchange relationships governed by something other than a contract.    
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Ethical Decision-Making Theory 
 Ethics concerns “inquiry into the nature and grounds of morality where the term 
morality is taken to mean moral judgments, standards, and rules of conduct” (Taylor 
1975, p. 1).   Morality provides the guidelines for resolving human conflicts and 
optimizing mutual benefit of societies (Rest 1986).  According to Beu et al. (2003, p. 88), 
“US business must be predicated on ethical business practices otherwise it would cease 
altogether.”  Sparks and Hunt (1998, p. 93) posit that “an ethical issue exists when a 
decision situation involves one or more alternative courses of action (including no 
action) that are differentially consistent or inconsistent with some formal or informal 
ethical rule, code, or norms.”   
Ethical decision making is a complicated subject (Beu et al. 2003) with roots in 
fundamental philosophical assumptions about human motivation and behavior.  
Differing philosophical assumptions drive different theories of morality.  Three such 
philosophies are utilitarianism, rights, and justice (Beauchamp and Bowie 1979).    
Fundamentally, moral theories differ based on two, and only two, factors: (1) whether 
there exist absolute moral standards of behavior (i.e., a definitive right and wrong) to 
guide decision-making, and (2) whether a moral decision should consider the 
consequences of the act.  The former is called deontological theory, whereas the latter 
is known as teleological (Beauchamp and Bowie 1979).  The teleological philosophy of 
utilitarianism posits that ethical decisions are those that provide for the greatest good to 
the greatest number.  However, this philosophy is plagued with controversy over whose 
greatest good should be sought.  Conversely, deontological philosophies such as rights 
and justice provide prescriptive rules to determine what is ethical.   
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One example is Kant’s categorical imperative.  Kant’s philosophy, at least in part, 
posits that human beings should never be treated solely as a means; rather, they 
should be treated as ends that have value in and of themselves.  Further, humans 
should only act such that their behavior could become a universal law - a law that 
upholds moral obligations and good will (Beauchamp and Bowie 1979).  Under this 
philosophy, there are no exceptions based on a particular situation.  If one chooses to 
deceive another, then in order to qualify as moral behavior, such deceit must be viewed 
as acceptable behavior from all people.  Consistent with its title, Kant’s philosophy 
applies to us all at all times, and thus is mandatory without exception.   
People often rely on different moral philosophies.  With differing moral 
philosophies, two individuals facing the same decision to make, under the same 
circumstances, may reach different conclusions.  For this reason, we might expect 
significant variance in decision making to exist across individuals and firms.  Further 
complicating the study of the effects of ethical decision making is the difference 
between what is (positive, or descriptive) and what ought to be (normative, or 
prescriptive).  Developing a defendable normative theory is difficult, particularly when 
considering a moral dilemma – situations where two or more moral principles are at 
odds and one must be sacrificed for the other, abound in both business and life.   
Normative theories face two additional challenges.  First, they are not designed 
to predict or explain.  Second, normative theories lack face validity (Trevino 1986).  A 
reconciliation of positive versus normative ethical theory is beyond the scope of this 
project.  Generally, however, in attempting to explain the greatest variance in ethical 
decision making, business researchers have gravitated toward the use of positive 
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theories (i.e., theories that describe what is decided versus theories that pontificate on 
what should be decided given an ethical situation).  This study follows suit by utilizing 
the positive approach.  
 
                                     Models of Ethical Decision Making 
Several situational, or contingency, models of ethical decision making have been 
presented in the marketing and management literatures (Rest 1986; Ferrell and 
Gresham 1985; Hunt and Vitell 1986; Trevino 1986; Jones 1991).  These contingency 
theories describe the decision as a process.  The ethical decision making process 
begins with consideration of environmental factors such as culture, industry, 
organization, personal, social, and economic.  These environmental factors affect the 
recognition of a moral issue, perceived alternatives, and consequences.  Next, an 
ethical judgment is decided as to what is right, wrong, and what should (or should not) 
be done.  An individual’s moral judgment is impacted by individual factors (e.g., traits, 
values, beliefs), situational factors (e.g., opportunities, rewards/punishments) and 
significant others (family, coworkers, leaders, organizational culture).  This judgment 
affects behavioral intentions which, in turn, drive behavior.  Researchers posit that 
situational, environmental, and individual constructs impact the moral judgment.  
Therefore, they adopt a compromise between the deontological and the teleological 
philosophies by accommodating both.  In fact, “any positive theory of ethics must 
account for both the deontological and teleological aspects of the evaluation process” 
(Hunt and Vitell 1986, p. 7).  Business ethics researchers acknowledge that humans are 
guided by certain intrinsic rules (e.g. norms, values, or beliefs) which are largely 
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culturally derived (Ferrell and Gresham 1985).  However, they also posit that humans 
are calculating and deliberate in their efforts, and that they consider the consequences 
of their actions.   
The contingency processes of ethical decision making provided by researchers 
(Ferrell and Gresham 1985; Hunt and Vitell 1986; Trevino 1986; Jones 1991), although 
containing idiosyncrasies, are similar.  For example, some models (Dubinsky and Loken 
1989; Hunt and Vitell 1986; Jones 1991) clearly fit within the ubiquitous decision-making 
framework of the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen 1991) whereby attitudes toward a 
specific behavior affect behavioral intentions.  These behavioral intentions, in turn, 
affect behavior.  Ajzen’s theory also considers how socialization affects decision making 
by positing that subjective norms (the decision makers’ assessment of how the people 
they care about will perceive the behavior) affect behavioral intentions.  The crux of 
Ajzen’s theory of planned behavior, previously titled the theory of reasoned action 
(Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), is that people consider the likely consequences of their 
behavior when making a decision.   
 
Ethical Sensitivity 
Another common denominator found in some of the ethical decision-making 
processes is that an individual decision maker must recognize that a situation involves 
an ethical issue (Rest 1986; Hunt and Vitell 1986; Jones 1991; Ferrell and Gresham 
1985).  There is significant variability among different individuals’ ability to recognize 
ethical issues, and this recognition is a function of the individual’s degree of ethical 
sensitivity (Sparks and Hunt 1998).  In Rest’s model, ethical sensitivity occurs in 
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Component 1 “Interpreting the Situation” (Rest 1986, p. 5) of his four-component model.  
Therein, an individual identifies alternative courses of action and considers the likely 
consequences of each alternative as they affect the interests, welfare, or expectations 
of each party involved.  Importantly, ethical sensitivity is a personal characteristic that is 
learned through socialization (Sparks and Hunt 1998). 
 
Ethical Judgment:  Cognitive Moral Development 
After recognizing a moral issue, the next stage of the decision-making process 
involves an ethical judgment.  One consideration of judgment is an individual’s level of 
cognitive moral development (CMD) (Jones 1991; Rest 1986; Trevino 1986).  The 
greater the CMD, the more likely an individual is to behave morally.  There are six 
stages of CMD (Kohlberg 1976) through which people develop sequentially:  (1) 
obedience and punishment orientation, (2) instrumental purpose and exchange, (3) 
interpersonal accord, conformity, mutual expectations, (4) social accord and system 
maintenance, (5) social contract and individual rights, and (6) universal ethical 
principles.  Each subsequent stage is cumulative; it encompasses its preceding stages.  
Most adults do not develop beyond stage four (Kohlberg 1976; Weber 1990).  According 
to Trevino (1986, p. 608), ”the [CMD] model provides a well-developed theoretical basis 
for understanding how individuals think about moral dilemmas and how thoughts and 
actions appear to be related.”  Since stages three and four of the CMD posit that 
managers look to others and to the situation to help determine what is right and wrong, 
and since most adults operate in these two stages, a contingency model of ethical 
decision making is likely to provide the best explanation of behavior.     
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 According to Hunt and Vitell’s (1986) model of marketing ethics, the ethical 
judgment stage in the decision-making process is where the trade-off between the 
deontological evaluation and the teleological evaluation is made.  Whether one 
evaluation will be more heavily weighted over the other is a function of the individual 
and the situation.  Similarly, in Rest’s model (1986), this reconciliation occurs in 
Component 3 where the individual prioritizes his or her values.   
All models examined identified internal and external factors that affect the ethical 
judgment as displayed in Table 2.1.   
TABLE 2.1 
Summary of Factors Affecting Ethical Judgments 
Model 
Factor Rest Hunt and 
Vitell 






Individual X X X X X X X 
  Knowledge      X X 
  Values X     X  
  Attitudes      X X 
  Intentions      X X 
  Ego Strength   X     
  Locus of Control   X  X   
  Field Dependence   X     
  CMD   X X X   
  Personality     X   
  Accountability   X  X   
  Compliance   X  X   
  Ethical Sensitivity X X      
Significant Others   X X  X X 
  Differential Association      X  
  Role Set Configuration      X  
Opportunity  X  X X X  
  Professional Codes      X  
  Corporate Policy     X X  
  Rewards/ Punishment  X   X X  

















Situation  X X X X   
  Reinforcement   X     
  Other Pressures   X     
  Normative Structure   
  (Culture)   X X    
  Role Taking   X  X   
  Resolution of Moral Conflict   X     
  Moral Intensity    X X   
 
Together, the components of these various models of ethical decision-making help 
researchers identify the pertinent phenomenon that should be considered in their 
examination.  What follows is a discussion of a subset of these factors.  The following 
factors are posited to be highly-relevant to a decision maker in the context of buyer-
supplier interactions.     
    
Buyer-Supplier Relationship Factors 
Buyer Power 
 
 Power is among the most significant phenomena in buyer-supplier relationships.  
It is defined as the ability to cause someone to do something that he or she would not 
have done otherwise (Gaski 1984).  Power emerges from its five sources:  coercive, 
reward, expert, legitimate, and referent (French and Raven 1959).  The four sources 
other than coercive power were later categorized into non-coercive power (Hunt and 
Nevin 1974).  Coercive power has to do with punishments; non-coercive power 
coincides with rewards.  The two types of power generally have opposite effects on 
other important constructs such as conflict and satisfaction (Gaksi 1984).   
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The effects of power vary depending on whether the power is exercised or not.  A 
firm that refrains from exercising available power earns favor from supply chain partners 
almost as if unexercised power is a form of cooperation.  A positive relationship exists 
between the amount of power attained and performance.  Some researchers (Cox 
2001) go so far as to suggest that power is at the heart of all business-to-business 
(B2B) relationships.  Evidence of its importance is the fact that the Institute of Supply 
Management (ISM) specifically warns its members to be cognizant of their power 
position and to use it ethically (Principles and Standards of Ethical Supply Management 
Conduct, ISM ).   
Power and dependence are two sides of the same coin (Gaski 1984).  Emerson 
(1962) first examined these constructs and concluded that the power of A over B is 
equal to, and based on, the dependence of B on A, which is:  (1) directly proportional to 
B’s motivational investment in goals mediated by A and (2) inversely proportional to the 
availability of those goals to B outside A-B relation.  The most-frequently studied 
construct affecting opportunism is dependence.  Dependence may be defined as 
existing when the rewards sought and received in a relationship are not available 
outside the relationship (Lambe et al. 2001; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Several studies 
(Provan and Skinner 1989; Ping 1993; Anderson 1988; Rokkan et al. 2003; Joshi and 
Arnold 1997; Achrol and Gundlach 1999; Deeds and Hill 1998; Joshi and Stump 1999; 
Lai et al. 2005) found relationships between forms of dependence and opportunism.   
Following TCE, one factor that contributes to dependence is a transaction- 
specific asset (TSA), a non-transferable investment whose utility is unique to a specific 
relationship.  Forms of TSAs include site specificity, physical asset specificity, and 
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human asset specificity (Williamson 1980).  Essentially, TSAs create a lock-in situation 
among trading partners that reduces the investor’s propensity to behave 
opportunistically, yet simultaneously putting them at risk to opportunism from their 
trading partner via hold-ups.     
    Situations of dependence give rise to power.  Power is included in the 
conceptual model herein, but dependence is not.  Since the underlying construct power 
is included, dependence is not examined directly.  For the sake of parsimony in an 
otherwise complex ethical topic, the concept of dependence is captured in the 
examination of power.  Power has been found to affect inter-firm opportunism (Lothia 
1991; John 1984).  Where power is symmetric, unethical behavior will be reduced 
(Brass et al. 1998).  Extending this, it is reasonable to expect that given a power 
imbalance, unethical behavior will increase.  As such, 
H1:  There is a positive relationship between buyer power and a sourcing 
professional’s decision to behave opportunistically. 
   
Relational Norms 
Relational norms “are expectations about behavior that are at least partially 
shared by a group of decision makers” that ”have been shown to govern individual 
exchange relationships between firms” (Heide and John 1992, p. 34).  Such norms are 
multi-dimensional, typically operationalized as solidarity (common responsibilities and 
interests), mutuality (mutual benefit and trust), flexibility (good faith modification), role 
integrity (dyadic roles extend beyond transactions), and harmonization of conflict 
(attempt to reach mutually-satisfactory compromise) (Gundlach et al. 1995).    
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Research shows that relational norms reduce opportunism (Gundlach et al. 1995; 
Achrol and Gundlach 1999; Brown et al. 2000; Joshi and Stump 1999; and Lai et al. 
2005).  Achrol and Gundlach (1999) found that while asymmetric resource investments 
create an incentive for opportunistic behavior from the under-vested party, social 
safeguards (i.e., relational norms) suppressed opportunism more effectively than did 
contractual safeguards.  This finding reinforces the limitations of TCE theory due to its 
silence on relational matters.   
Anderson (1988) and Rokkan et al. (2003) found support for the role of TSAs in 
driving opportunism; however, the strength of the relationship varied by norms of 
solidarity and by the expected duration of the relationships.  Where relationships are 
weak in norms of solidarity, TSAs promote opportunism from the asset receiver.  
However, according to Rokkan et al. (2003, p. 221), “in relationships characterized by a 
strong norm of solidarity, specific investments actually decrease the receiver’s 
opportunism.”  Furthermore, from a buyer’s perspective, the effect of TSAs on 
opportunism became negative as the expectation of the relationships’ continuance into 
the future strengthened.  Consequently, a buyer’s tendency to act opportunistically 
should lessen as expectations of a long-term relationship increase.     
Joshi and Arnold (1997) examined the impact of buyer dependence on buyer 
opportunism under varying levels of relational norms.  Their research found that 
dependence positively related to opportunism under conditions of low relational norms.  
Conversely, dependence decreased opportunism in the presence of high relational 
norms.  Firms sharing high relational norms exhibited a willingness to:  (1) react to 
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contract changes in good faith; (2) freely and continually exchange information; and (3) 
strive for the benefit of the relationship rather than individual interests.     
Similar findings have been reported in the ethics literature.  Where a relationship 
is strong, unethical behavior will be reduced (Brass et al. 1998).  Therefore, it is posited 
that: 
H2:   There is a negative relationship between relational norms and a sourcing 




 Firms do not make decisions or behave; rather, they are represented by a 
conglomeration of decisions and behaviors of their agents.  Therefore, when examining 
opportunism among firms, consideration of an individual employees’ perspective is 
necessary.  These employees are likely affected not only by inter-firm factors, but also 
by their immediate environment - characteristics of their own organization.  Hosmer 
(1987, p. 441) termed these “structural causes” and “managerial processes,” based on 
the premise that employers can increase unethical behavior by influencing an 
employee’s motivation toward self-interest.  Hence, the firm’s structure and processes 
such as reward systems, pressure to perform, and compensation (Derry 1989) can 
motivate employees toward unethical behavior that benefits the firm, and subsequently, 
by benefiting the firm, rewards trickle down to the employee.  Attention now turns to 
these structural factors.  
 
Corporate Ethical Values 
 The ethical context of the organization is an important environmental factor 
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expected to affect individuals’ judgments, attitudes and behaviors.  This concept has 
been explored and operationalized under different - and somewhat overlapping - 
constructs.  For example, some researchers examine organizational culture, whereas 
others explore organizational climate.  Some studies are more tailored to ethics by 
examining either ethical culture, ethical climate, or corporate ethical values (CEV).  An 
overview of these constructs follows.  
Organizational culture is a significant phenomenon affecting employee behavior 
and firm performance (Deshpandé et al. 1993).  It represents a firm’s history, norms, 
and values, and is shaped by its employees’ beliefs, expectations, and behaviors 
(Deshpande and Webster 1989).  According to Trevino et al. (1998, p. 452), 
“organizational culture is thought to provide direction for day-to-day behavior.”  In 
contrast, organization climate is an individual’s assessment of the congruency between 
the organization’s expectations and actual behavior (Deshpande and Webster 1989).  
These constructs have been tailored to the ethical context of the organization, 
represented by ethical culture and ethical climate.  Ethical climate characterizes 
“organizations in terms of broad normative characteristics and qualities that tell people 
what kind of organization this is - essentially what the organization values” (Trevino et 
al. 1998, p. 453).  In contrast, ethical culture is a more tangible manifestation of the 
ethical climate.  Ethical culture entails the organization’s formal and informal control 
systems such as rules, codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and reward systems 
(Trevino et al. 1998).   
Clearly, these constructs are not synchronized.  For instance, Deshpande and 
Webster’s (1989) conception of organizational culture seems to resemble the tailored 
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ethical climate.   Furthermore, the construct organizational climate seems to differ 
greatly from the tailored ethical climate construct.  These deviations may be due to 
origins in separate academic disciplines such as marketing and organizational behavior.  
Nonetheless, “questions remain about how best to conceptualize the ethical context of 
organizations and its relationship with attitudes and behaviors” (Trevino et al. 1998, p. 
470).  For the sake of parsimony, another construct is introduced that is likely to 
sufficiently represent the organization’s ethical context - the firm’s CEV.   
One important aspect of corporate culture is the firm’s ethical values (Hunt et al. 
1989; Trevino et al. 1998).  CEVs represent the amount of attention afforded to ethical 
issues by the firm, and the degree to which the firm behaves ethically (Hunt et al. 1989).  
They can be manifested in firm policies, processes, codes of conduct, employee 
compensation and recognition systems (Baker et al. 2006), the words and actions of 
authorities, and the degree of enforcement of policies and codes (Trevino and Ball 
1992).  Even the motivational art work lining the walls of common areas may convey 
CEV.  Anything that communicates norms or expectations of behavior, intended or 
unintended, may constitute CEV.   
Firms often develop and publish codes of ethics.  Additionally, it is not 
uncommon to find procurement functions within firms that publish procurement-specific 
codes of ethics or ethics policies.  A 2004 study by ISM showed that 83% of 952 
respondents abide by a formally endorsed set of standards of ethical conduct (Social 
Responsibility and the Supply Management Profession:  A Baseline Study 2004).  The 
public sector is regulated more extensively.  From the Procurement Integrity Act (41 
U.S.C. 423) to the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Defense Department’s 203-
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page Joint Ethics Regulation, federal sourcing professionals are responsible for 
extensive content of many statutes, regulations, and policies.   
Likewise, many professional associations, particularly those serving the 
purchasing discipline such as ISM, the Purchasing Management Association of Canada 
(PMAC), and the National Contract Management Association (NCMA), publish codes of 
ethics.  Some are sparse (Code of Ethics, NCMA), while others are specific (Principles 
and Standards of Ethical Supply Management Conduct, ISM).  Only the PMAC explicitly 
prohibits dishonest and misleading behavior, and prescribes penalties to violating 
members (Code of Ethics, PMAC).   
Admitting that gray areas exist in these codes, Schildhouse (2005) apportioned 
responsibility to companies to clearly delineate right from wrong.  She also called on 
firms to share their ethics standards with suppliers.  One industry report stated that only 
11% of firms provide ethics training to their suppliers (MAPI Survey 2004).  With this 
variance in guidance, we might expect a similar variance in behavior of associations’ 
constituents.   
Codes of ethics may not be effective suppressants of unethical behavior (Allen 
and Davis 1993).  Allen and Davis (1993) contend that the firm’s ethical culture, 
including punishments and rewards for (un)ethical behavior, is a better predictor of 
behavior than is a code of ethics alone.  These aspects of ethical culture are well-
represented by Hunt et al.’s (1989) construct, CEV.          
The theory of planned behavior (Ajzen 1991) partially explains how CEVs 
eventually affect employee behavior.  According to Ajzen, behavior results from 
behavioral intentions.  Intentions are affected by three phenomena:  (1) attitude toward 
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the behavior, (2) subjective norms, and (3) perceived behavioral control.  Based on an 
individual’s behavioral beliefs about the likely consequences of the behavior, an attitude 
toward the behavior is formed that is either favorable or unfavorable.  However, this 
attitude does not act alone in driving behavioral intentions.  A decision maker also 
examines his or her ability to perform the anticipated behavior.  Additionally, an 
individual considers how others are likely to view the behavior if he or she were to 
engage in it.  These subjective norms are a result of normative expectations of others.  
CEVs, developed over time through communications and actions of firm authorities, 
likely shape these expectations that others have of the individual.  Simply stated, if the 
firm communicates expectations of ethical behavior, and punishes those violating the 
previously communicated expectations, then others will eventually expect everyone to 
behave ethically.  When an individual contemplates a certain questionable behavior, he 
or she will consider what others expect him or her to do.  These expectations of others 
can curtail an intention to behave unethically, even though the individual: (1) has the 
ability to perform the behavior and (2) has a favorable attitude toward it.  This theory of 
reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) has been empirically supported in the 
context of ethical decision making (Dubinsky and Loken 1989).   
CEVs are important because the level of CEVs affects ethical judgments 
(Douglas et al. 2001) and ethical behavior (Baker et al. 2006) of employees.  CEVs also 
positively relate to employee commitment to the firm (Hunt et al. 1989).  This is 
important because employee commitment also leads to ethical behavior (Baker et al. 
2006).  Due to the close proximity of the definition of organizational climate and the 
operationalization of CEVs (Hunt et al. 1989), the effects of organizational climate 
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should not be excluded from this discussion of outcomes.  Organizational climate can 
reduce deviant behavior of employees (Boye and Jones 1997).  It decreases the 
frequency of use of deceptive tactics because a known organizational climate clarifies 
an otherwise gray area as to what behavior is acceptable and what is not (Aquino 
1998).  According to Loe et al. (2000, p. 187), “culture and climate have been found to 
be pervasive in influencing and adapting organizational ethics.”   
Given this wide variance in codes of ethics and enforcement, variances in 
employee behavior should be expected.  The presence of variance has given rise to a 
separate construct in ethics research, that of ethical ambiguity.  Ethical ambiguity 
represents the amount of uncertainty that an individual has with respect to their daily 
behavior in endeavoring to be ethical on the job (Robertson and Rymon 2001).  With the 
known effects of corporate culture, corporate climate, and corporate ethical values, 
coupled with variance in their magnitudes across firms, we should expect that:    
H3:   There is a negative relationship between corporate ethical values (CEV) and 
a sourcing professional’s decision to behave opportunistically. 
 
Pressure to Perform 
Another environmental factor affecting a sourcing professional’s decision to 
behave opportunistically is pressure to perform.  Often, conflict arrises between time, 
personal resources, personal capabilities, and the demands of the job making the 
individual’s work objectives extremely difficult or even unattainable (Grover 1993).  
Employees are repeatedly told to do more with less.  In 1997, the Ethics Officer 
Association and the American Society of Chartered Life Underwriters and Chartered 
Financial Consultants conducted a survey on workplace pressures (Petry et al. 1999).  
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Sixty percent of respondents reported feeling a substantial amount of pressure on the 
job.  Of all industries, manufacturing reported the highest level of pressure to act 
unethically or illegally.  This is ominous for the purchasing function, as much of the input 
(e.g. raw materials or components) into a manufacturers’ goods and services are 
procured from suppliers.  In the study, 20% of mid-level managers felt a high degree of 
pressure to behave illegally or unethically.  The study identified over 24 unethical or 
illegal actions taken in response to workplace pressure.  The most frequent actions 
include:  cutting corners on quality control, cover ups, abused sick days, deceived 
customers, pressured others, falsified reports, deceived superiors, withheld important 
information, and misused company property.   
The purchasing function is particularly susceptible to such pressures due to its 
direct and visible impact to firm profits by mitigating the costs of supplies and services.  
Under excessive pressure to deliver results, employees may be willing to compromise 
personal values to meet organizational demands (Brenner and Molander 1977; 
Robertson and Rymon 2001; Posner and Schmidt 1987).  This effect may be more 
severe among lower-level and more-junior managers.  Schweitzer et al. (2004) found 
that people with unmet goals were more likely to behave unethically than those who 
were simply trying to do their best.  As junior and middle managers struggle to climb the 
career ladder attempting to achieve unmet goals, they may find themselves in moral 
conflicts (Posner and Schmidt 1987), situations where personal values disagree with 
organizational values.   
Paradoxically, the same organization that attempts to create and sustain CEVs 
may also encourage unethical behavior by demanding extremely high performance 
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outcomes of its employees (Robertson and Rymon 2001).  This problem is likely 
magnified when considering that in many work process designs, a single focal outcome 
is outside of the control of any single employee.  These findings suggest that under 
extreme pressure to perform, junior and middle managers may be susceptible to using 
opportunistic tactics.  Notwithstanding, research has shown that perceived pressure to 
perform results in a greater use of deception by purchasing agents, regardless of the 
severity of the deception (Robertson and Rymon 2001).  Additional evidence may be 
found in a study of ethics of 1,245 supply professionals conducted by ISM.  Therein, 
pressure to perform was identified as a potential barrier to ethical behavior.  A related 
barrier that surfaced was an organizational culture that focused on short-term, bottom-
line gains (Ethical Practices, Drivers & Barriers:  Supply Professionals and Their Peers 
Weigh In 2006).   As such: 
H4:   There is a positive relationship between pressure to perform and a sourcing 
professional’s decision to behave opportunistically. 
 
Leadership Opportunistic Behavior 
Horvath (1995) suggested that leadership may be able to bridge organizational 
behavior and ethics.  Executive purchasing and supply chain leaders are very likely to 
influence sourcing professionals’ decisions.  Extending the concept presented in House 
and Mitchell’s 1974 article, “The Path-Goal Theory of Leadership,” leadership 
opportunistic behavior is defined as the extent to which executive decision makers 
support and promote the use of opportunistic tactics in supplier relationship 
management.  House and Mitchell (1974) explain that influencing behaviors 
demonstrated by leaders affect a follower’s motivation.  Influencing behaviors are 
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characterized as directive, supportive, participative, or achievement-oriented.  The 
leader identifies the subordinate’s behavior (path) most likely to lead to the desired 
rewards (goals), and then reinforces it with demonstrative behavior.  Leadership 
opportunistic behavior might consist of explicit direction to sourcing professionals, 
communicating expectations, and aggressive goal setting (commonly referred to as 
stretch goals).   Schweitzer et al. (2004) found that goal setting can cause unethical 
behavior when employees fail to meet the goals.   
Research on corporate ethics may explain the leader’s willingness to influence 
subordinates to compromise ethics.  Two surveys of business people, one by Baumhart 
(1968) and a replication by Brenner and Molander (1977), found that one of two key 
drivers of unethical behavior was the behavior patterns of leaders.  Brenner and 
Molander (1977) found that most of those surveyed felt the greatest responsibility 
toward their customers - more so than toward their shareholders and employees.  Thus, 
leaders may walk over employees and suppliers for the ultimate benefit of the 
downstream customer.  A separate study (Badenhorst 1994) ranked the behavior of 
company’s managers as the number one factor affecting unethical decisions.  
Notwithstanding, research shows that a decision maker’s motivation to comply with 
referent others (e.g., company leaders) affects his or her decision (Dubinsky and Loken 
1989).  Similarly, research found that obedience to authority is a solid predictor of 
unethical conduct (Trevino et al. 1998).  These findings inspire the following proposition: 
H5:   There is a positive relationship between leaders’ opportunistic behavior and 





The use of opportunistic tactics may be a function of the business sector in which 
a sourcing professional works.  Business-to-business exchange has been thoroughly 
studied in the marketing channels literature, but very little is known about marketing to 
the government (Reid and Plank 2000).  Nonetheless, evidence of the nature of 
government procurement and how it might differ from industry procurement may be 
found by examining the underlying structure of each type of procurement.  Government 
procurement is highly regulated via federal contracting statutes (e.g., the Competition in 
Contracting Act of 1984) and regulations (e.g. the Federal Acquisition Regulation) that 
discourage either close or long-term relationships with suppliers.  The expected long-
term duration of the relationship between a buyer and supplier decreases opportunism 
(Joshi and Stump 1999; Jap and Anderson 2003; Johnson et al. 1996; Gundlach et al. 
1995).  The numerous regulatory boundaries encircling government procurement 
encourage a perspective of discrete transactions versus relational exchange (Webster 
1992; Dwyer et al. 1987).  Furthermore, government procurement’s rigidity devalues, 
and in many cases explicitly prohibits, the principle tenets of buyer-supplier relations 
such as durability, consistency, expansion, trust, and commitment (Dwyer et al., 1987; 
Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  Since these relational norms are: (1) structurally suppressed 
in government procurement, and (2) prevalent among for-profit business relationships, 
and since these norms reduce opportunism, it is not unreasonable to conclude that 
government sourcing professionals overall might tend to think and behave more 
opportunistically than their industry counterparts.  This may seem counterintuitive due to 
the government sector’s lack of a profit motive; however, evidence suggests otherwise. 
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If government sourcing professionals behave opportunistically, evidence of such 
behavior should exist.  Traces of opportunism should be found in both pre-award 
(supplier selection) and post-award (contract administration) interactions with bidders 
and suppliers.  In search of some preliminary support, the researcher investigated bid 
protests decisions issued by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).  Bid 
protest cases examined were decided between January, 2004 and October, 2006 and 
included only decisions that were sustained.  Hence, the source selections reviewed 
were only those where an impropriety in the sourcing process was discovered.  
Between 2004 and 2005, an average of 22% of federal government bid protests were 
sustained (GAO Bid Protest Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 2005).  
From a listing of sustained bid protests obtained from the GAO, the researcher reviewed 
79 sustained bid protest decisions.  Of those 79, 16 (20.3%) involved overt opportunistic 
behavior by the buyer (federal agency).  Opportunistic behavior demonstrated included:  
withholding information, misrepresenting, dishonesty, cheating, shirking obligations, 
cover ups, disguising preferences, and deceit.  Reference Appendix A for details 
associated with each source selection.  There is little doubt that this investigation was 
imperfect.  However, bid protests qualified as involving opportunistic behavior only 
where the behavior was readily apparent in the language of the GAO ruling.  Thus, 20% 
represents a conservative count of what, in reality, is likely to be a more-frequent 
occurrence.   
Further evidence that government sourcing professionals may behave more 
opportunistically may be found in their education and training.  A direct excerpt from a 
U. S. Department of Defense acquisition training course provided by the Defense 
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Acquisition University (DAU) - a flagship formal education and training system for the 
government - advises contract managers as follows. 
(1)  Never volunteer information that would weaken your negotiating position or 
enhance the bargaining position of the contractor.  Although this rule is only 
common sense, it is often overlooked because most people are candid and 
forthright by nature.  Be honest but be careful.  Honesty and ethical behavior are 
always paramount in any government negotiating session. However, you do not 
have to be dishonest to avoid volunteering weaknesses. (DAU n.d.) 
(2)  [Y]ou can use patience to increase the stress on the contractor’s negotiator 
(DAU n.d.) 
While an ample amount of other DAU course material espouses the benefits of honesty, 
collaboration, relationships, and win-win strategies with suppliers, these excerpts 
encourage withholding information and applying pressure - both types of opportunism 
that potentially may cause distrust.      
Given the rich theoretical support coupled with the empirical evidence of (1) 
opportunistic behavior in source selection processes revealed during bid protests and 
(2) the nature of government procurement education and training content, it is 
reasonable to posit that: 
H6:   Overall, government sourcing professionals are more likely to behave 




 Rest (1986, p. 1) contends that “morality is rooted in the social condition and the 
human psyche.”  Just as environmental factors are likely to affect a decision to behave 
opportunistically, so too are individual-difference factors such as personality traits 
(Knouse and Giacaolone 1992).  Of all factors examined empirically, individual 
difference factors have been the most frequent (Loe et al. 2000).  The following 
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discussion substantiates investigation of the effects that personal values - 
Machiavellianism and honesty/integrity - may exercise on a sourcing professional’s 
choice to behave opportunistically toward his or her supplier.  The possible influence of 
other personal characteristics - age and experience - is explored.  
Values play an important role in ethical decision-making (Hunt and Vitell 1993; 
Moser 1988; Glover et al. 1997; Steenhaut and Kenhove 2006).  Values are “the 
individual’s prescriptive beliefs concerning the desirability of certain modes of conduct 
or end-states of behavior” (Glover et al. 1997, p.1320).  Values affect attitudes (Finegan 
1994; Mowen and Minor 2001), and attitudes influence behavior (Finegan 1994; Ajzen 
1991).   
Moral-related individual differences “may influence choice of ethicality of action” 
(Razzaque and Hwee, 2002, p. 309).  We may expect significant differences in values 
across different people (Finegan 1994; Glover et al. 1997) because individuals prioritize 
different values based on their unique experiences and culture (Rokeach 1973).  This 
point is reinforced by McDevitt and Van Hise (2002, p. 261) who derived several 
“spheres of influence” on an individual’s belief system.  Included were the workplace, 
the legal system, religion, profession, community, and family.  Since values are: (1) 
difficult to change (Landeros and Plank 1996), (2) similar to attitudes that predict 
behavior, and (3) different across individuals, they likely offer a source of explanation of 
behavior and are researchable.  ISM’s study on ethics identified employee values as 
potential antecedents to lower levels of deceitful practices (Ethical Practices, Drivers & 
Barriers:  Supply Professionals and Their Peers Weigh In 2006).  Due to their 
unquestionable influence on ethical decision making, scholars urged the inclusion of 
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values in ethics research (Hunt and Vitell 1993).   The specific values explored in this 
study were Machiavellianism and honesty/integrity. 
 
Machiavellianism 
In contrast to the previously postulated individual value, some values are not so 
virtuous.  Machiavellianism represents an amoral means of manipulating others in order 
to achieve one’s objectives (Hunt and Chonko 1984).  Qualifying behaviors include 
aggression, manipulation, exploitation, and deviousness (Calhoon 1969).  
Machiavellianism has achieved the status of a personality trait.  Those high in 
Machiavellianism (high Machs) will tend to persuade others more, and be persuaded 
less.  Thus, more often than not, they will win.  They also attempt to manipulate others 
more (Christie and Geis 1970), and are less easily detected when lying (Geis and Moon 
1981).  High Machs, in general, disregard accepted moral principles (Hunt and Chonko 
1984).  They perceive ethical issues as less serious than do low Machs (Singhapakdi 
and Vitell 1990).  However, high Machs are not reckless sociopaths.  Rather, they are 
more-accurately represented as people who remain emotionally detached from others 
(Singhapakdi and Vitell 1990).  They simply prioritize what they believe to be important, 
and remain detached to ease decisions that significantly and negatively impact other 
people. 
Several empirical studies have found relationships between Machiavellianism 
and unethical behavior (Hegarty and Sims 1978; Verbeke et al. 1996; Beu et al. 2003).  
Since ethics is concerned with what is morally right, based on fairness, rights, justice, 
and respect for others (Beauchamp and Bowie 1983), and since Machiavellianism is 
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based on psychological egoism (self-interest maximization), Machiavellianism is anti-
ethical.  As such, Machiavellianism and opportunism should coincide.  Therefore, it is 
posited that:   
H7:   There is a positive relationship between a sourcing professional’s 
Machiavellianism and his or her decision to behave opportunistically. 
 
Honesty & Integrity 
On a personal level, everyone must answer the following question: What is my 
highest aspiration?  The answer might be wealth, fame, knowledge, popularity, or 
integrity.  But if integrity is secondary to any of the alternatives, it will be 
sacrificed in situations in which a choice must be made. Such situations will 
inevitably occur in every person's life.  (Smith and Smith 2003, p. 5) 
  
One important value is honesty/integrity, an individual’s beliefs about the way he 
or she ought to tell the truth and do what he or she thinks is right (Ravlin and Meglino 
1987).  An individual’s honesty/integrity has been found to affect his or her moral 
judgment (Finegan 1994; Landeros and Plank 1996).  People who value honesty higher 
than average are more likely to perceive a given situation as immoral (Finegan 1994).  
These findings coincide with the deontological philosophy of ethics where absolute 
moral standards are developed then used in decision-making. 
Hopwood (1976) identified the dilemma faced by employees whose ethical 
values conflict with formal or informal codes of conduct expected by the employer.  
According to McDevitt and Van Hise (2002, p. 264), “if business decisions must be 
made in a setting of conflicting signals from top management, other interested parties, 
and personal beliefs, responsibilities and aspirations, then ethical dilemmas arise.”  
These dilemmas may pressure employees to compromise their personal standards 
(Bowman 1976; Carroll 1975).  Nonetheless, one means to resolve the cognitive 
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dissonance caused by an ethical dilemma in the mind of a conscientious individual is to 
simply choose not to engage in the questionable behavior (Moser 1988).  However, not 
everyone agrees; some people choose to rely upon deceptive practices rather than 
upon honesty.  There exists a plethora of variation on people’s reliance on honesty 
(Provis 2000).  Therefore, it is posited that:  
H8:  There is a negative relationship between a sourcing professional’s 
honesty/integrity and his or her decision to behave opportunistically. 
 
Buyer Age  
Age consistently relates positively to ethical decision making (Loe et al. 2000; 
Ruegger and King 1992).  In similar findings, older workers interpret ethical standards 
more strictly (Serwinek 1992), and, in general, have greater ethical concern (Vitell and 
Muncy 1992).  Notwithstanding, younger individuals are more Machiavellian than their 
elders (Hunt and Chonko 1984).  As an explanation of these findings, younger 
individuals may be driven more by self-interest.  They are more focused in the pre-
conventional stage of the cognitive moral development (CMD) model (Rest 1986) where 
the focus is on consequences.  Multiple studies supported by two meta analyses have 
found convincing evidence that moral judgment changes with age (Rest 1986).  
Younger individuals simply have not had the opportunity to mature and learn to respect 
societal norms or intrinsic values.  Younger individuals will be more inclined to use 
deceit to obtain power (Grover 1993).  Therefore:  
H9:   Younger sourcing professionals are more likely to behave opportunistically 
than are older sourcing professionals. 
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Years of Experience 
 A previous literature review revealed mixed findings with respect to the 
relationship between work experience and ethical decision making (Loe et al. 2000).  
Vitell and Hunt (1990), in a test of their general theory of marketing ethics, found that 
the number of years of experience in one’s current position moderated the relationship 
between deontological evaluations and ethical judgments.  Glover et al. (1997) found a 
relationship between years of work experience and higher degrees of ethical behavior.   
Years of experience may also serve as a surrogate for CMD.  According to Rest (1986), 
specific experiences do not affect moral judgment per se.  Rather, individuals mature 
over time such that they can discern their place in the social world.  This broad 
awareness, informed by many experiences, impacts moral judgment.  The greater the 
experience, the more apt an individual is to have developed context-specific, personal 
morals about how interactions with suppliers should be conducted.  These morals that 
guide behavior regardless of consequences are found in stages five and six of the CMD 
model.   
H10:  Less experienced sourcing professionals are more likely to behave 




 Notwithstanding buyer-supplier relational factors, environmental factors in the 
firm, and individual-difference factors, the characteristics of the situation at hand are key 
considerations during ethical decision-making.  In fact, often, the expected outcomes of 
decisions (i.e., the situation) supplant one’s personal values as the most reliable 
predictor of behavior (Allen and Davis 1993).  Hence, people tend to compromise their 
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values depending on the consequences at stake in a particular situation.  As such, any 
model of ethical decision-making should include consideration of the situation at hand.  
One effective measure of the situation is subjective expected utility (SEU).  
  
Subjective Expected Utility 
The corporate purchasing function is driven by results.  In light of the fact that 
manufacturers typically spend 55% of their revenue on purchased goods and services 
(Monczka et al. 2002), the purchasing function has a material impact on the firm’s 
bottom line.  The criticality of its outputs, coupled with the elevated, strategic nature of 
strategic sourcing (Ellram and Carr 1994; Ellram and Siferd 1998; Kraljic 1983) make 
procurement highly visible to firm leadership and key stakeholders.  With so much 
attention on work outputs, sourcing professionals concentrate their behaviors toward the 
most probabilistic and rewarding outcomes.  This calculated decision making is 
predicted by expectancy theories of motivation (Vroom 1964).   
Concepts from the “rational cheater” model of motivation found in employer-
employee relations may offer insights into behaviors.  Therein, “employees will be 
opportunistic whenever they perceive that the marginal benefit of [opportunism] exceeds 
the marginal costs” (Nagin et al. 2002, p. 852).  Researchers have documented the 
effect of opportunity on ethical decisions (Zey-Ferrell et al. 1979).  The influences of 
costs, benefits, and opportunities are represented well in the ethics literature.  Several 
positive models of ethical decision making suggest that individuals evaluate the possible 
consequences during their processes of making choices (Hunt and Vitell 1986; Jones 
1991; Ferrell and Gresham 1985; Ajzen 1990).  This consideration of consequences 
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boils down to a cost-benefit analysis of the decision by the decision maker - all within a 
particular situational context.   
One theory of situational analysis dealing with costs and benefits is subjective 
expected utility (SEU) (Kamat and Kanekar 2001), a concept derived from behavioral 
decision theory (Edwards 1954; Fischhoff et al. 1981).  As a stand-alone decision 
theory, SEU holds that individuals will choose alternatives that provide the maximum 
expected value (i.e. the one that will maximize his or her gain) (Gray 1975; Mitchell and 
Biglan 1971).  Hunt and Vitell’s (1986) general theory of marketing ethics incorporates 
SEU, which is a product of the desirability of a consequence and the probability of its 
occurrence (Kamat and Kanekar 2001; Nettles and Bayton 2001).  The SEU of a choice 
is expressed as: 
SEU = P1U1 + P2U2 + ...+ PnUn, 
where P represents the assessed probability of an event occurring and U represents the 
magnitude of the positive or negative utility of the consequence (Gray 1975).    
Both of these components of SEU affect moral judgments.  Consequences need not be 
restricted to economic measures; emotional consequences may also be accommodated 
by SEU (Kamat and Kanekar 2001).  SEU, because of its tractability and simplicity, is a 
preferred model of decision-making under conditions of uncertainty (Lo 2000).  It has 
been applied both as a normative guide for decision prediction and a positive theory to 
explain decisions.   
SEU is not without its critics (Frisch and Clemen 1994; Fischhoff et al. 1981).  It 
has received scrutiny as a stand-alone theory of decision making.  In this model, a 
stand-alone approach is not posited.  Instead, SEU is depicted as a factor integrated 
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into the larger conceptual model (Figure 2.1).  SEU has been successfully and validly 
applied to empirical ethics research (Farrington and Knight 1979).  Researchers 
(Holmstrom and Beach 1973) concluded that decisions can be decomposed into 
probabilities and utilities.  Furthermore, subjects are capable of rating their perceived 
utilities and indicating their subjective probabilities of realizing those utilities (Holmstrom 
and Beach 1973).  Therefore, SEU is a useful construct in ethical decision-making 
(Kamat and Kanekar 2001).   
The business press is replete with examples of how opportunistic tactics result in 
at least short-term gains.  Empirical evidence also shows that negotiators operating in 
an ethical climate achieved less favorable outcomes than those not working in an 
ethical climate (Aquino 1998).  Since opportunism results from perceived positive utility, 
and due to SEU’s empirical support in decision theory and in Hunt and Vitell’s (1986) 
model of marketing ethics, it is posited that:       
H11:  There is a positive relationship between subjective expected utility and a 
sourcing professional’s decision to behave opportunistically. 
 
Types of Opportunism and Moral Intensity  
The next hypothesis posits distinctions between strong-form and weak-form 
opportunism.  However, prior to discussing these types of opportunism, an 
understanding of another concept - moral intensity - is necessary.  The following 
discussion proceeds in this fashion by first explaining moral intensity, then by discussing 
the various forms of opportunism that have been introduced in the literature. 
The Issue-Contingent Model of ethical decision making (Jones 1991) introduces 
another consideration to the ethical decision-making process, the characteristics of the 
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ethical issue itself.  The main thrust of this model is based on an empirical finding that 
marketing managers behave more ethically as the negative consequences of the 
behavior become more severe (Fritzsche and Becker 1983), a finding supporting the 
teleological view of ethical decision making.  According to Jones (1991), moral issues 
differ on six dimensions of moral intensity.  The differences in these six dimensions 
affect individuals’ ethical decisions.  Dimensions include:  (1) probability of effect, (2) 
concentration of effect, (3) social consensus, (4) magnitude of the consequences, (5) 
temporal immediacy, and (6) proximity.  The probability of effect is accounted for in the 
model’s construct subjective expected utility; thus, it merits no further elaboration.  
Additionally, the concentration of effect seems to be a nuance of the magnitude of the 
consequences; thus, it will be subsumed in the discussion below of the latter component 
of moral intensity.   
Social consensus is the degree of public agreement that a proposed act is bad or 
good.  This corresponds to organizational culture factors in Trevino’s (1986) model.  In a 
business-to-business relationship context, social consensus encompasses what the 
parties accept as norms of behavior.  For example, if during negotiations, both parties 
fully expect the other to withhold information (an example of weak opportunism), then 
this behavior is more acceptable and consequently has a lower moral intensity.      
In addition to social consensus, the magnitude of the consequences affects 
ethical decision making (Weber 1996).  That consequences matter supports the 
teleological evaluation of moral judgment.  Weber (1990) found empirical support for 
differences in levels of reasoning depending on the type of moral issue presented.  As a 
possible explanation for this finding, Weber posited that moral issues encountered in an 
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employment context (versus a personal context) tend to evoke lower stages (Kohlberg 
1976) of moral reasoning.  Alternatively, Weber suggested that independent of the 
employment context, the severity of the consequence alone may account for the 
different levels of moral reasoning.  Based on his finding, Weber called for additional 
research to explore whether there is a “hierarchy of moral issues” (Weber 1990, p. 699).   
Additionally, temporal immediacy, the time it takes for consequences to 
materialize, is significant (Jones 1991).  If during negotiations, a sourcing professional 
alters the facts slightly and never expects this to be discovered, then the temporal 
immediacy may be indefinite.  The resultant moral intensity would be reduced.   
Likely the most significant dimension of moral intensity in the context of sourcing 
professionals’ behavior is proximity.  According to Jones (1991, p. 376), “the proximity 
of the moral issue is the feeling of nearness (social, cultural, psychological, or physical) 
that the moral agent has for victims (beneficiaries) of the evil (beneficial) act.”  
Particularly in transactional relationships where relational norms (e.g., trust, 
commitment, cooperation) exist at lower levels - if at all - the supplier may be viewed by 
the buyer as distant.  Consequently, moral intensity, ceteris paribus, may be low.  Beu 
et al. (2003, p. 91) stipulated that “If the focal individual perceives that the organization 
really needs his/her help in order to achieve a powerful organizational goal, then s/he 
will be more likely to evaluate the ethical issue in terms of the magnitude of the 
consequences and the proximity of those affected by the decision.”  
Differences in moral intensity have important implications to the ethical decision-
making process.  First, moral intensity affects whether an individual recognizes a 
situation as involving ethics (Jones 1991).  Therefore, the decision-making schemata 
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activated may bypass ethical considerations where moral intensity is low (Jones 1991).  
Second, moral intensity may affect the moral judgment of an individual.  The six 
dimensions of moral decision-making affect how important an individual perceives a 
moral issue to be.  According to Jones (1991, p. 392), “people generally behave better 
when the moral issue is important than they do when it is unimportant.”  Thus, as the 
level of moral intensity of an issue differs, we can expect different decisions.       
Jones’ model has received ubiquitous empirical support (Singhapakdi et al. 1996; 
Beu et al. 2003; Douglas et al. 2001; Morris and McDonald 1995; Vitell et al. 2003; 
DeConinck 2004; Leitsch 2006; Weber 1996; Paolillo and Vitell 2002).  Further support 
for differing effects for differing levels of moral intensity may be found in a comparison of 
buyers’ and sellers’ perceptions of ethical behaviors (Inks et al. 2004).  Buyers and 
sellers are more sensitive to direct deceit than to indirect deceit.  Additionally, buyers 
were found to be less ethically sensitive to their own use of deceitful behaviors 
compared to similar behavior initiated by the seller.     
Wathne and Heide (2000) provided a qualitative review of opportunism’s forms, 
outcomes, and solutions.  Their review ignored the ethics literature and relied instead on 
the marketing and economics literatures covering relational exchange and TCE 
theories, respectively.  Notably, within this theoretical realm, they posited a difference in 
types of opportunism - classified as either active or passive.  Active opportunism 
involves contract (written or unwritten, social) violations and forced renegotiations; 
whereas, passive opportunism entails evasion or refusal to adapt to changing situations.  
Although the line of demarcation between the two was indicated only via examples and 
not directly explicated, presumably the difference hinges on the activity of the 
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perpetrator.  If the perpetrator deliberately commits an act of opportunism, it is said to 
be active.  If, however, opportunism occurs from inaction, it is said to be passive.  For 
each type of opportunism, Wathne and Heide (2000) identified associated positive and 
negative consequences to both exchange members in terms of effects on revenues and 
costs.  It is unclear whether one or the other form of opportunism results in more severe 
negative consequences.  While this distinction may be useful for classifying types of 
opportunism, its theoretical underpinnings are clouded.  Hence, we do not know the 
significance of classifying opportunism this way. 
A more promising conceptual distinction recently emerged.  Luo (2006, p. 121) 
classified opportunism as either “strong-form (Type I)” or “weak-form (Type II).”  The 
differences between the two forms are clear, and grounded in SET as well as Jones’ 
theory of moral intensity (1991).  Strong-form opportunism violates explicit contractual 
agreements (terms and conditions); whereas, weak-form opportunism violates unwritten 
(but understood) relational norms.  The distinction in Luo’s (2006) taxonomy may be 
found in how the opportunistic actor views the consequences.  Strong-form opportunism 
violates a legally-binding contract thereby affording formal remedies to the victim.  
Weak-form opportunism, conversely, offers no formal remedy.  However, due to its 
impact on trust (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Kwon and Suh 2005), commitment (Gundlach 
et al. 1995), and cooperation (Morgan and Hunt 1994; Joshi and Stump 1999), these 
violations may result in consequences as bad as, or perhaps worse than, those 
associated with strong-form opportunism, particularly over the long term.  Nevertheless, 
consequences of weak-form opportunism are cloaked and may appear to be less of an 
immediate threat (Luo 2006).  Furthermore, they may not be easily traced to a specific 
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infraction.  Therefore, accountability of the actor may appear reduced.  Hence, the actor 
may perceive a latitude to use weak-form opportunistic tactics without putting the firm at 
immediate risk, explicitly.   
It is appropriate, now, to synthesize the concepts of moral intensity and types of 
opportunism.  Moral intensity will not be measured and tested per se; rather, it is relied 
upon as a theoretical basis to explain why Luo’s (2006) distinction between strong and 
weak opportunism may indeed be observed in buyers’ uses of opportunistic tactics.  
Two dimensions of moral intensity are particularly revealing, social consensus and 
temporal immediacy.  Since violations of contracts are understood to bring clear 
manifestations of distributive justice (e.g., lawsuits), it is likely that the social consensus 
of peers will be unfavorable.  In contrast, the ramifications resulting from violations of 
weak-form opportunism (violations of relational norms) are unknown.  Thus, the social 
consensus of peers should be much less intense.  Furthermore, since the ramifications 
of contractual violations include clear distributive justice, the temporal immediacy of the 
ramifications is somewhat known.  In contrast, the timing of any ramifications of weak-
form opportunism (violations of relational norms) is unclear.  In fact, the ramifications 
themselves are unknown.  Together, these two dimensions of moral intensity suggest 
that weak-form opportunism should be perceived by sourcing professionals as less 
morally intense than is strong-form opportunism.  As such, it is posited that: 
H12:  It is expected that the significant predictors of strong-form opportunism will 
be different than will be the significant predictors of weak-form opportunism.   
 
 
Government sourcing professionals will be more apt to believe that the contract 
represents the totality of the agreement, and discount the existence of unwritten 
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contractual terms.  The sanctity of the contract coupled with the structurally-inhibited 
relational norms suggests that government sourcing professionals will not behave 
opportunistically where the contract is violated, but are inclined to do so where the 
contract is not violated.  Therefore,  
H13:  Government sourcing professionals are less reluctant than are private-
sector sourcing professionals to engage in weak-form opportunism. 
 
 
 Government procedures and regulations are centered on ensuring contractors 
are treated fairly and according to the contract.  Justice is a central tenet.  Therefore, it 
is posited that: 
H14:  Government sourcing professionals are more reluctant than are private-
sector sourcing professionals to engage in strong-form opportunism. 
 
In this chapter, the relevant literature was reviewed providing support to the 
conceptual model introduced in chapter one.  Factors that best explain a sourcing 
professional’s decision to engage in opportunistic behavior emerged and directional 
hypotheses were developed.  Similar to prior studies of channel relationships and 
ethics, factors were grouped as either relationship-specific, environmental, individual-
difference variables, or situational.  Chapter III will explicate precisely how the research 




 This chapter addresses the qualitative and quantitative methods employed in an 
attempt to address the research questions posed in Chapter I, and more specifically, the 
hypotheses posed in Chapter II.  The discussion begins with an overview of the 
research design.  Next, the procedure for accessing the target population of sourcing 
professionals is discussed.  Following a discussion of the sample, the process of 
developing the questionnaire is explained to include how constructs were measured.  A 
procedure for ensuring integrity of the research, including reliability and validity, is 




In order to better understand the phenomenon of opportunism, the study 
commenced with a basic qualitative inquiry.  Qualitative research is appropriate where 
the objective is to describe, interpret, verify, and/or evaluate (Peshkin 1993).  Rather 
than a complex description or interpretation of phenomenon, the purpose of the 
qualitative portion of this mixed design (Creswell 2003) was twofold.  First, it was used 
to verify what was suggested by the diverse streams of literature (i.e. channels, ethics, 
and decision-making).  Hence, the researcher sought an answer to the question:  “In 
deciding whether to act opportunistically, are sourcing professionals simultaneously 
affected by buyer-supplier relationship factors, organizational environment factors, 
individual-difference factors, and situational factors?”  Additionally, the qualitative 
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approach sought, in an exploratory fashion, to understand to what extent ethics theory 
explains buyer behavior.  Second, the qualitative interviews were used to enhance the 
succeeding survey-based quantitative research.   Since the subsequent survey used 
vignettes to position respondents into a decision-making context, and since original 
vignettes had to be developed, the interview participants helped to improve the quality 
of the vignettes.  The following discussion first outlines the interview process employed.  
Next, the results of the theoretical portion of the interview are synopsized.  The results 
of the vignette reviews are presented later under the sub-heading manipulation check. 
 
Interview Design 
A convenience sample of four well-qualified professionals was selected for the 
semi-structured interviews.  Participants were deemed qualified due to their years of 
sourcing experience and breadth of procurement types (i.e., dollar values, types of 
product and services, and complexity).  Because one aspect of the research was to 
examine differences in opportunistic behavior among government and for-profit sourcing 
professionals, sourcing professionals holding positions in procurement in government 
and for-profit organizations (two each) were chosen to participate.  One participant, with 
seven years of experience, worked for a large Fortune 500 firm in the logistics services 
industry purchasing direct and indirect materials and services.  The other for-profit 
participant who had 16 years of experience worked for a small distributor purchasing 
passive, connector and electromechanical components.  One government participant, 
with 25 years of experience, worked for a small procurement group purchasing supplies, 
services, and construction in support of one U.S. Air Force installation. The other 
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government participant, with 10 years of experience, worked for a large procurement 
group contracting for a multi-billion dollar weapon system acquisition.   
 Interviews were conducted via email, telephone, and face-to-face.  First, a set of 
structured questions (Appendix B) were provided.  Participants provided written 
responses to the questions.  Following receipt and review of responses, participants 
were engaged in follow-on dialogue for further clarification and elaboration.  The follow-
up communication occurred by a combination of email, telephone, and face-to-face 
sessions.  Note that the word opportunism was not presented until the conclusion of the 
interview when participants were debriefed as to the purpose and scope of the 
research.   
 As expected, all four participants believed that ethics is an important topic in 
procurement.  When asked why they held this belief, respondents commented: 
• “Good ethics is the foundation of a good working relationship.” 
• “Ethics establishes the foundation for appropriate business practices and 
sourcing methods.  Without ethics, objectivity and fair decision making are 
not part of procurement.” 
• “The general public depends on US military and government workers to 
uphold the highest levels of ethical standards.  If we don’t exercise sound 
ethics in procuring goods and services to support our national security, we 
would not have, nor deserve, the respect of our citizens.” 
• “You should be honest, fair and impartial in your dealings with suppliers to 
promote mutual success and prolonged business relationships.” 
Similarly, when asked, all four participants affirmed that a buyer’s choice of tactics used 
in communicating with suppliers can be an ethical decision.  Participants were then 
asked to consider the list of tactics found in Table 3.1, and state whether the tactic is 
bad, somewhat bad, or whether it depends on the situation.  Additionally, participants 
were later asked whether each tactic is considered an ethical issue.   Finally, they were 
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asked whether they believed that anyone will engage in the tactics if the stakes are 
sufficiently high.  Table 3.1 displays the results.  A noticeable difference emerged 
between participant numbers one and four versus participants two and three, with 
participants one and four clustering closer toward virtuosity.  These two seemingly 
different camps of participants each included a government and a for-profit business 
sector, and they included disparate levels of experience and different genders 
suggesting that other factors may better account for the differences in attitudes.   
Situational factors such as subjective expected utility (SEU) emerged from two 
participants’ statements:  “I believe all of the examples of ethical issues you’ve listed 
can be considered questionable.  The extent of their impact would mainly be determined 
by the circumstances of their use,” and “Each [tactic] is open for interpretation based on 
the situation.  The [tactics]…could vary from ethical to gray to unethical depending on 
the situation.”  Furthermore, one participant emphasized an aspect of SEU - magnitude 
of the consequences to others - when questioned about what factors he considers when 
making an ethical decision.  He also stated that he would consider his individual key 
values suggesting that, in addition to SEU, individual-difference variables (personality 
characteristics) might account for variance in the decision to behave opportunistically.  
Another participant added that he would consider organizational policy and how the 
decision might be viewed by management and the legal department.  Finally, one 
participant proclaimed the “golden rule” as the sole consideration when facing an ethical 
decision - do unto others as you would have them do unto you.     
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TABLE 3.1 
Participants’ Attitudes Towards Opportunistic Tactics 













Lying 1,2,3,4   1,2,3,4 2,3 
Stealing 1,2,3,4   1,2,3,4 2,3 
Cheating 1,2,3,4   1,2,3,4 2,3 
Breach of contract 1,4  2,3 1,2,3,4 2,3 
Dishonesty 1,3,4 2  * * 
Distorting data 1,2 3,4  * * 
Obfuscating issues 1 2,3,4  * * 
Confusing transactions 1,2 3,4  * * 
False threats 1,2,4  3 1,4M 1,2,3,4 
False promises 1,3,4 2  * * 
Cutting corners 1 2,3,4  * * 
Cover ups 1,2,3,4   1,2,3,4 2,3 
Disguising attributes or 
preferences 
1,3 2,4  * * 
Withholding information 2  1,3,4 1M,2,3M,
4M 
1,2,3 
Deception 1,2,3,4   1,2,3,4 2,3 
Misrepresentation 1,2,3,4   * * 
Using a situation to further 
own interest at supplier’s 
expense  
1,4 3 2 * * 
Exaggerating damage 
caused by the supplier  
1,2,4 3  * * 
Not willing to adapt 
contract to changes  
4  1,2,3 * * 
Not sharing information 
with suppliers 
2  1,3 * * 
Altering the facts slightly in 
order to get what you need  
1,3,4 2  1,3,4 2,3 
Shirk contractual obligation 1,2,3,4   1,2,3,4 2,3 
Neglect responsibilities 
when supplier is not likely 
to notice  
1,2,3,4   * * 
Violate an unwritten 
understanding with a 
supplier 
* * * 1,2,3,4 2,3 
*Information Not Solicited 
M = Maybe 
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A final round of questions asked participants whether they believed that the 
constructs hypothesized in Chapter II might influence an individual to use opportunistic 
tactics listed in Table 3.1.  Table 3.2 summarizes the results.  Overall, there is some 
support that each construct may be involved in decisions to behave opportunistically.  
Two inquires regarding individual-difference variables, in general, and Machiavellianism, 
specifically, were unanimously supported.   
TABLE 3.2 
Participant’s Beliefs About Hypothesized Factors 
 Tally of Participants 
Construct Will Influence Decision To 
Use Tactic 
Will Not Influence Decision 
To Use Tactic 
SEU II II 
Pressure To Perform I III 
Leadership Opportunism I III 




Machiavellianism IIII  
     
In summary, a sufficient amount of dissonance emerged across interviews - in 
some cases confirming and in others, refuting hypotheses.  However, any refutations 
were not unanimous.  These results warranted further investigation as to the source of 
variance.  Notwithstanding, within single interviews, some inconsistencies emerged.  
For instance, the same individual that reported:  “You should be honest, fair and 
impartial in your dealings with suppliers…” also stated in a follow-up conversation that:  
“A good buyer is a good liar.”  Another participant stated:  “I believe in doing what’s right 
and legal regardless of the professional or personal outcome,” but in the very next 
question, agreed that the magnitude of the payoff (benefit) of using the tactics in Table 
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3.1 might influence the decision to use those tactics.  These contradictions suggested 
the presence of socially-desirable responding.  This situation poses a threat to validity 
that will be addressed later in this chapter.  
   
Quantitative 
An experimental design best establishes causality due to its assurance of the 
following principles:  (1) temporal precedence, (2) a relationship between the cause and 
the effect, (3) the elimination of alternative plausible explanations, and (4) that the 
cause should never occur without the presence of the effect (Cook and Campbell 1979).  
However, laboratory experimental conditions involving relationships among firms or 
government agencies are not plausible.  An alternative approach employs vignettes to 
represent reality.  However, this design would be confounded in a model exploring 11 
independent variables.  A completely randomized factorial design of 11 independent 
variables with at least two levels each (e.g., high and low) would require at least:  211 = 
2,048 treatment combinations.  Such a design would be untenable in terms of managing 
the experiment and the required sample size per treatment group.        
 Rather than an experiment, this research employed a multivariate statistical 
model using cross-sectional survey data in order to test the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter II.  The hypotheses were tested using two logistic regression models, one for 
each of two hypothetical vignettes.  Logistic regression is the multivariate procedure of 
choice where the dependent variable is categorical and involves only two groups (Hair 
et al. 1998).  Logistic regression can accommodate non-metric and metric independent 
variables - both of which are characteristic of the research at hand.  One vignette will 
 61
represent strong-form opportunism and the other will represent weak-form opportunism.  
To measure the dependent variable, each vignette posed a question to the respondent 
whose response was a probability (on a scale of one to eight) that he or she would 
engage in the opportunistic behavior.  As in Glover et al. (1997), the probability scale 
was converted to a binary variable via median split.  This research design permits a 
multi-variate analysis of indicators of a sourcing professional’s likelihood of behaving 
opportunistically.   
The use of hypothetical, realistic vignettes in ethics research is not only 
commonplace (Hunt and Vitell 1986; Ameen et al. 1996; Street and Street 2006; Beu et 
al. 2003; Glover et al. 1997), but is urged (Hunt and Vitell 1993).  Additionally, the use of 
scenarios in combination with logit models is routine.  Due to the non-linear nature of 
the dependent variable, this study is well-suited for analysis using a logistic regression 
model.  Reference Figure 3.1 for a graphical representation of the logistic regression 





Logistic Regression Model of Factors Affecting A Sourcing Professional’s  





The targeted population included purchasing practitioners from private and public 
sectors, with the individual buyer as the unit of analysis.  Chapter I explained how 
sourcing professionals are optimally suited for research on opportunism due to the 
criticality of procurement to firm performance, and their key boundary-spanning role.  
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for Supply Management (ISM) and the National Contract Management Association 
(NCMA), and by directly contacting sourcing executives in Fortune 500 firms and in 
government buying agencies.   
 
Questionnaire Design and Construct Measurement 
Approximately 90% of empirical studies of business ethics published in academic 
journals rely upon self-report data (Randall and Gibson 1990).  This research design 
followed suit, utilizing cross-sectional survey data.  The research design utilized, 
therefore, was consistent with accepted practice in the discipline. 
Latent constructs measured with the survey instrument included:  relational 
norms, buyer power, corporate ethical values, pressure to perform, leadership 
opportunistic behavior, honesty/integrity, Machiavellianism, and subjective expected 
utility.  Additionally, the survey captured other key variables such as business sector, 
age, and experience.  Notwithstanding, several demographics were collected.  Each 
latent construct was assessed using multiple items (questions) in order to maximize the 
reliability of variable human inputs (Churchill 1979).  These items originated from 
existing scales that have been successfully employed in previous research.  In order to 
ensure content validity, the survey items were reviewed by industry experts and 
academicians to ensure that they capture the universe of the meaning of the 
phenomenon (Kerlinger and Lee 2000).  Each survey item pertaining to a latent 
construct was assessed on a seven-point Likert-type scale.  The survey instrument is 
displayed in Appendix D.   
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In the following section, the measures for each latent construct are presented.  
Each will be described to include the rationale for its use and previous research utilizing 
the measure.  Reliability of each construct will be reported from studies using the 
construct.     
 
Decision to Behave Opportunistically 
The dependent variable, Decision To Behave Opportunistically, is measured 
using a single item asking the respondent, given a vignette and a chosen buyer-supplier 
relationship, to indicate the probability that they would behave opportunistically.  This 
“embedded vignette approach” was employed by embedding a hypothetical situation 
into the context of a real buyer-supplier relationship of the respondent’s choosing.  The 
benefit of “embedding” the vignette into an existing buyer-supplier relationship is the 
ability to:  (1) simplify the research design, and (2) reduce the length of the vignette and 
the survey.  The research design was simplified because the different levels of the 
relationship-specific independent variables (relational norms and buyer power) did not 
have to be manipulated experimentally.  Rather, the researcher relied on the natural 
and realistic variability inherent in existing buyer-supplier relationships.  Rather than 
having multiple vignettes with different combinations of treatment levels of relational 
norms and buyer power, information regarding those constructs need not be provided in 
the vignette if embedded naturally.  Therefore, the length of the vignettes was abridged.  
A shorter survey helps maximize the response rate (Dillman 2000).   
Many studies in ethics research (Ameen et al. 1996; Street and Street 2006; Beu 
et al. 2003; Glover et al. 1997) utilize hypothetical, realistic vignettes in order to facilitate 
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decisions by the respondent.  Those decisions are commonly used as the dependent 
variable in a model whose results are intended to explain the decision.  As used in this 
study, the dependent variable is a response to a question of whether or not the 
respondent’s closest coworker in purchasing would likely choose to behave 
opportunistically.  The response represented a dichotomous choice; either the 
respondent was likely to choose the act that is considered opportunistic or not.   
Recall that the second objective of the qualitative interviews was to critique a set 
of three draft vignettes, two of which would be used in the survey.  The final two 
vignettes are found in Appendix C.  The eliminated vignette follows. 
Your organization has recently experienced a cash-flow crisis, and therefore, 
cash flow has become an important emphasis by senior leadership in all 
functional areas.  Each employee is expected to help improve the cash-flow 
crisis.  You could help by altering the payment terms in the contract with Supplier 
X. Currently, the contract states that payment terms are net 30 days, but you 
consider contacting Accounts Payable (or Finance) and advising them not to pay 
invoices until at least 60 days from receipt of the invoice.  Your annual spend 
with Supplier X is substantial.  Over the course of a year, your firm’s delayed 
payments to Supplier X will likely cost them $300,000 in borrowing costs and lost 
short-term investment opportunities. 
 
While the situation presented in this vignette is common in for-profit business practice, 
one of the government interview participants pointed out that it would be uncommon in 
government contracting.  Thus, the vignette was removed from further consideration.  
The remaining vignettes were reviewed by the four interview participants.  All four 
concluded that the two remaining vignettes were easy to read and understand.  Three of 
the four participants stated that the vignettes did not take too much time to read.  These 
essential characteristics helped ensure:   (1) reliability of survey respondent inputs and 
(2) little impact to the response rate due to excessive survey length.   
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Buyer-Supplier Relationship Factors 
Buyer Power  
Power is defined as the ability to cause someone to do something that he or she 
would not have done otherwise (Gaski 1984).  Buyer power was measured using the 
operationalization of Bunn (1993), and is presented in Table 3.3.  Scale items capture 
the salient indicants of power such as negotiating strength, competition, and sacrifice.  
Many other measures of power have been used in research; however, these typically 
drill down to the distinct types of power.  For example, French and Raven (1959) 
differentiated power as coercive, referent, expert, legitimate, or reward.  A later 
distinction made by Hunt and Nevin (1974), classified power as either coercive or non-
coercive.  However, power, as measured in previous research pertaining to inter-firm 
relationships and opportunism, was conceptualized using a general measure of power.  
This general measure of power attempted to measure an organization’s amount of 
leverage over the other party.  This measure most appropriately captures the domain of 
power as intended by Gaski’s (1984) definition above.  Previous research demonstrated 
the measure’s construct validity and reliability, as reported in Table 3.3.   
TABLE 3.3 
Buyer Power Measure 
Items Source 
1. We had much bargaining power in this purchase situation. 
2. The suppliers were really competing to make this sale to us. 
3. The vendor we chose gave us a better deal than most of their other 
customers. 
4. The supplier was really motivated in making this sale to us. 
5. In terms of our negotiating strength, we didn't have much "clout." (R) 
Bunn (1993); 
Alpha=0.81 
(R) Reverse coded. 
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Relational Norms 
 Relational norms are shared expectations about behavior that govern future 
behavior among firms (Heide and John, 1992).  There are many types of relational 
norms, and researchers have selectively employed various types in their research 
designs.  These multi-dimensional norms are typically operationalized as solidarity, 
mutuality, flexibility, role integrity, and harmonization of conflict (Gundlach et al. 1995).   
Several researchers (Gundlach et al. 1995; Gundlach 1999) have reliably combined a 
variety of norms into a single construct.  This scale (Table 3.4) was selected for use due 
to its reliability demonstrated in previous studies, and due to its ability to capture a 
variety of norms (flexibility, role integrity, harmonization of conflict, mutuality and 
solidarity). 
TABLE 3.4   
Relational Norms Measure  
Items Source 
1. Staying together in the face of adversity/challenge is very important to 
both firms. 
2. Relationship is based on mutual benefit and trust. 
3. Relationship is flexible in accommodating one another if special 
problems/needs arise. 
4. Relationship extends across many complex responsibilities and multiple 
tasks. 
5. When disagreements arise in the relationship, all facts are reassessed to 
try to reach a mutually satisfactory compromise. 
Gundlach et al. (1995), 




Corporate Ethical Values  
Corporate ethical values (CEV) represent the amount of attention afforded to 
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ethical issues by the firm, and the degree to which the firm behaves ethically (Hunt et al. 
1989).  Whereas other scales have been developed to measure similar constructs such 
as organizational culture (Deshpande et al. 1993) and organizational climate (Victor and 
Cullen 1987), only one study (Hunt et al. 1989) has developed a scale to specifically 
measure corporate ethical values.  CEV, as measured by Hunt et al. (1989), assesses 
three aspects of corporate ethics:  1) the (un)ethical behavior of managers, 2) the 
degree of management’s concern about ethical issues in the firm, and 3) whether 
(un)ethical behavior will be (punished) rewarded (Hunt et al. 1989).  Scale items used 
by Hunt et al. (1989) are shown in Table 3.5.  Hunt et al. (1989) achieved a sufficient 
level of reliability in their sample (Cronbach’s alpha 0.78).   
TABLE 3.5   
Corporate Ethical Values Measure 
Items Source 
1. Managers in my company often engage in behaviors that I consider to 
be unethical. (R) 
2. In order to succeed in my company, it is often necessary to 
compromise one's ethics. (R) 
3. Top management in my company has let it be known in no uncertain 
terms that unethical behaviors will not be tolerated. 
4. If a manager in my company is discovered to have engaged in 
unethical behavior that results primarily in personal gain (rather than 
corporate gain), he or she will be promptly reprimanded. 
5. If a manager in my company is discovered to have engaged in 
unethical behavior that results primarily in corporate gain (rather than 
personal gain), he or she will be promptly reprimanded. 
Hunt et al. (1989); 
Alpha=0.78 
(R) Reverse coded 
 
Pressure to Perform  
Pressure to perform represents internal and external motivators to achieve 
challenging performance results.  The challenge is derived from a situation that 
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demands more resources than the individual employee perceives as being available.  
The concept is similar to job stress, but is distinct from physical ailments such as 
burnout or other measures more closely associated with traumatic incidents.  Rather, 
pressure to perform represents a work environment where negative consequences 
result from a failure to meet the employers’ expectations.  The construct attempts to 
capture the employee’s perspective that the pursuit of the employers’ expectations is 
perpetual.  Robertson and Rymon (2001) measured pressure to perform using the first 
three items appearing in Table 3.6.  Two additional items were added to the scale in an 
effort to enhance its reliability. 
TABLE 3.6 
 Pressure to Perform Measure  
Items Sources 
1.  My firm has made it clear that I am expendable if I don’t deliver. 
2.  My compensation is directly tied to my performance. 
3.  I won’t last long in my job if I don’t perform. 
4.  In my job, I feel stressed by the requirement to deliver results. 
5.  My job is very demanding. 







Leadership Opportunistic Behavior  
Leadership opportunistic behavior represents perceptions by employees of their 
leaders’ propensity to behave opportunistically.  Indicators of the leaders’ propensity to 
behave opportunistically include:  observing the leaders’ committed acts of opportunism 
toward suppliers, the leaders’ direction to subordinates to treat a supplier 
opportunistically, or a leader’s expressed advice of what he or she would do if placed in 
a similar situation.  The scale used to assess leadership opportunistic behavior (Table 
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3.7) is modified from two common scales used to assess opportunism (Ping 1993; Joshi 
and Stump 1999).  The alteration to the scale is subtle; rather than assessing the 
individual’s own opportunism, the same questions are asked about the leader.                
TABLE 3.7  
Leadership Opportunistic Behavior Measure  
Items Sources 
1. My leaders use situations to further their own interests at the expense of 
a supplier using whatever means. 
2. My leaders exaggerate the extent of the damage caused to us by the 
supplier in order to extract concessions from them.   
3. My leaders are not willing to make adjustments to a contract with a 
supplier in order to cope with a temporary crisis. 
4. My leaders do not volunteer much information regarding their business 
to their primary suppliers. 
5. Sometimes, my leaders alter the facts slightly in order to get what they 
need from their primary suppliers. 















Honesty/integrity is an individual’s belief about the way he or she ought to tell the 
truth and do what he or she thinks is right (Ravlin and Meglino 1987).  Vitell et al. (1993) 
developed a scale of marketing norms using the code of ethics from the American 
Marketing Association.  They demonstrated convergent and discriminant validity by 
comparing scores to a criterion measure - the Ethics Position Questionnaire (EPQ).  
The EPQ measures an individual’s moral philosophy on two dimensions:  idealism and 
relativism.  These dimensions correspond directly with deontology and teleology 
discussed in Chapter II.  Idealists hold to absolute moral standards, whereas relativists 
contend that any ethical judgment depends on the situation.  In Vitell et al.’s (1993) 
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research, convergent validity was demonstrated since the marketing norms correlated 
high and significantly with the ideological dimension of the EPQ.  Similarly, the 
marketing norms scale demonstrated discriminant validity by correlating weakly and 
negatively with the relativism dimension.  Confirmatory factor analysis yielded a 
respectable model fit that explained 54.2% of the variance.  For this reason, the 
measurement scale used by Vitell et al. (1993) was also used in this research to assess 
honesty/integrity (Table 3.8).     
TABLE 3.8  
Honesty/Integrity Measure  
Items Sources 
1. One should always adhere to all applicable laws and regulations. 
2. One should always accurately represent one’s education, training, and 
experience. 
3. One must always be honest in serving consumers, clients, employees, 
suppliers, distributors, and the public. 
4. One should not knowingly participate in a conflict of interest without prior 
notice to all parties involved. 
5. When dealing with suppliers, complete honesty is always the best policy. 









 An individual possessing a Machiavellianism personality is one who condones  
amoral means of manipulating others in order to achieve a desired end (Hunt and 
Chonko 1984).  These individuals will use tactics such as manipulation, persuasion, and 
deceit.  The MACH IV scale (Christie and Geis 1970), originating from Machiavelli’s The 
Prince and The Discourses (Robinson et al. 1991), assesses these tendencies in three 
“substantive areas:  (1) the nature of interpersonal tactics, (2) views of human nature, 
and (3) abstract or generalized morality” (Robinson et al. 1991, p. 376 ).  The Mach IV 
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scale is composed of 20 items.  Razzaque and Hwee (2002) measured 
Machiavellianism using a subset of the original 20 items.  The scale was reported to be 
sufficiently reliable with a Cronbach’s Alpha between 0.66 and 0.88.  Additionally, factor 
analysis provided evidence of construct, convergent, and discriminant validity.  Thus, 
the study at hand employed an abridged version of the MACH IV scale as shown in 
Table 3.9.   
TABLE 3.9  
Machiavellianism Measure  
Items Source 
1. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear. 
2. Most people are basically good and kind. (R) 
3. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will 
come out when they are given a chance. 
4. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives. (R) 
5. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. 
6. It is hard to get ahead without hurting someone here and there. 
MACH IV Christie and 
Geis (1970); Alpha=0.79 
 
(R) Reverse coded. 
 
Situation Factor 
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) 
SEU is a product of the desirability of a consequence and the probability of its 
occurrence (Kamat and Kanekar 2001; Nettles and Bayton 2001).   In this study, SEU 
was operationalized consistent with Nettles and Bayton (2001).  This method has 
proven to be valid in conjunction with written vignettes (Nettles and Bayton 2001), and is 
effective in predicting dichotomous choices (Jacoby 1975).  Addressing the validity of 
the SEU model, researchers (Bonoma and Johnston 1979, p. 188) concluded that:  
“subjects not previously trained in, or exposed to, decision theory do feel comfortable 
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thinking in probability and worth terms, and…are able, with only minimal and 
nonmathematical instruction, to make intuitive decisions that conform to the 
requirements of SEU-like models.”   
In operationalizing SEU, the qualitative interviews were used to identify a list of 
the most-likely positive and negative consequences resulting from a decision to behave 
opportunistically in each vignette.  An example of the consequences for the vignette 
involving weak-form opportunism is exhibited in Table 3.10.  For each consequence 
listed on the survey, the respondent rated the desirability of that consequence on a 
scale of -5 to +5 (later converted to a scale of 1 to 11).  Next, the respondent rated the 
probability that the consequence will occur on a scale of 10% to 100%, in increments of 
10%.  The SEU was calculated as the product of the two aforementioned inputs.  If the 
desirability of the consequence was less than zero (undesirable), the probability (P) of 
the consequence was adjusted by the formula 1-P (Nettles and Bayton 2001).  This 
adjustment prevented the inflation of the expected utility where undesirable 
consequence were probable.  The SEUs for all of the consequences of that vignette 
were averaged to arrive at a single overall SEU score for that vignette and that 
respondent.  This single-indicator, continuous variable was input into the multivariate 
models to represent SEU.  Table 3.10 shows how SEU was calculated for a notional 
response to the weak-form opportunism vignette.  The SEU score for the strong-form 
opportunism vignette was calculated the same way, but the list of consequences 





Subjective Expected Utility Measure 
 






SEU = (P)(U) 
 
- Decrease in supplier’s 
performance (because your 
business is less profitable) 
Rating = -3 
(Converted = 3) 
70% 
(Adjusted = 30%) 0.9 
- Positive recognition from your 
supervisor for avoiding costs 
Rating = 2 
(Converted = 8) 40% 3.2 
- Easier negotiation (can 
ignore analysis of overhead 
pool)  
Rating = 1 
(Converted = 7) 60% 4.2 
- Decreased trust from your 
supplier 
Rating = -1 
(Converted = 5) 
80% 
(Adjusted = 20%) 1.0 
- Cost avoidance to your 
organization -- maintain a low 
unit cost of widgets 
Rating = 5 
(Converted = 11) 100% 11 
SEU Score = 
5
∑SEU  4.06 
aMeasured on a scale from -5 to 5  (Converted to a scale from 0 to 11) 
bMeasured on a scale of 10% to 100% 
 
 
 Type of Opportunism 
 
Hypothesis 12 stipulated that predictors of strong-form versus weak-form 
opportunism are different.  In order to investigate this hypothesis, two separate 
vignettes were used.  One vignette involved a strong-form of opportunism, whereas the 
other entailed a weak-form.  A manipulation check was used to garner confidence that 
survey respondents would recognize the fundamental difference between the two 
vignettes - that one scenario represented a contract violation (strong-form opportunism), 
whereas the other did not (weak-form opportunism).   
  
Manipulation Check 
An online survey (Appendix C) was employed to present the two vignettes to 
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respondents and then asked them to list, in an open text field, what they believed to be 
the fundamental differences between the two scenarios.  Sixty-two sourcing 
professionals working for government and for-profit organizations were targeted for 
participation.  A convenience sample of 28 sourcing professionals responded (response 
rate 45%).  Of the respondents, 79% correctly identified the fundamental difference that 
one vignette involved a contract violation, whereas the other 21% did not.  Respondents 
identified this difference without any prompting from the researcher or survey instrument 
as to the type of difference solicited.  This rate of acknowledgement of the difference 
between strong and weak-form opportunism represented in the two scenarios provides 
construct validity that the independent variable, type of opportunism, is indeed 
recognized by the respondents.     
 
Pretest 
 In order to ensure that the constructs were valid in content and the survey items 
sufficiently clear, the survey instrument was reviewed by an industry expert, doctoral 
students, and academicians established in the content domain.  The industry expert 
held a director-level position in the global procurement division of a Fortune 500 
company.  A convenience sample of eight doctoral students pursuing degrees at the 
University of North Texas (UNT) also reviewed the survey.  Academicians included 
those from the College of Business at UNT.  Notwithstanding, two leading scholars in 
the realm of marketing channels, outside of UNT, were consulted.         
These experts from industry and academia were asked to review the survey 
instrument.  As recommended by Dillman (2000), feedback was solicited regarding 
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whether the survey items: (1) captured the domain of the construct (content validity), (2) 
were unambiguous, (3) were simple to understand, and (4) were consistently 
interpretable.  The experts were asked whether the model was sufficiently 
comprehensive, that is, whether it included all of the relevant constructs.  The survey 
was modified to reflect improvements recommended by the experts. 
 
Pilot Test 
In an effort to ensure construct reliability and validity, the survey instrument was 
pilot tested using a convenience sample of sourcing professionals from for-profit firms 
and government agencies.  The nine organizations, both for-profit and government, 
varied widely in terms of their mission, industry, number of employees, 
revenues/budget, and locations throughout the United States.  The populations included 
221 buyers, from which 56 responded (response rate 25%).  Survey recipients from 
three of the nine participating organizations were contacted directly by the researcher.  
The other six organizations used internal sponsors as intermediaries to communicate 
with survey recipients.  These intermediaries reported to the researcher the total 
number of survey recipients.  Contingent on the accuracy of the intermediaries’ reports, 
there is some uncertainty that the population of 221 buyers is accurate.  Hence, the 
actual response rate may deviate slightly from the reported 25%.  Data from the pilot 
test was used to assess construct reliability and validity, and to improve measures 
(Churchill 1979) prior to full-scale survey deployment.     
There were seven data elements missing from the entire sample.  Values were 
imputed via mean substitution because the omitted data was determined to be missing 
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 Internal consistency reliability for each latent construct was assessed using 
Cronbach’s alpha.  Table 3.11 displays the results of the cleansed constructs.  Due to a 
lack of validity of the five-item pressure to perform construct, the scale was reduced to 
two items.  “Cronbach's alpha is a meaningless calculation with a two-item scale” 
(Mentzer et al. 1999, p. 17); thus, it was not reported.  Another construct, 
Machiavellianism, had a low coefficient alpha (.629).  All remaining constructs showed 
adequate reliabilities greater than 0.7 (Hair et al. 2006).   
 
Validity 
 To help assess construct validity, single-factor structures were analyzed using 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA).  First, in order to justify the use of factor analysis, 
each construct was examined to ensure that sufficient correlations existed among the 
items.  For all seven latent constructs, the Bartlett test of sphericity was significant 
indicating a sufficient amount of correlations among the items.  However, one of the 
seven latent constructs, pressure to perform, had measures of sampling adequacy 
(MSA) less than the acceptable threshold of 0.5.  The MSA for this construct (0.48) 
indicated too few correlations existed.   
Each construct was analyzed via principle-components factor analysis using a 
Varimax rotation.  The criteria for the number of factors to extract was determined by 
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those having Eigenvalues greater than one.  Subsequent factor analysis of the pressure 
to perform construct revealed that its five items loaded on three factors.  Due to its lack 
of construct validity, three of the five items were replaced in the survey prior to full-scale 
survey deployment.  Table 3.12 displays the dropped and replacement items.  From a 
list of ten possible replacement items, three were selected following a review of all ten 
items by four academicians and four doctoral students.  Reviews encompassed clarity 
and content validity similar to the pretest process.  Of the remaining constructs, buyer 
power, relational norms, leadership opportunism, and honesty/integrity each 
demonstrated single-factor structures with adequate reliability.  However, two 
constructs, corporate ethical values (CEV) and Machiavellianism, loaded on more than 
one factor.  After dropping problematic items from the analysis, single factor structures 
revealed sufficiently-valid, three-item constructs.  
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TABLE 3.11  
Measurement Results - Pilot 
 







BP3 .800 .631 
BP4 .768 .581 
BP2 .748 .579 
BP1 .726 .552 
Buyer Power 
BP5 .626 .457 
54.18 .780 
RN1 .892 .815 
RN2 .882 .800 
RN3 .839 .726 
RN5 .811 .691 
Relational Norms 
RN4 .686 .548 
68.11 .880 
CEV5 .901 .743 
CEV4 .841 .632 Corporate Ethical Values 
CEV3 .780 .542 
70.88 .789 
PP4 .858 .471 
Pressure To Perform 




TABLE 3.11 (continued) 
 
 







L1 .872 .771  
L5 .840 .717  
L4 .776 .631 61.22 
L2 .763 .621  
Leadership Opportunism 
L3 .640 .483  
.839 
M1 .792 .485  
M6 .779 .457 58.21 Machiavellianism  
M3 .716 .398  
.629 
H4 .913 .802 
H2 .896 .763 
H3 .789 .601 
H5 .649 .456 
Honesty/Integrity 





Pressure to Perform Scale – Item Replacements 
 
Pilot Survey Item Replacement Item 
PP1  My firm has made it clear that I am 
expendable if I don’t deliver. 
PP6  The possibility of failing to achieve 
targeted results at work is worrisome. 
PP2  My compensation is directly tied to 
my performance. 
PP7  If I don’t achieve targeted results 
people (e.g., co-workers, supervisors, 
employer) will notice. 
PP3  I won’t last long in my job if I don’t 
perform. 
PP8  If feel pressure to perform well in my 








An online survey (Appendix G) was used to collect the data.  Web-based surveys 
yield slightly higher response rates than do mail surveys and the data exhibits no 
characteristic differences than that of mail surveys (Griffis et al. 2003).  The survey 
included approximately 85 questions (items) that measured each construct and variable 
in the model.  Additionally, various demographics were collected in order to facilitate an 
assessment of generalizability (Tables 3.13 - 3.19).  An email invitation (Appendix E) 
was sent to respondents informing them of the purpose and importance of the research.  
This invitation included an embedded link to the Internet universal resource locator 
(URL) to facilitate convenient access to the survey.  Brief instructions were provided at 
the beginning of the survey, and were dispersed throughout the survey as appropriate.  
One follow-up message (Appendix F) served as a reminder to prospective respondents.      
In order to maximize the response rate, survey deployment and data collection 
utilized Dillman’s (2000) tailored design method for Internet surveys.  Fundamentally, 
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Dillman’s method entails establishing trust with the respondent, increasing the rewards 
for completing the survey, and mitigating the costs of completing the survey.  To 
establish trust in the current design, sponsorship by a legitimate authority (Dillman 
2000) will be used.  The NCMA and purchasing executives in industry helped 
disseminate the survey instrument to the target population.  This provided a veil of 
sponsorship and encouraged respondents to participate.  Additionally, the message in 
the invitation to the survey emphasized the importance of the study (Dillman 2000).  
Finally, the invitation identified that the research is for the purpose of a doctoral degree, 
and that UNT’s Institutional Review Board will maintain oversight of the research.  
Together, these measures encircled the research with an aura of trust.   
In order to provide rewards, the researcher showed positive regard to the 
respondent (Dillman 2000).  This was accomplished in the email invitation.  Therein, 
respondents were referred to as valued experts whose input is critical to the research.  
Respondents perceived that the researcher was seeking their advice (Dillman 2000).  
Notwithstanding, the invitation and the survey thanked the respondents for their 
consideration and time.  Additionally, the invitation showed a support of group values 
(Dillman 2000).  The researcher was identified as a cohort in procurement, one who has 
procurement experience, and who holds the premier professional certifications in the 
field.  The use of vignettes made the survey interesting (Dillman 2000), which stimulated 
additional involvement.  Finally, the respondents were offered a report of the results of 
the research.   
In order to reduce the perceived costs of completing the survey, the researcher 
avoided subordinating language, embarrassment, and inconvenience (Dillman 2000).  
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Additionally, the survey was relatively short and easy (Dillman 2000).  The respondent 
did not have to spend time seeking any information; the respondent could complete the 
survey armed only with his or her experience, beliefs, and attitudes.  Additionally, with 
the exception of a few demographic questions such as gender, personal information 
was not requested (Dillman 2000).  Finally, the emailed survey invitation offered the 
respondent the option of receiving a hard copy survey with prepaid return postage.  
   
Sample Characteristics 
 
 In order to ensure that the data represented the target population of government 
and for-profit sourcing professionals with the greatest representation, sampling occurred 
via two methods, random sampling and convenience sampling.   An analysis of the 
statistical power to detect small effect sizes, given the size and composition of the 
logistic regression model, a power of 0.80, and a significance level of 0.05, required a 
sample of approximately 270 respondents.  To achieve the required sample size of 
government and for-profit buyers, the survey was presented to a total of 3,215 sourcing 
professionals in four populations.  
First, 1,496 members were randomly sampled from a membership lists from the 
ISM.  Of these members, five were deemed ineligible and 208 were never contacted 
due to inaccurate email addresses.  Additionally, one respondent forwarded the survey 
invitation to 13 people.  104 responses resulted from this sub-population for a response 
rate of 8.0%.   
Second, 1,800 members were randomly sampled from the members of the 
NCMA.  Of those contacted, three were deemed ineligible and 270 were not reached 
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due to inaccurate email addresses.  The survey was forwarded to another three people 
by one of the respondents.  This sub-population resulted in 139 responses for a 
response rate of 9.1%.    
Third, the participants in the pilot study were included in the data set.  This 
convenience sample of 56 respondents out of a sub-population of 221 resulted in a 
response rate of 25%.   
Finally, another convenience sample of sourcing professionals from Fortune 500 
firms was included.  213 chief procurement officers (CPO) were contacted to help 
distribute the survey invitation within their companies (Appendix D).  Of these, 18 
agreed to participate, yielding a company response rate of 8.5%.  These 18 CPOs 
forwarded the survey invitation to 168 sourcing professionals within their respective 
companies.  From this sub-population, 55 responses were obtained yielding a response 
rate of 32.7%.   
 
Combining Samples 
Responses from the four populations were collected in four separate databases 
to facilitate the detection of any differences between the four samples.  Testing the 
homogeneity of the samples was required because it was desired to combine the four 
samples for the purpose of hypothesis testing.  A multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) test was run on eight factors - all seven latent constructs and experience.  
The results showed no differences on five of the constructs/variables, but did show 
differences between the four samples on buyer power, CEV, and pressure to perform at 
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the .05 level of significance.  Additionally, chi-square tests showed differences in gender 
and business sector.   
However, many of these differences were expected because two of the samples 
differed in their composition.  The NCMA list sample consisted of 68.4% government 
buyers, whereas the ISM list sample, the Fortune 500 sample, and the pilot study 
sample contained 8.6%, 0%, and 25.8% government buyers, respectively.  A MANOVA 
test exploring differences between business sectors on the same eight factors 
confirmed that the source of variance was likely due to the business sector rather than 
the constructs/variables in the populations that would impact the hypotheses.  
Differences between business sectors were found in CEV and gender.   
The remaining unexplained differences on two constructs (buyer power and 
pressure to perform) between the four samples were examined to ensure that their 
differences would have no affect on a multivariate model if the four samples were 
combined.  An examination of the descriptive statistics showed that the mean pressure 
to perform score for the pilot study sample was less than half the mean of the other 
three samples.  However, the pilot study sample included only eight organizations and a 
small fraction of the total data collected.   
The only remaining difference between the four samples concerned buyer power.  
To confirm that the combination of the four samples would have no impact on the 
multivariate hypothesis tests, the same MANOVA test was re-run, but this time, using 
the polar extremes approach (Hair et al. 2006) to the dependent variables for each of 
the two vignettes.  After removing cases that rated the likelihood of engaging in 
opportunistic behavior either a three, four, five, or six, the MANOVA test showed no 
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differences across the four samples on buyer power.  This polar extremes approach is 
further explained later in this chapter where it is employed in hypothesis testing. 
To further examine the validity of combining the four samples, interaction terms 
were created to determine whether the sample moderated the relationships between the 
hypothesized predictors and the dependent variable, likelihood of behaving 
opportunistically.  Three categorical variables were created to represent the four 
samples.  Five latent constructs (buyer power, relational norms, pressure to perform, 
CEV, and honesty) were tested for interactions in both the weak-form and strong-form 
opportunism models.  For each respondent, the summated value of each construct was 
multiplied by the three categorical variables (sample), resulting in the testing of 15 
interaction terms (sample1*buyer power, sample2*buyer power, sample3*buyer power, 
sample1*relational norms, sample2*relational norms, sample3*relational norms,… and 
sample1*honesty, sample2*honesty, sample3*honesty).  Since these interaction terms 
were explored in separate models for weak-form and strong-form opportunism, 30 
interactions were examined.  When included in the logistic regression models, none of 
the interaction terms were significant in the strong-form opportunism model.  In the 
weak-form opportunism model, only one sample (NCMA list) was significant in only one 
of the constructs (CEV).  Because only one interaction out of 30 was significant, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the sample does not moderate the relationships between 
the hypothesized predictors and the dependent variable.     
Given the analyses above, evidence suggested that no differences existed 
across the four populations that would invalidate hypothesis testing on a combined 
sample.  Therefore, the samples were combined.  Across the four sampling 
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methodologies, the total population included 3,215 sourcing professionals, of which 367 
responses were received.  This resulted in a combined response rate of 11.4%.   
Response rates by sample are displayed in Table 3.13.  Tables 3.14 through 3.20 
provide demographic data regarding the combined sample.   
TABLE 3.13   
Response Rate by Sample and Population 
Sample Population Response Rate 
Random ISM List 8% 
Random NCMA List 9.1% 
Convenience Pilot Study 25% 
Convenience Fortune 500 32.7% 
 
TABLE 3.14   
Professional Certification 
Type Frequency 




TABLE 3.15   
Age 
Group Frequency 
18 - 24 1 
25 - 34 42 
35 - 44 94 
45 - 54 135 
55 - 64 53 
65 or older 3 
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TABLE 3.16   
Procurement Experience 
Years Frequency 
0 - 9 98 
10 - 19 96 
20 - 29 102 
30 - 39 31 
40 - 49 1 
 
 
TABLE 3.17   
Gender 
Type Frequency Percentage 
Male 215 65.6 
Female 113 34.4 
 
 
TABLE 3.18   
Type of Organization 
Sector Frequency 
Private Sector 185 
Federal Government - Defense 29 
Federal Government - Non-Defense 74 
State Government 11 









Computers/Information Technology 11 
Construction 11 
Consulting 4 





Food & Apparel 10 
Government 96 















Annual Sales Frequency Percentage 
Under $250,000 2 0.6 
$250,000 to $999,999 5 1.5 
$1 million to $2.4 million 3 0.9 
$2.5 million to $4.9 million 5 1.5 
$5 million to $9.9 million 9 2.7 
$10 million to $19.9 million 9 2.7 
$20 million to $29.9 million 5 1.5 
$30 million to $49.9 million 8 8 
$50 million - $99.9 million 15 4.5 
$100 million or more 173 52.4 




Missing Data  
 Cases were examined for missing data.  Twelve cases were deleted because the 
respondents failed to provide information for at least one entire construct.  Of the 12, 
three failed to assess buyer power.  All three of these respondents were government 
buyers.  As indicated by one respondent in the comments field, the buyer may have 
only placed an order against the basic contract with the supplier.  Hence, the ordering 
buyer was not necessarily involved in the selection of the supplier; thus, may not have 
been able to assess buyer power at the time of source selection.  Seven of the 12 failed 
to assess SEU for either one or both scenarios.  This may have been due to the length 
of the scenario.  The 12 deleted cases were proportionately distributed across the four 
sampling methods/sub-populations. 
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In addition to the 12 cases deleted due to omitted constructs, the first 18 cases 
were deleted from the pilot study data.  An error in the survey instrument - the scaling of 
SEU for the first vignette - resulted in distorted information.  This survey error was 
corrected after the first 18 responses were received.  Thus, a total of 30 cases were 
removed from the data set.   
All other cases that sparsely omitted data (0.25% of total data fields) but were not 
deleted were grouped by construct (seven groups), then compared to groups that were 
not missing data on that construct (Hair et al. 2006).  MANOVA test were run rather 
than a series of separate ANOVAs in order to prevent artificial inflation of the Type I 
error rate (Hair et al. 2006).  Of the seven MANOVA tests (Appendix H), two, relational 
norms and honesty/integrity, showed significant differences between cases that were 
missing values and those that were complete.  However, subsequent ANOVA tests 
revealed that relational norms differed in only one (CEV) of the seven measures.  
Subsequent ANOVA tests of honesty/integrity identified two differences (relational 
norms and pressure to perform) out of the seven measures.  Overall, these three 
differences represent a minute portion of possible differences explored; therefore, these 
differences likely appeared by chance.  Since there appeared to be no pattern of 
differences and the number of differences was minute, the data was determined to be 
missing completely at random (Hair et al. 2006).  As such, missing data in these 
instances were imputed via mean substitution (Hair et al. 2006).  When data was found 
missing in the SEU probability fields, a neutral probability (50%) was substituted.  
Similarly, when data was omitted from the SEU desirability fields, a neutral rating of 
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zero was inserted.  In total, ten data elements were missing from each of the SEU 
ratings for the weak-form and strong-form opportunism vignettes.   
 
Outliers 
 The data was examined for the presence of outliers in order to prevent 
unrepresentative data from distorting the analysis.  Appendix J displays the results of a 
univariate analysis of standardized scores.  As evidenced from the data, outliers were 
detected within the pressure to perform, Machiavellianism, and honesty/integrity 
constructs.  However, no single case demonstrated a sufficient pattern of outliers to 
suggest that the data is not representative of the population (Hair et al. 2006).  
Therefore, no data was discarded due to outliers.     
 
Normality 
First, univariate normality was assessed by observing the constructs’ 
distributions and normal probability plots.  Next, tests for skewness and kurtosis 
(Appendix K) revealed that, except for honesty/integrity, all item z-scores for skewness 
were less than three and all z-scores for kurtosis were less than eight and, hence, were 
normally distributed (Kline 1997).  The honesty/integrity construct was skewed with a 
strong negative distribution.  This may be indicative of a social desirability bias.  Though 
honesty/integrity failed the test, logistic regression is robust precluding the necessity for 





A major concern in cross-sectional survey research is response bias, particularly 
coverage bias, selection bias, non-response bias (Blair and Zinkhan 2006), and socially-
desirable responding (SDR).  Coverage bias occurs when, due to research methods, a 
particular group is excluded from the population (Blair and Zinkhan 2006).  Hence, this 
excluded group has no chance of being considered in the sample.  This research design 
mitigated the effects of coverage bias by sampling from four populations.  Selection bias 
occurs when, again due to research methods, a particular group receives a greater 
chance of representation in the data (Blair and Zinkhan 2006).  The research design, 
while mitigating coverage bias, may have introduced selection bias since one sample 
(ISM List) afforded respondents from large firms a higher chance of selection.  
Examination of the demographics in Table 3.20 confirmed a disproportionately-high 
representation of large businesses.  Non-response bias occurs when a particular 
group(s) fails to respond to the survey.  Non-response bias was evaluated by comparing 
responses from early and late respondents.  The rationale for this approach is that late 
respondents sufficiently resemble non-respondents (Armstrong and Overton 1977).  
Chi-square tests (Appendix I) explored whether differences existed across key 
demographic data such as:  buyer certification status, gender, business sector, and age.  
Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) and Box’s M tests explored any differences 
in metric measures (i.e., the constructs).   
Because the research design utilized four samples, four separate sets of 
statistical tests (one for each sub-population) were used to test for non-response bias.  
Appendix I displays the results.  The pilot study sample was the only sample that 
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showed a multivariate difference between early and late responders on any of the seven 
latent constructs.  The difference appeared only in one (pressure to perform) of seven 
the constructs.  A subsequent ANOVA confirmed the difference.  This difference on 
pressure to perform between early and late responders did not exist in the other three 
samples.  In the pilot study sample, late responders showed greater pressure to perform 
than did early responders.  Additionally, a chi-square test showed differences from 
expected values for business sector (p < 0.011) and professional certifications (p < 
0.024).  A difference in business sector was expected since the pilot study survey was 
deployed to a government buying agency later than to for-profit counterparts.  No 
differences emerged either from the tests of the Fortune 500 convenience sample, the 
NCMA list, or from the ISM list sample.   Understanding that some differences will occur 
by chance (Hair et al. 2006) and with so few differences detected, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the data was not tainted by a non-response bias; thus, the data was 
representative of the population.   
 
Socially-Desirable Responding 
SDR is “the tendency to give answers that make the respondent look good” 
(Paulhus 1991, p. 17).  This natural tendency may obfuscate the truth; thus, SDR can 
seriously jeopardize the validity of survey research (Randall and Fernandes 1991; 
Nunnally 1978).  “SD[R] can act as (1) an unmeasured variable that produces spurious 
correlations between study variables, (2) a suppressor variable that hides relationships, 
or (3) a moderator variable that conditions the relationship between two other variables” 
(Ganster et al. 1983, p. 321).  Some tools are available to the researcher to control the 
 95
influence of SDR (Paulhus 1991; Randall and Fernandes 1991).  Tactics include:  using 
a forced-choice format, factor-analytic techniques, and using demand reduction.  
Demand reduction techniques essentially reduce the respondent’s motivation to 
respond in a socially-acceptable way.  One method is to assure respondents of 
anonymity.  Other means include warning subjects of methods for detecting faking and 
the randomized response technique.  In the randomized response technique, 
respondents are advised to flip a coin in order to determine which question they answer, 
either the sensitive question or an innocuous question (e.g., are your mother’s eyes 
blue?).  With the known probability of flipping heads on the coin (0.5) coupled with the 
proportion of people with blue eyes in the population, the response on the sensitive 
question can be accurately estimated.  Using this method, the respondent is aware that 
the researcher can not know which question he or she answered.  Thus, SDR should be 
reduced.  Finally, the researcher could use proxy subjects, where either a close 
acquaintance is questioned about the respondent’s behavior or a respondent is asked 
about a third-person’s behavior (Paulhus 1991; Trevino et al. 1998).   
For the research design at hand, two techniques were employed to mitigate the 
effects of SDR.  First, the design used proxy subjects.  Rather than being asked to 
report their own choice to the two vignettes, the respondents were asked to indicate 
what a typical coworker would choose - similar to the method employed by Jeffrey et al. 
(2004).  Second, the research design maximized perceived anonymity.  This is 
consistent with other similar research of situations encountered by procurement 
professionals making procurement-related decisions (Landeros and Plank 1996).   
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Though SDR may have a significant impact on ethics research, the two vignette-
based choices used in the current design are commonly encountered in practice, and 
are not self incriminating.  There should be less reluctance to choose the less-ethical 
behaviors in this study than to choose blatant unethical behaviors, such as cheating on 
tests, commonly examined in other ethics research.  Hence, the moral intensity 
previously discussed is relatively low in the present research design.  Relative to many 
ethics studies, including the study of Randall and Fernandez (1991) that examines the 
effects of SDR, the vignette-based decisions in the current study are quite benign.  
Other techniques to reduce SDR would further exacerbate an already complex design, 
and would add significant length to the survey.  In order to ensure perceived anonymity, 
respondents were informed in the invitation and on the survey instrument that their 
responses could be traced neither to themselves nor to their employing organization.  
Further, they were advised on the survey that there were no “wrong” answers.      
Indicators of the presence of SDR were included in the survey instrument.  If 
significant SDR was detected in a response, that response was simply discarded from 
the analysis, as suggested by Paulhus (1991), in order to prevent contamination of the 
data set.  In order to minimize survey length, SDR was detected by inclusion of the 
“overclaiming” scale (Randall and Fernandez 1991) found in Table 3.21.  “Inclusion of 
an overclaiming scale…may provide a less cumbersome method of detecting a [SDR] 
bias than an item desirability assessment when the number of items to be rated is large” 
(Randall and Fernandes 1991, pg 814).  This scale asked respondents about their 
familiarity with several bogus popular culture media (e.g., movies, clothing lines, music 
CDs) on a scale of one to five.  Since the overclaiming scale is closely associated with 
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SDR personality characteristics of self-deception and impression management (Randall 
and Fernandez 1991), separate scales to measure these personality traits, such as the 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus 1991) were unnecessary.  
Overclaiming has been found to relate positively to the other dimension of SDR - item 
desirability (Phillips and Clancy 1972), although further research showed mixed results 
(Randall and Fernandes 1991).  In summary, the defensive mechanisms of anonymity 
to thwart SDR and the use of an overclaiming scale to detect SDR, together, sufficiently 
enabled the researcher to either prevent SDR outright or to extract the influence of SDR 
from the data.   The degree of influence of SDR can be detected by inclusion of the 
measure in the model.  An overclaiming score was derived by adding the familiarity 





How familiar are you with each of the following newly released movies? 
 (1) Turned to Gold 
 (2) Katherine’s Mistake 
How familiar are you with each of the following products? 
 (1) Microsoft Statistical Assistant 
 (2) New Life Spices 
How familiar are you with each of the following CDs? 
 (1) Cosmic Being 
 (2) Offender After Dark 
How familiar are you with each of the following designer labels? 
 (1) Ocean City 
 (2) Jones L.A. 
All answers provided with a five point Likert scale (1 – not at all familiar, 3 – somewhat familiar, 
and 5 – very familiar) 
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After deleting 30 cases with missing data, the remaining 337 responses were 
examined for SDR by examining responses to the 8-item overclaiming scale.  A 
conservative standard was applied to the data.  If three of the eight overclaiming scales 
were rated three (“somewhat familiar”) or above by any one respondent, then that case 
was discarded.  By setting a standard of at least three questions, patterns of consistent 
“overclaiming” by the respondent were detectable.  Eight cases failed to pass the 
standard; thus, they were removed from consideration.  One respondent failed to 
complete the entire 8-item overclaiming scale.  Since the SDR bias of the case was 
indeterminable, it was deleted.  Overall, due to missing data and the mitigation of SDR 
bias, the sample of 367 reduced to 328.      
 
Measure Evaluation 
Reliability and Validity  
The reliability of latent constructs was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha, a 
measure of internal consistency reliability (Kerlinger and Lee 2000), and by analyzing 
composite reliabilities (Fornell and Larcker 1981).  The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 
each construct (Table 3.21) was compared to the generally-accepted standard of 0.7 for 
established scales (Nunnally 1978).  A preliminary analysis of the seven latent 
constructs revealed that Machiavellianism (.586) and Honesty/Integrity (.601) failed to 
meet the accepted standard of 0.7.   A parallel assessment of validity helped to identify 
the faulty items.   
Reliability is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for validity (Kerlinger and Lee 
2000).  Another aspect of validity that must be satisfied is to ensure that what is actually 
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measured corresponds with what was intended to be measured.  This aspect of validity 
addresses the accuracy of the measures.  It was assessed via construct, convergent, 
and discriminant validity.  Specifically, construct validity was assessed first using 
principle components EFA with a Varimax rotation.  This exploratory approach served 
as a screening mechanism to identify any cross-loaded items prior to conducting 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).  First, however, tests ensured that there were 
sufficient correlations among items to support a factor analysis.  A significant Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity ( χ 2 = 3790.96, p < 0.0001) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy (0.781) greater than 0.5 indicated sufficient correlations existed 
among items to support an EFA (Hair et al. 2006).  Each construct (i.e., its associated 
items) was tested individually to ensure its unidimensionality (Hattie 1985).  Next, all 
predictor constructs were run together in an EFA.  Individual items were assessed for 
sufficient correlation with the factor (factor loading), greater than 0.5, while 
simultaneously not correlating with any other factor (cross-loading), ensuring cross-
loadings are less than 0.3 (Hair et al. 2006).  Criteria for determining the number of 
factors to extract included:  (1) eigenvalues greater than one, and (2) percentage of 
variance explained for practical significance (Hair et al. 2006).  The EFA (Table 3.21) 
yielded ten factors where seven were expected.  Items from Machiavellianism (M2 and 
M4), pressure to perform (PP7 and PP8), and honesty/integrity (H1) cross-loaded onto 
an additional three factors.   
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TABLE 3.22  
Measurement Results 
 









BP1 .795 .702 
BP2 .753 .594 
BP4 .731 .637 
BP5 .726 .516 
1 
(Buyer Power) 
BP3 .597 .530 
8.51 .807 
RN3 .845 .775 
RN2 .792 .728 
RN1 .781 .693 
RN5 .756 .690 
2 
(Relational Norms) 
RN4 .609 .417 
9.14 .847 
CEV5 .813 .689 
CEV4 .803 .628 
CEV3 .761 .558 
CEV2 .612 .517 
3 
(Corporate Ethical Values) 




TABLE 3.22 (continued) 
 
(table continues) 









PP6 .800 .621  
PP4 .777 .628  
PP5 .732 .458 7.26 
PP7 .648 .629  
4 
(Pressure To Perform) 
PP8 .362 .417  
.774 
L1 .836 .759  
L5 .804 .757  
L4 .784 .703 9.09 
L2 .713 570  
5 
(Leadership Opportunism) 
L3 .673 483  
.845 
M6 .719 .423 
M3 .692 .413 
M1 .583 .229 
6 
(Machiavellianism) 
M5 .455 .285 
5.23 .586 
H4 .801 .667 
H2 .777 .411 
H3 .719 .502 
7 
(Honesty/Integrity) 
H5 .655 .337 
6.90 .601 
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TABLE 3.22 (continued) 









M4 .807 3.99 8 





(Un-named - Crossloads) H1 .820 N/A 3.44 N/A 
PP8 .718 10 
(Un-named - Crossloads) PP7 .435 




Measurement Scales:  Reliability, Factor Structure (LISREL) Diagnostics, and Measurement Model Diagnostics 
 
     
    Single Factor Structure Diagnostics 
 
Construct CR AVE χ 2(df) p-value RMR GFI AGFI CFI NFI IFI RMSEA 
Buyer Power 0.81 .47 32.61 
(5) 
0.0001 0.11 0.96 0.88 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.13 
Relational Norms 0.85 .54 12.27 
 (5) 
0.0313 0.05 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.07 
Corporate Ethical 
Values 
0.82 .48 46.66 
(5) 
0.0001 0.18 0.95 0.84 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.16 
Pressure To 
Perform 
0.77 .41 39.68 
(5) 
0.0001 0.11 0.95 0.86 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.15 
Leadership 
Opportunism 
0.85 .55 70.11 
(5) 
0.0001 0.19 0.92 0.76 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.20 
Machiavellianism 0.62 .22 40.59 
(9) 
0.0001 0.14 0.96 0.91 0.86 0.83 0.86 0.10 
Honesty/Integrity 0.74 .39 32.08 0.0001 0.07 0.96 0.89 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.13 
   (5)  
Measurement Model Diagnostics 
            
Measurement 
Model 




  1037.01 
(573) 
0.01 0.14 0.85 0.83 0.92 0.85 0.92 0.05 
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The EFA was succeeded by a CFA using structural equation modeling in LISREL 
version 8.54.  Covariances were used as input data.  All loadings were significant at the 
.05 level, and their standard errors were not abnormal.  No standardized loadings 
exceeded 1.0, and no negative error variances (Heyworth Case) occurred.  The 
measurement model compared the data to the hypothesized model to ensure adequate 
fit (Table 3.22).  While the test statistic was significant ( χ 2 (573) = 1037.01, p < 0.01) 
indicating a difference between the hypothesized model and the data, this is not 
unusual.  Research suggests that some models will almost assuredly fail a chi-square 
test and recommends more appropriate measures of fit (Fornell, 1983).  A global 
assessment (Bagozzi and Yi 1988) of the various goodness of fit indices indicated poor 
fit.  The goodness of fit index (GFI) of .85, adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) of .83, 
and the normed fit index (NFI) of .85, fell short of the recommended threshold of .9.  
The remaining analysis entailed finding the sub-set of items that measured the 
constructs reliably and validly.  This was accomplished iteratively by removing one item 
at a time and re-running the EFA and CFA. 
Aware of the cross-loaded items from the EFA and a poor-fitting model from 
CFA, the EFA was re-accomplished after removing item H1.  This resulted in a 9-factor 
solution.  Thus, the next largest loading on an ancillary factor, M4, was removed - 
resulting in the same 9-factor solution.  Similarly, M1 was then removed which yielded 
an eight-factor solution.  Since PP8 was the next largest loading on an ancillary factor, it 
was removed.  A seven-factor solution resulted, and the previously cross-loaded item 
PP7 converged with the other pressure to perform scale items.  Scale reliabilities were 
then reassessed (Table 3.23).  A CFA model was run to reflect the removal of items H1, 
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M4, M1, and PP8 (Table 3.24).   Whereas the Cronbach’s Alpha of the 
Machiavellianism scale was unacceptable (.577), the composite reliability (.61) was 
marginally acceptable when compared to the standard of .6 (Bagozzi and Yi 1988).   
TABLE 3.24 
Scale Reliabilities - H1, M4, M1, PP8 Removed 
Construct Cronbach’s Alpha 
Buyer Power .807 
Relational Norms .847 
CEV .795 
Pressure To Perform .772 




Investigation of the average variance extracted (AVE) revealed very little 
convergent validity since .29 does not meet the standard of .5 (Fornell and Larcker 
1981).  Composite reliability was calculated as CR = ∑ ∑ ∑+ )]()/[()( 22 iii yy ελλ , and 
the AVE was calculated as AVE = ∑∑ + )/( 22 iii yy ελλ , according to Fornell and 
Larcker (1981).  When the AVE “is less than .50, the variance due to measurement 
error is larger than the variance captured by the construct, and the validity of the 
individual indicators, as well as the construct, is questionable” (Fornell and Larcker 
1981, p. 46).  Nonetheless, this standard is a more conservative assessment of validity.  
Furthermore, the remaining four-item Machiavellianism scale loaded on a single factor 
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in the EFA absent cross-loadings exceeding 0.3, and all four factor loadings were 
significant in the CFA.   
The measurement model with items H1, M4, M1, and PP8 removed again fell 
short of conclusive validity since the data appeared not to match the hypothesized 
model.  The GFI of .87, AGFI of .85 and NFI of .88 failed to satisfy the suggested 
thresholds of .9.  While the model need not be discarded based on any single fit index 
(Bagozzi and Yi 1988; Byrne 1998; Hair et al. 2006), doubt encircles a model with 
multiple insufficient indices.  In sum, conflicting evidence emerged concerning the 
validity of the Machiavellianism scale.  In an attempt to improve the CFA model fit, this 
construct was dropped from the model, and the CFA was re-run yet again.  Table 3.26 
displays the results of the CFA model excluding all six Machiavellianism items and 
excluding previously-removed items H1 and PP8.   
 
TABLE 3.25 
Measurement Model Diagnostics - H1, M4, M1, PP8 Removed 
 Measurement Model Diagnostics 
Measurement 
Model  
χ 2(df) p RMR GFI AGFI CFI NFI IFI RMSEA 
Exogenous 
Latent 
Variables (ξ)  
780.77 




Composite Reliabilities and Average Variance Extracted - H1, M4, M1, PP8 Removed 
Construct CR AVE 
Buyer Power .81 .47 
Relational Norms .85 .54 
CEV .82 .48 
Pressure To Perform .77 .46 
Leader Opportunism .85 .55 
Machiavellianism .61 .29 
Honesty/Integrity .77 .47 
   
TABLE 3.27 
 
Measurement Model Diagnostics - H1, M1-M6, PP8 Removed 
 
 Measurement Model Diagnostics 
Measurement 
Model  
χ 2(df) p RMR GFI AGFI CFI NFI IFI RMSEA 
Exogenous 
Latent 
Variables (ξ)  
660.38 
(335) 
0.01 0.14 0.87 0.85 0.94 0.89 0.94 0.055 
 
TABLE 3.28 
Composite Reliabilities and Average Variance Extracted - H1, M1-M6, PP8 Removed 
Construct CR AVE 
Buyer Power .81 .47 
Relational Norms .85 .54 
CEV .82 .48 
Pressure To Perform .77 .46 
Leader Opportunism .85 .55 
Machiavellianism Removed Removed 
Honesty/Integrity .77 .47 
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 As displayed, the model was essentially unchanged with the removal of the 
remaining Machiavellianism items.  All factor loadings were nearly identical and all 
remained significant.  Since the model did not improve, the Machiavellianism items were 
reinserted for further investigation.  Attention then turned to other indicators of construct 
validity in search of marginal items that weakened the model.  The average variance 
extracted in Table 3.27 showed that buyer power, CEV, pressure to perform, and 
honesty/integrity failed to reach the benchmark of .5.  The final EFA was re-examined 
for items within these constructs whose loadings were significantly low, and whose 
reliability would improve upon deletion.  This analysis identified H5, PP5, BP3, and 
CEV1 as candidates for deletion.  These items were removed, in that order, and the 
CFA model re-accomplished each time.  The results of this final CFA are presented in 
Table 3.28.  The GFI is .9 and the AGFI is .87, both at or near the “rough guideline” of .9 
(Bagozzi and Yi, 1988, p. 79).  Additionally, the CFI, NFI, and incremental fit index (IFI) 
each surpass the .9 standard.   Table 3.30 shows the composite reliabilities and 
average variance extracted for each scale following the final model improvement.  All 
composite reliabilities exceeded .6 and except for Machiavellianism, each average 
variance extracted, a more conservative measure of validity (Fornell and Larcker 1981), 
exceeded the .5 threshold.  The constructs, as modified, were deemed to be of 




Measurement Model Diagnostics - H1, M1, M4, PP8, H5, PP5, BP3, CEV1 Removed 
 
 Measurement Model Diagnostics 
Item Removed  χ 2(df) p RMR GFI AGFI CFI NFI IFI RMSEA 
          




0.01 0.14 0.88 0.85 0.95 0.88 0.95 0.047 
          
H1, M1, M4, 
PP8, H5, PP5 
653.57 
(384) 
0.01 0.14 0.88 0.86 0.95 0.89 0.95 0.046 
          
H1, M1, M4, 




0.01 0.13 0.89 0.86 0.95 0.89 0.95 0.046 
          
*H1, M1, M4, 




0.01 0.13 0.90 0.87 0.96 0.90 0.96 0.043 
*Final Model 
TABLE 3.30 
Composite Reliabilities and Average Variance Extracted - H1, M1, M4, PP8, H5, PP5, 
BP3, CEV1 Removed 
Construct CR AVE 
Buyer Power .80 .51 
Relational Norms .85 .54 
CEV .81 .52 
Pressure To Perform .76 .52 
Leader Opportunism .85 .55 
Machiavellianism .61 .29 
Honesty/Integrity .79 .56 
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The final CFA model was examined for any effects of the skewed data comprising the 
honesty/integrity scale.  The three honesty/integrity items were transformed using the 
natural logarithm, then substituted into the CFA model.  This transformed model showed 
no improvement across all fit indices suggesting that the skewness of the 
honesty/integrity data did not affect the CFA model.   
The remaining forms of validity, convergent and discriminant, were assessed via 
an analysis of inter-item correlations.  An analysis of the item-level correlation matrix 
showed that at least 90% of the within-factor correlations exceed between-factor 
correlations (Campbell and Fiske 1959).  Additionally, all between-factor correlations 
were less than the focal construct’s coefficient alpha providing evidence of discriminant 
validity (Gaski and Nevin 1985).   
In summary, the preceding processes of achieving sufficient reliability and validity 
resulted in a four-item scale for buyer power, a five-item scale measuring relational 
norms, a four-item scale measuring corporate ethical values, a five-item scale for leader 
opportunism, a three item scale for pressure to perform, a four-item scale for 
Machiavellianism, and a three-item scale for honesty/integrity.  Since reliability and 
validity were sufficient, composite scores of the constructs were created by summing 
the respective items in preparation for model testing.  Table 3.30 presents the means, 
standard deviations, scale reliabilities, and correlations for these constructs.  
 111
TABLE 3.31 
Construct Means, Standard Deviations, Scale Reliabilitiesa and Correlations 
Construct Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Buyer Power 19.80 5.11 (.80)       
2. Relational Norms 26.57 5.75 .403** (.85)      
3. Corporate Ethical 
Values 
22.99 5.39 .123* .209** (.81)     
4. Pressure To Perform 14.75 4.86 .044 .070 .028 (.76)    
5. Leadership 
Opportunism 
14.40 6.61 .048 -.065 -.245** .058 (.85)   
6. Machiavellianism 11.73 4.18 -.078 -.074 -.060 .011 .264** (.61)  
7. Honesty/Integrity 19.93 1.93 .033 .058 .109* .015 -.170** -.249** (.78)












 The purpose of this research was to determine whether theoretically-derived 
predictor variables - relational factors, organizational environmental factors, individual-
difference factors, and the situation - affected a buyer’s decision to behave 
opportunistically.  In order to test the set of resultant hypotheses, respondents were 
presented with two hypothetical vignettes, and asked to make a decision - the likelihood 
that they would engage in the opportunistic behavior.  Their two decisions, one for each 
vignette, served as the dichotomous dependent variables in two logistic regression 
models as shown below.  Those highly likely to engage in the behavior were coded “1,” 
whereas those unlikely to behave opportunistically were coded “0.”   
MODEL 1 - Weak-Form Opportunism 
Yi = β0 + β1Xi1 + β2Xi2 + β3Xi3 + β4Xi4 + β5Xi5 + β6Xi6 + β7Xi7 + β8Xi8 + β9Xi9  + β10Xi10  + 
β11Xi11  + εi 
MODEL 2 - Strong-Form Opportunism 
Yi = β0 + β1Xi1 + β2Xi2 + β3Xi3 + β4Xi4 + β5Xi5 + β6Xi6 + β7Xi7 + β8Xi8 + β9Xi9  + β10Xi10  + 
β11Xi11  + εi 
Model Definitions: 
Model 1 
• Y = Likelihood of Decision To Behave Opportunistically - Weak-form 
Opportunism 
• X1 = Buyer Power 
• X2 = Relational Norms 
• X3 = Corporate Ethical Values 
• X4 = Pressure To Perform 
• X5 = Leadership Opportunistic Behavior 
• X6 = Business Sector (binary) 
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• X7 = Machiavellianism 
• X8 = Honesty/Integrity 
• X9 = Age 
• X10 = Experience 
• X11 = Subjective Expected Utility - Weak-form Opportunism Vignette 
 
Model 2 
• Y = Likelihood of Decision To Behave Opportunistically - Strong-form 
Opportunism 
• X1 = Buyer Power 
• X2 = Relational Norms 
• X3 = Corporate Ethical Values 
• X4 = Pressure To Perform 
• X5 = Leadership Opportunistic Behavior 
• X6 = Business Sector (binary) 
• X7 = Machiavellianism 
• X8 = Honesty/Integrity 
• X9 = Age 
• X10 = Experience 
• X11 = Subjective Expected Utility - Strong-form Opportunism Vignette 
 
 
Tests of Hypotheses 
Two logistic regression models were fit to the data in an attempt to predict the 
likelihood that a respondent would engage in opportunistic behavior, given the predictor 
variables above.  Table 4.1 displays the results of the model for weak-form 
opportunism.  Generally, the model demonstrated satisfactory fit to the data.  First, the 
omnibus chi-square test, a measure that resembles the F test in regular regression 
(Hair et al. 2006), indicated an improvement in the -2 Log Likelihood (-2LL) value ( χ 2 = 
34.915, p < .001) from the base model to the final model (-2LL = 413.32).  The Hosmer 
and Lemeshow Test was not significant ( χ 2 = 5.807, p < .669) indicating no difference 
between the actual and predicted classifications.  However, the practical significance of 
the model was questionable due to two assessments of pseudo-R2.  The Cox and Snell 
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R2 was .101, and the Nagelkerke R2 was .136 indicating that between 10% and 14% of 
the variance in the likelihood of behaving opportunistically was explained by the 
significant predictor variables.  Though the portion of variance explained seems low, 
such pseudo-R2 values are not uncommon in ethics research (Street and Street 2006).  
Another assessment of practical significance, the hit ratio (portion of cases classified 
correctly), was more promising at 63%. 
Of the eleven independent variables tested in this initial model, three showed 
beta coefficients significantly different from zero.  As seen in Table 4.1, leadership 
opportunism (Wald chi-square 6.184, p < .013), honesty/integrity (Wald chi-square 
5.598, p < .018), and subjective expected utility (Wald chi-square 8.791, p < .003) were 
found to be significant.  Therefore, in opportunities to commit weak-form opportunism, 
buyers’ decisions are functions of these three factors.  These findings support H5, H8 
and H11, respectively.  
TABLE 4.1 
Logistic Regression Predictors of Opportunistic Behavior - Weak Opportunism  
Independent Variables B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Buyer Power -.020 .026 .612 .434 .980 
Relational Norms .026 .023 1.271 .260 1.027 
CEV .018 .023 .607 .436 1.018 
Pressure To Perform -.034 .025 1.820 .177 .967 
Leadership Opportunistic Behavior .049 .020 6.184 .013 1.051 
Business Sector -.176 .253 .485 .486 .838 
Machiavellianism .038 .031 1.517 .218 1.039 
Honesty/Integrity -.196 .083 5.598 .018 .822 
Age .037 .173 .045 .831 1.038 
Experience .004 .017 .056 .813 1.004 
SEU .287 .097 .866 .352 6.010 
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The second logistic regression model explored the same set of predictors in the 
context of strong-form opportunism.  Similarly, this model demonstrated adequate fit.  
The omnibus chi-Square test ( χ 2 = 24.617, p < .01) indicated a difference between the 
final model and the base model.  Additionally, the Hosmer and Lemeshow test ( χ 2 =  
3.802, p < .875) showed no difference between predicted and actual classifications.  
However, again, the portion of explained variance was low as evidenced by the Cox and 
Snell R2 of .072 and the Nagelkerke R2 of .099.  But similar to the first model, practical 
significance was evidence by a reasonable hit ratio of 65%.  In this second logistic 
regression model, two factors were found to be significant factors (Table 4.2) in a 
buyer’s decision to take strong opportunistic action, buyer power (Wald chi-square 
2.961, p < .1) and subjective expected utility (Wald chi-square 8.622, p < .01).  Hence, 
H1 one was also supported.   
TABLE 4.2 
Logistic Regression Predictors of Opportunistic Behavior - Strong Opportunism  
Independent Variables B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Buyer Power .045 .026 2.961 .085 1.046 
Relational Norms .001 .024 .001 .996 1.000 
CEV .016 .023 .441 .506 1.016 
Pressure To Perform .023 .025 .840 .359 1.023 
Leadership Opportunistic Behavior -.014 .020 .534 .465 .986 
Business Sector .373 .252 2.193 .139 1.451 
Machiavellianism -.007 .031 .047 .829 .993 
Honesty/Integrity .066 .064 1.051 .305 1.068 
Age -.118 .175 .458 .499 .888 
Experience .017 .018 .928 .335 1.017 
SEU .229 .078 8.622 .003 1.258 
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 In order to further investigate the hypotheses, the models were re-examined to 
determine whether the factors contributed to buyers’ likelihood of behaving 
opportunistically in cases where buyers held extreme inclinations either to or not to 
behave opportunistically.  Hence, the polar extremes (Hair et al. 2006) of the dependent 
variables were explored.  To do so, only those respondents who were either extremely 
unlikely (rated one or two on the eight-point scale) or extremely likely (rated seven or 
eight on the eight-point scale) to engage in the opportunistic behavior were retained in 
the data set, then the logistic regression models were re-accomplished.  Table 4.3 
displays the results of the polar extremes, weak-form opportunism model.  After 
removing the middle cases, the sample was reduced to 149.  Overall, the model fit 
improved and one more construct appeared to affect the buyer’s decision to behave 
opportunistically.  In addition to the omnibus chi-square statistic significance ( χ 2 =  
33.246, p < .01) and the Hosmer and Lemeshow test showing no difference between 
predicted and actual classifications, the pseudo R2 measures improved (Cox and Shell 
R2 .20; Nagelkerke R-square .268).  This model showed that business sector was a 
significant factor (Wald chi-square 4.366, p < .05); however, the relationship direction 
was opposite of that expected.  Whereas it was hypothesized that government sourcing 
professionals would behave more opportunistically overall, this model suggests that 
they are actually less likely to do so under weak forms of opportunism.    
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TABLE 4.3 
Logistic Regression Predictors of Opportunistic Behavior - Weak Opportunism - Polar 
Extremes 
Independent Variables B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Buyer Power .014 .040 .115 .734 1.014 
Relational Norms -.016 .035 .212 .645 .984 
CEV .022 .037 .347 .556 1.022 
Pressure To Perform -.051 .038 1.797 .180 .950 
Leadership Opportunistic 
Behavior .059 .030 3.838 .050 1.060 
Business Sector -.887 .425 4.366 .037 .412 
Machiavellianism .029 .047 .377 .539 1.029 
Honesty/Integrity -.293 .128 5.276 .022 .746 
Age .201 .263 .585 .444 1.223 
Experience .002 .027 .009 .926 1.002 
SEU .557 .153 13.34 .001 1.746 
 
 
 The same polar extremes approach was applied to the strong-form opportunism 
model with similar results (Table 4.4).  After removing the middle cases, the sample was 
reduced to 128.  The model improved in fit and another construct was found to affect 
the buyer’s likelihood of behaving opportunistically - this time of the strong-form.  The 
omnibus chi-square was significant ( χ 2 = 36.40, p < .01) and the Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test was not significant ( χ 2 = 11.162, p < .193), both solid measures of fit.  
Similarly, the Cox and Shell pseudo R2 (.248) and the Nagelkerke R2 (.336) showed 
marked improvement over prior models.  In this model, business sector was also a 
significant factor (Wald chi-square 6.282, p < .05), and its relationship with a likelihood 
of opportunistic behavior was consistent with the hypothesized direction.  Hence, 
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government buyers were more likely to choose to engage in strong-form opportunism.  
Therefore, in consideration of the decisions of government buyers under situations 
involving weak and strong-form opportunism, mixed support was found for H6.   
Corporate ethical values also significantly related to the likelihood of behaving 
opportunistically (Wald chi-square 7.791, p < .01), but the direction of the relationship 
was opposite of that expected.  Therefore, H3 was not supported.   
TABLE 4.4 
Logistic Regression Predictors of Opportunistic Behavior - Strong Opportunism - Polar 
Extremes  
Independent Variables B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Buyer Power .062 .044 1.968 .161 1.064 
Relational Norms -.060 .042 1.998 .158 .942 
CEV .127 .046 7.791 .005 1.136 
Pressure To Perform .053 .042 1.563 .211 1.054 
Leadership Opportunistic 
Behavior .003 .034 .007 .936 1.003 
Business Sector 1.121 .447 6.282 .012 3.068 
Machiavellianism -.040 .054 .535 .464 .961 
Honesty/Integrity -.012 .100 .015 .903 .988 
Age -.257 .344 .559 .455 .773 
Experience -.033 .034 .926 .336 .968 
SEU .497 .146 11.608 .001 1.643 
 
Since multicollinearity can have deleterious effects on regression models, whose 
objective is to explain phenomenon (due to common variance that cannot be parceled 
out to correlated constructs) (Cohen et al. 2003), two multiple regression models were 
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run using the same eleven independent variables - one for each form of opportunism 
(weak and strong).  However, this time, the dependent variable used was the original 
metric survey question asking the respondent to indicate his or her likelihood of 
behaving opportunistically on a scale of one to eight.  Tables 4.5 and 4.6 display the 
results.  Since none of the variance inflation factors (VIF) exceeded 10, excessive 
multicollinearity was not present.  Additionally, none of the correlations among 
summated scales exceeded .5.  These additional two regression models confirmed all 
of the significant findings discovered in the previous four logistic regression models.  In 
addition, this multiple regression model found that pressure to perform also significantly 
related to a buyer’s likelihood of engaging in weak-form opportunistic behavior.  
Therefore, support was found for hypothesis four.  These two multiple regression 
models were re-run again after transforming the honesty/integrity construct to ensure 
that its skewed distribution did not hinder the model.  The results were unchanged; thus, 
the original models were retained for ease of interpreting the coefficients.  
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TABLE 4.5 
Multiple Regression Results - Weak-form Opportunism 
Variable B S.E.B β 95% Lower C.I. 
95% Upper 
C.I. t p VIF 
Buyer Power -.016 .025 -.038 -.065 .032 -.653 .514 1.24 
Relational 
Norms .004 .022 .011 -.040 .048 .176 .860 1.27 
CEV .028 .023 .069 -.017 .072 1.22 .223 1.14 
Pressure To 




.057 .019 .174 .020 .094  3.03 
 
.003 1.19 
Business Sector .319 .245 .073 -.162 .800 1.29 .196 1.13 
Machiavellianism .022 .030 .041 -.037 .080 .721 .471 1.18 
Honesty/Integrity -.130 .062 -.115 -.252 -.007 -2.07 .039 1.11 
Age .141 .166 .061 -.186 .468 .842 .401 1.89 
Experience -.005 .017 -.021 -.038 .028 -.287 .775 1.89 
SEU .380 .091 .235 .202 .559 4.169 .001 1.14 




Multiple Regression Results - Strong-form Opportunism 
Variable B S.E.B β 95% Lower C.I. 
95% Upper 
C.I. t p VIF 
Buyer Power .033 .023 .084 -.012 .079 1.425 .155 1.24 
Relational 
Norms -.006 .021 -.016 -.047 .036 -.258 .796 1.30 
CEV .043 .021 .115 .002 .085 2.02 .044 1.14 
Pressure To 




.005 .018 .018 -.029 .040  .310 
 
.757 1.18 
Business Sector -.383 .227 -.093 -.825 .059 -1.69 .092 1.08 
Machiavellianism -.021 .028 -.043 -.075 .034 -.745 .457 1.18 
Honesty/Integrity .055 .059 .053 -.060 .170 .938 .349 1.12 
Age -.079 .155 -.037 -.383 .224 -.511 .610 1.85 
Experience .001 .016 .004 -.030 .032 .051 .959 1.86 
SEU .284 .066 .236 .155 .413 4.30 .001 1.07 
R2 = .11         
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H12 posited that the predictors of weak-form opportunism and strong-form 
opportunism would be different.  The four models above show the significant predictors 
of weak-form opportunism to be honesty/integrity, leadership opportunism, business 
sector, and subjective expected utility.  Consistent with the hypothesis, some of the 
significant predictors of strong-form opportunism (buyer power and corporate ethical 
values) were indeed different than those of weak-form opportunism, and vice versa.  
However, further analysis was necessary to ensure that the posited predictors 
accounted for the difference in type of opportunism (weak versus strong) rather than 
some other factor(s).  Attention turned to the only predictor variable exclusively tied to 
the vignettes, subjective expected utility (SEU).  Although the differences in 
consequences of the two vignettes were intentionally mitigated, they were not 
prevented.  A comparison of means showed that the strong-form opportunism vignette 
rated significantly higher in SEU than that of weak-form opportunism (t = 16.31, p < .01).   
Because SEU of the strong-opportunism vignette was greater than that of the 
weak-opportunism vignette, it was necessary to explore whether differences in 
opportunistic choices were attributed to the type of opportunism (weak versus strong) as 
hypothesized or, conversely, to a difference in SEU between the vignettes.  First, for 
each case, the differences between the two SEU ratings were calculated.  Next a 
dummy variable was created to create two groups, high differences in SEU (greater 
than an absolute value of 1.5) and low differences (lower than an absolute value of 1.5).  
Next, several analyses of variance (ANOVA) tested for differences in the predictor 
variables (i.e., the ones that were different across the two types of opportunism).  No 
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differences were found between groups on honesty/integrity, leadership opportunism, 
buyer power, corporate ethical values, and pressure to perform.   
As a further test, interaction terms were created for each of the above-listed 
constructs (honesty/integrity*SEU groups, leadership opportunism*SEU groups, buyer 
power*SEU groups, corporate ethical values*SEU groups, and pressure to 
perform*SEU groups).  SEU group membership was determined by either a large or 
small difference between SEU ratings across the two vignettes.  These interaction terms 
were inserted into the logistic regression models shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4 (polar 
extremes models).   
The interaction tests produced different results for the weak and strong for 
models.  For the weak-form opportunism model, no interaction terms were significant 
and all previously-significant predictors remained so.  These findings suggest that none 
of the differences in significant predictors across the two vignettes is attributable to 
differences in SEU across vignettes.  However, for the strong-form opportunism model, 
the interaction term buyer power*SEU group was significant.  Thus, some evidence 
suggests that buyer power is a significant determinant of buyer likelihood of 
opportunistic action not because of a difference in type of opportunism, but at least 
partially because of a difference in SEU.  Nonetheless, after considering interaction 
terms of differences of SEU across vignettes, differences in predictors of strong versus 
weak opportunism remained such as honesty/integrity (weak), leadership opportunism 
(weak), pressure to perform (weak), and corporate ethical values (strong).  Therefore, 
H12 was supported.   
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H13 and H14 were tested using two separate procedures.  First, the odds ratios 
from the logistic regression models were examined.  In the weak-form opportunism 
vignette that included the entire combined sample (n = 328), the odds ratio was not 
significant.  Likewise, in the strong-form opportunism vignette (n = 328), the odds ratio 
was not significant.  However, when examining the polar extremes of the respondent’s 
decision of his or her likelihood of choosing to behave opportunistically, the odds ratios 
in both the weak and strong-form opportunism vignettes were significant.  Furthermore, 
for the weak-form opportunism model, the odd ratio was opposite of that hypothesized.  
In the weak-form opportunism vignette, government buyers were 59% (odds ratio .412, 
Wald chi-square 4.367, p < .05) less likely to choose to behave opportunistically.  In this 
scenario, 56.9% of government buyers indicated a high likelihood (5 - 8 on an eight 
point scale) of behaving opportunistically; whereas 73.8% of for-profit buyers held the 
same tendency.  In the strong-form opportunism vignette, government buyers were 
three times (odds ratio 3.07, Wald chi-square 6.28, p < .05) more likely to choose to 
behave opportunistically.  In this scenario, 69.3% of government buyers indicated a high 
likelihood (5 - 8 on an eight point scale) of behaving opportunistically, while 38.7% of 
their for-profit counterparts were such inclined. 
The second procedure used to examine H13 and H14 explored the intensity of 
the behavioral intentions.  An ANOVA examined differences between government and 
for-profit buyers on the decisions to behave opportunistically in the situations presented 
in the vignettes.  Rather than test the binary variable used in the logistic regression, this 
ANOVA used the metric data (rated 1 - 8) from the original responses to the question 
assessing the likelihood that the buyer would engage in the opportunistic behavior.  The 
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hypothesis that the government buyers would be less reluctant to engage in weak-form 
opportunism than would for-profit buyers was not supported (F = 0.195, p < 0.659).  
Through analysis of both testing procedures, H13 was clearly not supported.  However, 
the hypothesis that the for-profit buyers were more likely than the government buyers to 
engage in strong-form opportunism (H14) was supported (F = 4.85, p < .05).  The mean 
of the likelihood of behaving opportunistically was significantly higher among the for-
profit buyers.  Thus, for-profit buyers were more intense in their opportunistic intentions.  
Considering both testing procedures, H14 received mixed support.    
Across all of the models and testing methodologies, several constructs and 
variables failed to relate to a buyer’s likelihood of behaving opportunistically, either in its 
weak or strong-form.  These orphan constructs include relational norms, 
Machiavellianism, age, and experience.  Therefore, H2, H7, H9, and H10 were not 
supported.  Table 4.5 summarizes the results of all hypothesis testing.   
Socially-desirable responding (SDR) was tested statistically using the procedure 
for calculating the degree of overclaiming outlined in Randall and Fernandez (1991) and 
annotated in the previous chapter.  When adding the overclaiming score as an 
independent variable, it was not significant; thus, it is reasonable to conclude that SDR 
had no meaningful distorting effect on the responses.     
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TABLE 4.7 
Summary of Hypotheses 
(table continues) 
Hypotheses Result 
H1: There is a positive relationship between buyer 
power and a sourcing professional’s decision to 
behave opportunistically. 
Supported (Strong Opp.; p < .10) 
H2: There is a negative relationship between 
relational norms and a sourcing professional’s 
decision to behave opportunistically. 
Not Supported 
H3: There is a negative relationship between 
corporate ethical values (CEV) and a sourcing 
professional’s decision to behave 
opportunistically. 
Significant (Strong Opp.; p < .01); 
not in expected direction 
H4: There is a positive relationship between 
pressure to perform and a sourcing professional’s 
decision to behave opportunistically. 
Supported (Weak Opp.; p < .10) 
H5: There is a positive relationship between 
leaders’ opportunistic behavior and a sourcing 
professional’s decision to behave 
opportunistically. 
Supported (Weak Opp.; p  < .05) 
H6:  Overall, government sourcing professionals 
are more likely to behave opportunistically than 
are sourcing professionals employed in private 
industry.  
Mixed Support (Strong but not 
Weak Opp.; p < .05) 
H7:  There is a positive relationship between a 
sourcing professional’s Machiavellianism and his 
or her decision to behave opportunistically. 
Not Supported 
H8:  There is a negative relationship between a 
sourcing professional’s honesty/integrity and his 
or her decision to behave opportunistically. 
Supported (Weak Opp.; p < .05) 
H9:  Younger sourcing professionals are more 
likely to behave opportunistically than are older 
sourcing professionals.   
Not Supported 
H10:  Less experienced sourcing professionals 
are more likely to behave opportunistically than 
are seasoned sourcing professionals.   
Not Supported 
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TABLE 4.7 (continued) 
Hypotheses Result 
H11:  There is a positive relationship between 
subjective expected utility and a sourcing 
professional’s decision to behave 
opportunistically. 
Supported (Weak and Strong 
Opp.; p < .01) 
H12:  It is expected that the significant predictors 
of strong-form opportunism will be different than 
will be the significant predictors of weak-form 
opportunism.   
Supported 
H13:  Government sourcing professionals are less 
reluctant than are private-sector sourcing 
professionals to engage in weak-form 
opportunism. 
Not Supported 
H14:  Government sourcing professionals are 
more reluctant than are private-sector sourcing 








CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
 This study examined opportunism, an important phenomenon in buyer-supplier 
relations.  Its importance in theory and practice cannot be overemphasized since 
opportunism can degrade buyer-supplier relations and impact exchange-member 
performance.  The business press is replete with reports of opportunistic actions among 
firms (i.e., agents of firms).  Although not rampant, opportunistic behavior is sufficiently 
ubiquitous to warrant a substantial amount of empirical research in the last two 
decades.   
 Despite its importance, our understanding of opportunism is incomplete.  Gaps 
remain - partially due to a lack of integration of applicable theories and partially due to 
the customary unit of analysis from which inter-organizational opportunism has been 
studied, both of which are discussed next.  Opportunism serves as a fundamental 
assumption of a very rich research tradition explaining firm boundaries - transaction cost 
economics.  It is affected by buyer-supplier dynamics such as power-dependence and 
restrained by relational norms - a key tenet of social exchange theory.  Since, by 
definition, opportunism negatively affects the exchange partner, another rich stream of 
research, ethics, applies.  Ethics - the inquiry into the nature of moral judgments, 
standards, and rules of conduct - involves principles such as utilitarianism, justice, and 
rights that help govern individuals’ choices.  But absent in the literature was a fusion of 
the two disciplines - channels and ethics - that might better explain inter-firm 
opportunism, particularly from the buyer side of the dyad.  Since ethical theories 
attribute behavior to traits and to individuals’ assessments of their working environment 
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and the situation, an individual unit of analysis was warranted - but was absent from the 
literature.  Another reason justifying an individual-level unit of analysis is that individual 
agents of organizations make decisions and act on behalf of the organization.  
However, opportunism in business-to-business interactions has primarily been 
examined from an organizational unit of analysis.  This unit of analysis has precluded 
researchers from examining individual-level predictors of opportunistic behavior that are 
espoused in the ethics literature.  This resulted in the following problem.  We don’t know 
why sourcing professionals continue to engage in opportunistic tactics with their 
suppliers.   
 This research sought to bridge these gaps.  The objective was to help explain 
why sourcing professionals continue to engage in opportunistic tactics despite the 
obviously negative consequences and ethical dilemmas that result.  Specifically, this 
research explored whether the hypothesized relational factors, organization-
environmental factors, individual-difference factors, and the situation affect a buyer’s 
decision to behave opportunistically.  Additionally, of the factors examined, the research 
investigated which factor was the greatest determinant.  Finally, this study pursued 
empirical evidence of a difference between weak and strong-form opportunism and how 
this affects buyers’ decisions to behave opportunistically.   
 Overall, the synthesis of theories proved to be fruitful.  Specific results and 
implications are discussed below, and are organized as follows.  First, each of the 
hypothesized relationships is discussed.  Explanations for the findings - and in some 
cases, the lack of findings - and conclusions are offered.  Next, theoretical contributions 
are identified and discussed, followed by implications for practitioners.  The limitations 
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of the study are then identified.  The study is concluded with recommendations for 
future research and a summary.   
 
Discussion 
 This study examined two constructs known to affect inter-organizational 
dynamics, buyer power and relational norms.  The former was found to affect buyers’ 
decisions but only under situations involving strong-form opportunism.  Conversely, 
relational norms did not significantly decrease a buyer’s likelihood of behaving 
opportunistically.  These findings suggest that the buyer’s relative power advantage 
provides the confidence to the buyer that he or she can be successful in behaving 
opportunistically - where such behavior violates the contract.  Additionally, the findings 
suggest that buyers may not respect relational norms (e.g., trust, commitment, and 
cooperation) enough to forego opportunities for gain.  That relational norms did not 
decrease buyers’ likelihood of opportunistic behavior calls in to question the benefits - 
perhaps the overstated benefits (Blois 2005) - associated with relationship marketing.    
 The next group of predictors examined pertained to the organizational 
environment.  Overall, results supported past contingency models of ethical decision-
making presented in Chapter II (Table 2.1).  Results showed that pressure to perform 
on the job affects a buyer’s likelihood of behaving opportunistically, but only under weak 
forms of opportunism.  Hence, job pressures were not enough to cause a buyer to 
violate a contractual term.  However, where the contract is not violated by an act of 
opportunism, the buyer may be willing to compromise personal values and succumb to 
the pressures of the workplace.  Another environmental factor influencing weak-form 
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opportunistic behavior (but not strong-form) was leadership opportunism.  Where a 
leader is observed to endorse opportunistic treatment of suppliers, subordinates notice 
and adapt their behavior to match.   Additionally, the business sector in which the buyer 
works may impact the buyer’s decision.  Some evidence suggests that buyers of for-
profit organizations hold stronger affinities for the likelihood of opportunistic behavior, 
but only under situations involving strong-form opportunism.  Since behavioral intentions 
lead to behavior (Ajzen 1991), it is reasonable to conclude that stronger behavioral 
intentions among buyers in the for-profit sector will more likely be acted upon than will 
weaker intentions.  Conversely, under circumstances of weak-form opportunism, 
government buyers were not more opportunistic.  A lower level of relational norms 
served as the theoretical justification for this hypothesis.  However, further evaluation 
revealed that relational norms between government buyers and their suppliers versus 
for-profit buyers and their suppliers did not differ.  Thus, despite the highly-regulated 
and formalized structure of government procurement, buyers in this environment are 
able to develop and maintain relational norms (e.g., solidarity, role integrity, mutuality, 
flexibility, and harmonization of conflict) with suppliers.   
  In addition to organizational environmental factors, contingency models of 
ethical decision making posit the effects of individual-difference variables.  The traits 
examined in this study included honesty/integrity and Machiavellianism.  Additionally, 
two proxies for cognitive moral development (CMD) - age and experience - were 
included.  None of these predictors showed an effect on buyer likelihood of opportunistic 
behavior except honest/integrity.  The measurement of Machiavellianism suffered from 
low reliability and questionable construct validity, which may have impacted the results.  
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Also, age and experience do not tap the full domain of CMD; thus, a conclusion that 
CMD does not relate to buyers’ choices to engage in opportunistic behavior is 
inappropriate.  We can only infer that age and experience had no bearing on decisions 
in the contexts presented in the vignettes.   
 A buyer’s honesty/integrity effectively curtailed his or her likelihood of choosing to 
behave opportunistically, but only within situations involving weak-form opportunism.  
This phenomenon may be explained by the tradeoff between the deontological norms 
and teleological evaluations made by individuals.  Honesty/integrity represents a form of 
a deontological norm - a black and white moral standard.  However, a high teleological 
cost/benefit ratio, assessed herein as subjective expected utility (SEU), may be what is 
required to cause individuals to violate a contract (strong opportunism).  Hence, for 
some situations, SEU may be so great that any effects of honesty/integrity are 
overwhelmed.      
 Finally, as predicted by contingency theories of ethical decision making, the 
particular situation at hand is important.  The teleological evaluation, operationalized as 
SEU, has a significant effect on buyer behavior in both forms of opportunism.  In fact, in 
three of the four logistic regression models, SEU was the strongest positive predictor.  
Additionally, the form of opportunism, weak or strong, in each situation is an important 
factor in explaining buyer opportunism.   
 The purpose of this research was to enhance our understanding with respect to 
why buyers choose to behave opportunistically.  The findings of this research at least 
partially alleviate the problem that motivated the research.  The first research question 
sought to identify the factors that contribute to the individual buyer’s decision to behave 
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opportunistically.  According to these findings, buyers behave opportunistically because 
of the buyer’s power position, the business sector in which the buyer works, pressure to 
perform on the job, leaders’ opportunistic attitudes and behavior, the buyer’s 
honesty/integrity trait, and the prospective net benefit (SEU) of the situation at hand.  
These factors were discoverable only by examining the individual - versus 
organizational - unit of analysis.  The second research question pursued the identity of 
the factor with the greatest effect on the sourcing professional’s decision to act 
opportunistically.  This research identified the net benefit (SEU) as the single greatest 
contributor to the buyer’s decision.  The third research question inquired whether 
differences existed in the predictors of strong-form versus weak-form opportunism.  The 
findings suggest that these predictors differ providing evidence that:  (1) the strong-
weak distinction between types of opportunism is meaningful and (2) that differing levels 
of moral intensity matter in a given situation.  Attention now turns to the implications of 
these answers.    
 
Theoretical Implications 
 This study makes six important contributions to our understanding of 
opportunism in buyer-supplier relations.  First, this research integrates theories from two 
disciplines.  Second, this study refines our understanding of how individual decision-
making manifests in organizational-level phenomenon prescribed by TCE theory.  Third, 
the findings of this research expand ethical decision-making models to include buyer-
supplier relationship factors such as buyer power.  Fourth, this study finds a meaningful 
distinction between strong and weak forms of opportunism.   Fifth, a new measurement 
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scale to measure pressure to perform is offered for future use.  Finally, this study 
identified business sector as an important variable to consider in ethics and marketing 
theories.  Each of these contributions is expounded below. 
 This research explores, in one study, literature streams - such as marketing 
channels and ethics - known to impact ethical decisions in the context of buyer-supplier 
relationships.  Thus, the relative effects of individual-difference variables, environmental 
factors, the situation at hand, power, and relational norms were able to be assessed.  
From this assessment, clearly, SEU dominated buyer decision making.  SEU is a 
situational variable that is prescribed by the various contingency models of ethical 
decision making.  Therefore, ethical theory, rather than buyer-supplier relationship 
theories (e.g., marketing channels), seems to provide the greatest explanation of the 
opportunism phenomenon.  This finding supports the contention that research on 
opportunism should be conducted at the individual-level unit of analysis versus the that 
of the organizational level.   
 Second, the study supplements transaction cost economic (TCE) theory by:  (1) 
analyzing opportunism at the individual’s psyche level and (2) determining the factors 
that lead to a decision to employ opportunistic tactics.  This, in turn, facilitates a better 
explanation of firm boundaries because predictors of opportunism - the driver of 
transaction costs - can be identified and assessed.   
 Third, this research expands the ethics literature by considering buyer-supplier 
relationship factors (from the TCE and channels literature), previously unaccounted for 
in the ethics literature.  This study found that buyer power can influence buyers to 
violate contract terms (strong-form opportunism).  Therefore, ethical decision-making 
 135
models, at least in the context of business-to-business interactions, should include 
buyer-supplier relationship factors as predictors of opportunistic behavior. 
 Finally, the study empirically contrasted strong versus weak opportunism (Luo 
2006) and found that differences in moral intensity apparently affect buyer behavior.  
Therefore, Jones’ (1991) theory of moral intensity, likely the social consensus and 
temporal immediacy components, was observed to apply to inter-organizational dyads.  
This research offers moral intensity as the underlying theoretical foundation for 
differences in types of opportunism, and finds that strong and weak types of 
opportunism are meaningful distinctions.  Previous research (Wathne and Heide 2000) 
created a taxonomy of opportunism but it was supported neither by underlying theory 
nor quantitative empirical data. 
  This study also contributes to the efforts of future researchers.  Though 
unintentional, a refined scale for the construct pressure to perform was developed.  This 
scale differs from the original scale of Robertson and Rymon (2001) by measuring 
general job stress rather than threat to job security.  In this sense, the new scale 
provided herein is applicable to government employees - who typically don’t experience 
the same degree of threat to job security - and employees of for-profit firms.  The three-
item scale demonstrated sufficient reliability and construct validity; thus, it may be a 
useful measurement instrument for future research involving pressure to perform. 
 Finally, this research addressed an important gap in the body of marketing 
knowledge.  Reid and Plank (2000) called attention to the mystery of marketing to 
government entities.  This study peeks behind the curtain and uncovers key insights 
about the nature of government buyers, namely that they are less likely than their for-
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profit counterparts to violate contracts (strong-form opportunism).  This finding 
underscores the importance that government buyers place on written expectations.  
Additionally, that relational norms did not affect decision-making highlights the lack of 
emphasis on, and comparative importance of, relational norms among government 
buyers.  The theoretical implication raised by this research is that business sector (i.e., 
government) may be a key moderator in relationship marketing causal relationships. 
Perhaps the same effects in a government setting may not be as strong. 
 
Managerial Implications 
 In addition to the contributions to theory, the findings of this study should yield 
several benefits for procurement practitioners, both in the government and for-profit 
sectors.  First, knowledge of the factors causing buyers to behave opportunistically 
should allow organizations’ leaders to make more accurate judgments of what functions 
to insource rather than outsource.  The findings of this research suggest that managers 
should be aware of the buyer’s power position, the business sector, a buyer’s perceived 
pressure to perform on the job, opportunism exhibited by leaders, buyers’ 
honesty/integrity, and the potential net benefits of the situation at hand.  A better 
estimate of the probability of opportunistic behavior, given conducive circumstances, 
should yield a more accurate estimate of monitoring and other control costs – a central 
tenet of TCE theory that affects the make or buy decision.  A more accurate 
assessment of these transaction costs should result in a better decision. 
 Second, an understanding of the individual factors driving opportunistic behavior 
should enable organizational leadership to hire and appropriately assign sourcing talent 
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to manage particular groups of company spend.  Non-critical spend includes purchased 
goods and services that: (1) do not contribute much to the organization’s competitive 
advantage and (2) do not pose a risk to the organization’s performance if delayed or 
absent.  Because of these characteristics, suppliers of non-critical goods and services 
are best suited for transactional governance (Webster 1992).  In contrast, strategic 
spend involves goods and services that: (1) contribute substantially to the organization’s 
competitive advantage and (2) pose a risk to the organization’s performance if delayed 
or absent.  These characteristics of strategic spend make it conducive to relational 
governance (Kraljic 1983).  Thus, for those categories of spend where building and 
sustaining relationships with suppliers is paramount, the sourcing professionals hired or 
assigned to manage those relationships/contracts should be screened for relational 
traits such as honesty/integrity.  Such relationships with suppliers are built on trust and 
commitment - relational norms that can be damaged by acts of opportunism.  An 
individual buyer’s honesty/integrity reduces the inclination to behave opportunistically.  
Thus, hiring authorities will want to know whether their candidates are adequately 
equipped to resist opportunism.  Additionally, with respect to internal candidates whom 
management might want to promote, these results suggest that an organization should 
emphasize integrity in its developmental education and training.  
 In addition, leaders’ awareness of the inter-firm, organizational, individual and 
situational factors driving opportunism will help leaders manage buyer-supplier 
relationships by knowing which factors to monitor.  This study suggests that leaders will 
need to track the expected utility of situations where buyers could be tempted to behave 
opportunistically both involving potential contract violations (strong-form opportunism) 
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and potential non-contract, or relational norm, violations (weak-form opportunism).  
Since these opportunities appear frequently across the many contracts managed by 
sourcing professionals, these findings suggest that senior procurement executives 
should seriously consider the span of control of the sourcing manager.  A sourcing 
manager cannot reasonably be expected to monitor all potentially-risky situations where 
he or she is accountable for either too many contracts/relationships or too many 
sourcing professionals.  Notwithstanding, since SEU is the strongest factor influencing a 
likelihood of behaving opportunistically, managers must ask themselves why buyers, in 
a given situation, might perceive a net benefit of the opportunistic behavior.  Is the 
leader’s own incentive structure increasing the perceived payoff of such behavior?  
Where buyers are rewarded for short-term financial gains, opportunistic tendencies may 
prevail.  The finding of this research that the net benefit (SEU) is paramount in buyer 
decision making suggests that leaders will need to examine how buyers are assessing 
SEU - that is, whether buyers are assessing SEU over the long term (which considers 
total cost ramifications) or the short term (which may be myopic).     
 The findings of this research suggest that the buyer’s power position matters 
when contemplating an act of opportunism.  As such, leaders should monitor the 
balance of power between the dyad.  Relative positions of power/dependence change 
constantly with changes in the market, market share, and number of suppliers.  Leaders 
should be aware of how individual buyers perceive their organization’s power position 
and their propensity to leverage that power.  Leaders must introspectively monitor their 
own behavior and the behavior of the organization at large.  The ability to monitor and 
control propensities to act opportunistically should decrease instances of opportunism.  
 139
This, in turn, should increase relationship success by preserving relational norms and 
performance.  By monitoring the factors that contribute to opportunism, and by not 
monitoring irrelevant factors, organizations can make the most effective use of scarce 
resources.  Finally, monitoring factors that contribute to strong-form opportunism should 
enable leaders to prevent the risky behavior that could jeopardize the organization, 
particularly from litigation.     
 Another practical contribution of this research is the discovery that leaders can 
have a substantial impact on subordinates in at least three ways.  First, when leaders 
behave opportunistically, the findings of this study suggest that followers mimic that 
behavior.  Leaders cannot expect subordinates to do as they say, but not as they do.  
Clearly, leaders’ attitudes and actions toward suppliers manifest in subordinates’ 
behaviors.  Not only do leaders’ own behavior and words matter, but so does the 
emphasis they place on employees to deliver results.  If leaders are not careful, 
opportunistic treatment of suppliers may be the buyer’s shortcut to alleviate 
performance pressures.   
 Since differences were discovered across business sectors, there are also 
sector-specific implications.  This study found that government buyers are more 
reluctant to engage in opportunism that results in a contract violation (strong-form).  An 
examination of (1) the structure of government procurement and (2) the reward - and 
punishment - system of government procurement may help understand this finding.  
Government procurement procedures are tightly bound by statue and regulation.  
Because the government is a steward of public funds and, therefore, the public’s trust, 
there also exists much oversight from internal and external agencies - making detection 
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of procedural violations plausible.  Violations of policy, regulation, and public law can 
result in hefty legal or administrative punishment.  Likewise, violations of explicit 
agreements are often detectable, and can result in serious consequences such as 
formal disputes and litigation.  Consequently, in government procurement, the written 
contract is likely well-respected and relied upon as the primary governance mechanism 
- regardless of the type of spend.  This transparency of government procurement 
coupled with the importance on the written agreement likely suppresses much of the 
opportunistic tendencies of buyers. Therefore, when dealing with the government and 
prior to contract formation, suppliers should advocate inserting the maximum detail of 
expectations into the written contract.  In this sense, otherwise weak-form opportunism 
transforms to strong-form opportunism, and a natural insulation is built in.  This 
protection is important considering the magnitude of the government sector of the 
economy.  The federal portion alone accounted for 378 billion dollars awarded through 
5.9 million contracts in fiscal year 2005 (Federal Procurement Report FY 2005).     
 As a general observation, more predictive factors were discovered for weak-form 
opportunism (five) than for strong-form (three).  At first glance, this may appear 
disappointing since managers want to prevent contract violations due to their 
potentially-damaging consequences.  However, weak-form opportunism may also have 
serious ramifications such as deteriorating relational norms.  Since weak-form 
opportunism is more difficult to detect, buyers are not deterred by the threat of discovery 
and follow-on sanctions.  Thus, weak-form opportunism should be more prevalent.  It 
should be important to mitigate this otherwise more prevalent behavior that might 
compromise the organization.     
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Limitations 
 This study is not without weaknesses; it suffers from limitations common to 
survey methodologies and ethics research.  First, a scaled dependent variable 
attempting to assess a choice given a scenario, in reality, can only approximate a 
behavioral intention.  Whereas behavioral intentions are solid predictors of choice 
(Fishbein and Ajzen 1991), their correlation to an actual behavioral choice is less than 
1.0.  Thus, findings of significant factors contributing to choices to utilize opportunistic 
tactics in this study must be qualified as explaining behavioral intentions and not 
necessarily the behavior itself.  This limitation renders the causal inferences that can be 
made from predictors to behavior less than perfect. 
 Second, the research design relied upon self-reported data from respondents.  
Where two or more constructs are measured by self-reports, the data may be 
contaminated by common method variance (CMV) (Podsakoff and Organ 1986).  
Podsakoff and Organ (1986) preferred research design remedies over post hoc 
statistical tests used to detect CMV.  This research applied both.  The design of the 
research employed the scale-trimming method of eliminating overlap in items measuring 
the independent and dependent variables.  This was accomplished by measuring multi-
item latent constructs as independent variables, but using an interval-scale single 
choice as the dependent variable.  As a statistical test, Harman’s one-factor test 
revealed that when all of the items were run in a single factor analysis, the unrotated 
solution did not result in a single factor, nor did it result in a general factor that 
accounted for most of the covariation (Podsakoff and Organ 1986).  Based on the 
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research design defense mechanism employed and the results of the statistical test, the 
impact of CMV on this research is expected to be minimal. 
 Third, the response rate of 11.4% is contingent on accurate reporting from each 
company’s focal point of contact.  For example, if a purchasing executive reported that 
they would send the survey invitation to ten employees, but, actually sent it to more or 
fewer, the reported response rate would be inaccurate.  However, since a small portion 
(30%) of the combined sample was collected using this methodology, any small 
deviations should not materially alter the response rate.   
 Fourth, the generalizability of the findings may be compromised by the low 
response rate.  Nonetheless, multiple tests did not generate evidence of a non-
response bias.  An examination of the demographic data showed that a broad 
representation of industries, organizational sizes, type of organizations, buyer ages, 
buyer experience, and buyer gender.  This evidence did not suggest that the 
generalizability of the study should be limited.  Furthermore, low response rates in 
survey research are becoming commonplace (Larson 2005). 
 Fifth, without a completely random sample, a response bias is possible where the 
company point of contact is permitted to determine, based on undiscoverable criteria, 
the survey recipients.  Thus, although improbable, it is plausible that survey candidates 
selected by organizational focal points of contact could have differed by some 
unmeasured demographic or trait resulting in a selection bias. 
 Sixth, the research design relied upon one vignette for each type of opportunism, 
weak and strong.  As noted in chapter one, opportunism is broad; it may be manifested 
in many ways.  Two vignettes can only examine two of these manifestations.  It is 
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conceivable that different situations or opportunities to behave opportunistically may 
elicit different responses, particularly in light of the findings pertaining to hypothesis 12 - 
that predictors of strong-form and weak-form opportunism are different.  Therefore, a 
strict interpretation may limit the study’s generalizability to situations involving deceit or 
breach of contract (vignette involving altered quality control terms) and withholding 
information (vignette involving concealed intent to not renew a separate contract).   
 Finally, corporate ethical values (CEV) positively related to buyer’s likelihood of 
strong-form opportunistic behavior.  The direction of this relationship is opposite of that 
expected.  This finding may be an artifact of the particular vignette chosen to represent 
strong-form opportunism rather than a true effect.  The vignette involved a supplier who 
is delivering sub-standard product or service.  The act of opportunism made available to 
the respondent was the option to unilaterally violate the contract by altering the 
inspection terms from random to targeted - in order to detect the supplier’s non-
conformances.  This may have been a matter of reversed ethical values - that is, where 
the organization’s expectation of high ethical values are extended as expectations onto 
the supplier.  Perhaps respondents thought it consistent with corporate ethical values to 
catch a supplier that may be cheating the organization.  This potential confound casts 
doubt on any inferences of the effect of CEV on the likelihood of opportunistic behavior.  
 
Future Research Directions 
 Future research should follow and build upon the promising findings of this study.  
First, although the models exhibited good fit and several factors were found to 
significantly affect a buyer’s likelihood of behaving opportunistically, the proportion of 
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variance explained was low.  Thus, other unidentified factors may further explain buyer 
opportunistic behavior.  One factor that might further explain opportunistic behavior is 
the trait achievement motivation, the degree to which individuals seek success, strive to 
get ahead, and assume responsibility for solving problems (McClelland 1961).  Since it 
has been found that those who use opportunistic tactics obtain more personally 
favorable outcomes than those who do not (Aquino 1998), and since one’s level of 
achievement motivation may direct his or her behavior (McClelland 1961), the effect of 
achievement motivation on opportunistic behavior is worth exploring.  A study 
examining this effect could be designed either as a multi-variate analysis of survey data 
as employed herein or a field experiment - whose strengths are discussed next.  
Second, note that this correlational study based on cross-sectional data is limited 
in its ability to detect causal relations.  That several hypothesized constructs and 
variables were not found to be significant influencers of buyers’ decisions to behave 
opportunistically does not necessarily mean that the non-significant factors do not affect 
the buyers’ decisions.  It could be that the survey methodology coupled with 
manufactured situations (i.e., the vignettes) could not elicit completely realistic 
responses.  Future research should employ a stronger method of inference such as a 
field experiment.  The research question might address whether the true effects of 
predictors on opportunistic behavior are actually stronger than that determined in this 
survey research.  Perhaps a context closer to reality (than a short vignette) that 
provides more information could excite the subjects to assess the factors even more 
accurately.   
 Additionally, the present research only considered antecedents to a decision to 
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behave opportunistically.  Future research should examine the consequences of the 
opportunistic actions at the individual unit of analysis.  For instance, longitudinal 
research may help discern whether a pattern of decisions to behave opportunistically 
influences future decisions.  Since prior success leads to continued behavior (Ouellette 
and Wood 1998), the success (or failure) of past opportunistic actions might be another 
factor influencing the buyer’s decision to behave opportunistically in the future.  One 
method for testing this relationship is a repeated survey separated by a period of time.  
While this method best captures a realistic context, it might be difficult to obtain a 
sufficient sample of individuals who have experienced successes or failures with uses of 
opportunism with similar consequences.  Thus, a series of field experiments might be 
preferred.    
 Next, the mixed results in one aspect of this research, business sector, suggest 
that further research is necessary in order to fully understand differences between 
government and for-profit buyer behavior.  This study found that where buyers indicated 
very strong tendencies either for or against strong and weak-form opportunism (polar 
extremes), government buyers were half as likely to engage in weak-form opportunism, 
but three times more likely to commit strong-form opportunism.  These findings are 
opposite to that expected.  However, they could be due to artifacts of the scenarios.  
The vignette representing strong-form opportunism involved a supplier who failed to 
meet quality standards.  Perhaps government buyers perceived a greater entitlement to 
agreed-upon performance levels.  If this was the case, future research should control for 
distributive justice.  Further analysis (ANOVA) on the metric dependent variable without 
a dichotomous split revealed that when including all respondents, for-profit buyers had 
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materially higher tendencies to engage in strong-form opportunism.  These results seem 
somewhat contradictory to those of the polar extremes analysis prompting further 
examination.       
 Future research should expand this study internationally.  The research question 
would address whether the individual-level and organizational-level antecedents of 
opportunism differ due to cultural differences.  Similar to the method adopted herein, 
cultural moderators could be explored using multi-variate analysis of cross-sectional 
survey data.  Furthermore, a Web-based survey might prove particularly useful to reach 
distant populations.  Marketing scholars have long-sought expanded international 
research (Steenkamp 2005).  Such knowledge of international supply chain 
relationships is critical due to the perpetually-emerging global economy.   
 Another opportunity for further research involves the role of sellers.  The 
knowledge base would be enhanced by a similar understanding of the sell side of the 
dyad.  Future research should explore why sellers behave opportunistically toward 
buyers.  These findings, coupled with the findings of this study, would permit an 
opportunism gap analysis that might serve as a useful independent variable affecting 
relationship success.  Undoubtedly, there remains great opportunity to build on this 
research to further advance our understanding of buyer-supplier relationships and 
associated organizational performance. 
 
Summary 
 A synthesis of theories from other disciplines - namely marketing channels and 
ethics - has proven useful in explaining why sourcing professionals may choose to 
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behave opportunistically toward suppliers.  An inter-firm factor, buyer power, was found 
to affect the buyer’s decision.  In addition, organizational-environmental factors such as 
leadership opportunism, pressure to perform, and business sector were influential.  
Notwithstanding, a characteristic of the individual, honesty/integrity, related to the 
sourcing professional’s likely behavior - confirming the appropriateness of examining 
opportunism at the individual unit of analysis.  Finally, the situational variable, subjective 
expected utility, was found to be a strong predictor of opportunistic behavior.   
 This research contributes the identity of the aforementioned factors driving 
opportunistic behavior, and makes the following additional contributions.  By integrating 
a variety of theories from distinct disciplines, this research was able to identify ethical 
decision-making theory as offering the greatest explanation of buyer opportunistic 
behavior.  Finally, by examining strong and weak types of opportunism, this study found 
that the moral intensity of the situation affects buyer’s likely behavior.   
Through greater awareness and more understanding of these factors, 
organizational leaders may be able to exercise greater control and mitigate 
opportunistic behavior of its sourcing staff where appropriate.  Consistent with TCE 
theory, such a feat could have a significant impact on the supply chain by lowering 
monitoring costs and, consequently, reducing the costs of exchange on the open 
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1. Protester’s contention that the agency conducted flawed discussions 
regarding price is sustained where (1) the agency corrected an error in the 
awardee’s pricing; (2) the agency concluded that the awardee’s price, as 
corrected, violated the solicitation’s price target; (3) the agency advised the 
awardee in discussions that its price violated the solicitation’s price target, 
though it did not, but never disclosed the upward adjustment it had made to 
correct the pricing error; (4) the awardee lowered its price in its final proposal, 
but repeated the pricing error it had made before; and (5) the agency selected 
that offeror for award after concluding that its significant price advantage offered 
the best value to the government. Thus, the record, as a whole, shows that the 
flawed discussions led the awardee to significantly lower its price, and the 
selection decision turned on the price differential between awardee and the 
protester.  
2. Protester’s contention that the agency failed to evaluate price proposals for 
completeness is sustained where the record shows that: (1) the solicitation 
expressly advised that price proposals would be assessed for completeness, 
including an assessment of the traceability of price estimates, and required that 
offerors submit detailed pricing data showing the traceability of those estimates 
in a work breakdown structure; (2) the agency never performed the 
completeness review; and (3) it is reasonable to conclude that, had it not been 
compelled to structure its proposal to comply with this solicitation requirement, 
the protester could have employed a different approach to structuring its 
proposal which could have resulted in a lower price. 
3. Protester’s contention that the evaluation of technical proposals was 
unreasonable is sustained where the record shows that the evaluation deviated 
from the stated evaluation criteria under one of the technical subfactors. 





Misled Protest that published synopsis expressing an agency’s intent to award a sole-source 
contract under simplified acquisition procedures was improper because the 
synopsis 
lacked necessary information is sustained where the synopsis did not accurately 
describe the agency’s requirements. 
 
In light of the misleading notice used here, Information Ventures, as well as 
other 
potential contractors, was denied any realistic opportunity to compete for the 
agency’s requirements. 
B-293541 9 Apr 04 Dept. of Health and 
Human Services - 
National Institutes 








The record here also discloses that the agency’s sole-source determination may 
not be reasonable. We first note in this regard that the agency has never 
synopsized its intent to make a sole-source award to Metaworks. Although the 
agency points out that it received no responses (other than the protester’s) to 
the December 15 pre-solicitation notice, the agency also acknowledges that the 
pre-solicitation notice was misclassified as “medical services,” rather than as 
“other scientific and technical consulting services.” AR, Tab 1, Statement of 
Facts, at 4. The document that the agency terms a “revised notice” was, in 
actuality, an RFQ apparently issued only to IVI. Given these flaws, the agency’s 
actions may have denied potential sources (other than the protester) the 
opportunity to respond to a proper synopsis of the agency’s intended sole-
source.  
 
This description, on its face, suggests that there are other providers of these 
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(Make or Buy 
Cost Study) 
Misled Notwithstanding this document indicating the MEO’s intended staffing levels, the record shows that the MEO affirmatively represented to the technical evaluators 
that it was using 38.5 FTEs to perform the requirement, which was inconsistent 
with the 34.5 FTEs used to calculate the MEO’s cost (there is no dispute that, at 
least in the initial cost comparison, only 34.5 FTEs were used to calculate the 
MEO’s cost).  In this connection, the narrative portion of the TPP specifically 
describes the MEO’s proposed staffing as including 38.5 employees. AR, exh. 
28, at 9-10. 
 
In order to meet the PWS requirement for a call monitoring program, 
the MEO proposed a program purportedly based on meeting the ANSI/ASQ 
standard, and in doing so created the impression that its proposed sample size 
was consistent with that standard, when this in fact was apparently not the case. 
Had the evaluators been aware that the proposed sample size was significantly 
below that called for under the ANSI/ASQ standard, they may not have found 
that the MEO’s proposed quality control program met the requirements of the 
PWS.  As noted, we find that the agency unreasonably evaluated the MEO’s 
TPP based on a higher level of staffing than was included in the calculation of 
the cost of in-house performance, and also may not have properly considered 
the adequacy of the proposed level of staffing for 
the MEO’s quality control program. 
B-294572 1 Dec 04 Dept. of Agriculture 














We also note that to the extent that the agency believed Spherix’s approach to 
the marketing plan requirement was inadequate (the SSET’s briefing slides 
identified this to be a “significant weakness”), this should have been, but was 
not, raised with Spherix during discussions. 
Given Spherix’s substantial price advantage, any narrowing of the difference in 
perceived difference in technical quality between Spherix’s and 
ReserveAmerica’s proposal could result in a different selection decision. In this 
respect, the SSA admitted that he may have made a different selection decision 
if “ReserveAmerica [did] not provide sufficient value to bridge the gap between 
the cost differences.”20 See Tr. at 126. As a result, we conclude that the flaws 
in the evaluation of proposals prejudiced Spherix, and we therefore sustain this 
basis of Spherix’s protest.  
It is a fundamental precept of negotiated procurements that discussions, when 
conducted, must be meaningful; that is, discussions may not mislead offerors 
and must identify deficiencies and significant weaknesses in each offeror’s 
proposal that could reasonably be addressed in a manner to materially enhance 
the offerors potential for receiving award.  








In view of the foregoing, we sustain LMC’s protest on grounds that the agency 
improperly engaged in post-FPR discussions with EDS, but not LMC, and 
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Where a senior procurement official who functioned as the source selection 
authority has acknowledged bias in favor of the awardee, and was materially 
involved in the evaluation of proposals, indicating during the evaluation process 
that she believed the awardee’s technical ratings should be raised in various 
areas and that the protesters’ technical ratings should be lowered in various 
areas, the protests are sustained based on the agency’s failure to demonstrate 
that the senior official’s acknowledged bias did not prejudice the protesters and 
that the integrity of the procurement process was not compromised.  
Protests are sustained where, following submission of final proposal revisions, 
the agency reopened discussions in order to permit the ultimate awardee to 
address an aspect of its proposal that was contrary to instructions previously 
given by the agency during discussions, but failed to identify similar concerns 
with the proposals of the protesters.  
On February 23, while the evaluation was still ongoing, the contracting officer 
sent the evaluators an e-mail, carrying the subject heading “Database 
Cleanup/Organization,” directing the evaluators to “clean up” and “delete” 
various portions of the evaluation record.  
We similarly reject the agency’s assertion that “the evaluation process was 
conducted properly.” As discussed above, the agency clearly failed to treat 
offerors fairly with regard to discussions. 
B-293348 4 Mar 04 Dept. of Justice - 






Center  in 
Nashville, TN  
Withheld 
Information 
Based on the hearing testimony and the documentation in the record, we find 
that the SSA was not presented with an accurate summary of the offerors’ 
evaluated past performance to support his cost/technical tradeoff judgment.  
 











Neither the language of the solicitation, nor the information provided by the 
agency 
during discussions, reasonably placed the offerors on notice that 
“contractorspecific” 
savings would have no effect on the agency’s calculation of AUPC. 
Further, the agency 
clearly knew, or should have known, that Lockheed’s initially proposed AUPC 
was 
based on “contractor-specific” costs, including the costs associated with the 
proposed [deleted]; yet the agency failed to advise Lockheed during discussions 
that 
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Based on this information, the protester’s comments on the agency report 
included the allegation that the Navy had provided Eastern with an unfair 
competitive advantage in the reopened competition when it informed Eastern, 
during its post-award debriefing, that the RFP requirements would probably not 
be removed under the PPV program during the life of the contract. According to 
the protest, the Navy should have disclosed this information to all the offerors 
when it reopened the competition.7  
 
It is a fundamental principle of competitive negotiations that offerors must be 
provided with the same statements of the agency’s requirements so as to 
provide a common basis for the submission of proposals. Union Carbide Corp., 
B-184495, Feb. 26, 1976, 76-1 CPD ¶ 134. The Navy asserts that the 
information it provided Eastern did not in any way change the terms of the 
solicitation since the solicitation did not discuss the PPV schedule and thus that 
it did not provide Eastern with a competitive advantage.  
The information given to Eastern concerning the PPV program, however, was 
clearly material for purposes of proposal preparation since it provided additional 
information concerning an important aspect of the agency’s requirements.8 The 
RFP expressly identified the risks associated with the PPV program--the fact 
that contract requirements may be eliminated--and warned offerors that the 
costs of eliminating requirements due to the PPV program would not be 
negotiated. Thus, as SYMVIONICS notes, a reasonable offeror would have 
factored the risk of PPV implementation into its prices. [Deleted]. SYMVIONICS 
further notes that the Navy has eliminated hundreds of housing units under two 
SYMVIONICS contracts as well as an entire contract for 3,300 housing units, as 
a result of the PPV program. Because Eastern knows that the risk associated 
with the PPV program is minimal in this instance, it can more accurately reflect 
this risk in its pricing in the recompetition.  








We find that DEA’s use of BPAs to fulfill its hazardous waste cleanup 
requirements failed to comply with applicable competition requirements in 
several regards. First, the choice of vendors with whom DEA established BPAs 
was noncompetitive and apparently based upon the personal preference of local 
agency personnel. DEA also viewed the establishment of BPAs as a form of 
“down-select” that effectively determined which vendors the agency would 
exclusively consider and utilize to meet its hazardous waste cleanup 
requirements. See OMNIPLEX World Servs. Corp., supra. Lastly, DEA’s 
subsequent decision to noncompetitively issue purchase orders to select BPA 
holders was not consistent with the applicable standard--obtaining competition 
to the maximum extent practicable. 
In sum, as asserted in Envirosolve’s earlier protest, the record shows that DEA 
failed to adhere to applicable competition requirements in its procurements here. 
In addition, DEA failed to promptly implement its proposed corrective action, 
effectively requiring the protester to file a second protest, and thereby defeating 
the goal of resolving protests economically and expeditiously.  
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While an agency is not required to “spoon-feed” an offeror during discussions as 
to each and every item that could be revised to improve its proposal, see ITT 
Fed. Sys. Int’l Corp., B-285176.4, B-285176.5, Jan. 9, 2001, 2001 CPD ¶ 45 at 
6, agencies must impart sufficient information to afford offerors a fair and 
reasonable opportunity to identify and correct deficiencies, excesses or 
mistakes in their proposals. Matrix Int’l Logistics, Inc., B-272388.2, Dec. 9, 1996, 
97-2 CPD ¶ 89 at 9. In this case, we conclude that CITI could not be reasonably 
expected to have understood the true nature and magnitude of the agency’s 
concern with its proposal based upon the information provided by the Army 
during its discussions with CITI, thus rendering those discussions essentially 
meaningless.  
By informing CITI only that its total price was “overstated,” the Army failed to 
convey, in any meaningful way, the magnitude of the disparity in prices. 
Moreover, by characterizing the issue simply as one of price, the agency failed 
to address the underlying cause of CITI’s unreasonable pricing9 
As a consequence, CITI could not reasonably have understood the agency’s 
concern with its proposal or the fact that its proposal required fundamental 
changes in order to have a reasonable chance of being selected for award. 
Accordingly, the agency’s discussions were not meaningful.  








The protesters both argue that the synopsis did not indicate that any of these 
matters needed to be addressed in their respective responses.  Thompson 
argues that “were Thompson given the chance [it] could demonstrate expertise 
in all of these topics,” 
 
A synopsis must provide an “accurate description” of the property or service to 
be purchased and must be sufficient to allow a prospective contractor to make 
an informed business judgment as to whether to request a copy of the 
solicitation. 
 
Here, the notice, as issued, did not meaningfully describe DOE’s requirements. 
 
Moreover, DOE compounded the shortcomings of this particular notice by 
providing no information on the availability of a statement of work and by stating 
in the synopsis that the notice “is for informational purposes only and is no a 
request for proposals or other information.” Cf. 41 U.S.C. § 416(b)(4); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 637(f); FAR § 5.207(c)(15).9  The protesters and the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) argue, and we agree, that the language of the synopsis 
discouraged, and may have been intended to discourage, responses.   
B-297758 1 Mar 06 Dept. of Health & 
Human Services - 







Misled IVI also contends that the cost realism adjustments were unreasonable because the agency misled it during discussions.  
Although neither of the written discussions questions specifically directed IVI to 
reduce its proposed hours for the project director position, IVI contends that the 
agency indicated during an August 19, 2005 telephone conversation that the 
agency anticipated a reduced role for the project director:  
As discussed above, IVI and BRI each reduced the number of hours proposed 
for the project director position after discussions with the agency.  
Normalization involves the adjustment of offers to the same standard or baseline 
where there is no logical basis for a difference in approach or where there is 
insufficient information provided with the proposals, leading to the establishment 
of common “should have bid” estimates by the agency. See The Research 
Found. of State Univ. of New York, B-274269, Dec. 2, 1996, 96-2 CPD ¶ 207 at 
5. Normalization is not proper, however, where varying costs between 
competing proposals result from different technical approaches that are 
permitted by the RFP.  
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In our view, DOL did not act reasonably in determining that Odyssey’s 
spreadsheets were not in good order and did not provide clear and convincing 
evidence of Odyssey’s intended bid. DOL’s reversal of its initial decision 
permitting Odyssey to upwardly correct the bid was based upon what DOL 
regarded as possible additional mistakes in the spreadsheets beyond the one 
Odyssey claimed. Under FAR § 14.407-1, in cases of apparent mistakes and in 
cases where the contracting officer has reason to believe that a mistake may 
have been made, the contracting officer is required to request from the bidder a 
verification of the bid, calling attention to the suspected mistakes. Since DOL 
suspected other mistakes in Odyssey’s bid than the one Odyssey was 
requesting to correct, consistent with FAR § 14.407-1, it should have requested 
further verification of Odyssey’s bid price, and called Odyssey’s attention to the 
suspected mistakes in its spreadsheets. In this regard, FAR § 14.407-3(g)(1)(iv) 
provides that to ensure that the bidder will be put on notice of mistakes 
suspected by the contracting officer, the bidder should be advised as 
appropriate “of any other information, proper for disclosure, that leads the 
contracting officer to believe that there is a mistake in bid.” See Enco Dredging, 
B-284107, Feb. 22, 2000, 2000 CPD ¶ 44 at 6. Here, the agency did not advise 
Odyssey of these additional suspected mistakes prior to rejecting Odyssey’s 
request for correction (which effectively served as a rejection of Odyssey’s bid).  












As discussed above, DRC clearly stated in its quotation that it did not intend to 
comply with the on-site requirement for at least one of the web page 
designer/developer positions, and the record establishes that the agency clearly 
recognized this aspect of DRC’s quotation; yet, the agency evaluated the 
personnel proposed to fill these positions as constituting a “Significant Strength.” 
Further, in performing the contract, none of the personnel DRC proposed to 
perform either of the two web page designer/developer positions has ever 
performed on-site. Finally, as noted above, LAI maintains that, had it been 
permitted to similarly propose off-site personnel to fill these positions, it could 
have proposed more qualified personnel.  
On this record, it is clear that the agency permitted DRC to propose to perform 
the contract requirements on a basis that was materially different than that 
required by the solicitation. That is, the agency effectively relaxed the 
solicitation’s stated requirements for on-site performance without providing an 
















Name (optional):  _____________________________ 
Employer (optional):  __________________________ 
Years experience in procurement: ____ 






1.  Do you believe that ethics is an important topic in procurement?  YES   NO  
If yes, why?  ____________________________________________________________ 
In no, why not? __________________________________________________________ 
 











d. breach of contract 
e. dishonesty 
f. distorting data 
g. obfuscating issues 
h. confusing transactions 
i. false threats 
j. false promises 
k. cutting corners 
l. cover ups 
m. disguising attributes or preferences 
n. withholding information 
o. deception 
p. misrepresentation 
q. using a situation to further your own interest at the expense of the supplier using 
whatever means available 
r. exaggerating the extent of the damage caused to your firm by the supplier in order to 
extract concessions from them. 
s. not being willing to adapt the contract to accommodate changing circumstances 
t. not sharing information with suppliers 
u. altering the facts slightly in order to get what you need from you suppliers 
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v. shirking certain contractual obligations to your supplier when you see profit opportunities 
from doing so 
w. neglecting your responsibilities when your supplier is not likely to notice the 
noncompliance 
Do you believe all of these examples of ethical issues are equally bad - as they pertain to use 
with a supplier?    Yes  No 
Explain:  _____________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. If you had to place each of the tactics above into one of three buckets, labeled “very bad” 
“somewhat bad,” and “depends on situation,” in which bucket would you place each?   (place 
letters on lines below.) 
very bad: _____________________________________________________________ 
somewhat bad: ________________________________________________________ 
depends on situation: ___________________________________________________ 
 






5. Do you think that the magnitude of the payoff (benefit) of using any of the tactics above 
might influence your decision to use the tactic?  Yes   No 
 
6. Do you believe that pressure from your organization to deliver results (e.g., fear for your job, 
pay, promotion opportunity) might influence your decision to use any of the tactics above?  
Yes    No 
 
7. If you observed your leaders (supervisor, or senior executives) using any of the tactics above, 
might you be more inclined to also use any of the tactics above?  Yes   No 
 
8. If your firm never punished any sourcing professionals for using any of the tactics above, 
might you be more inclined to also use any of the tactics above?  Yes   No 
 
9. Does your firm have a code of ethics or a procurement ethics policy that explicitly addresses 
all of the tactics above?  Yes      No. 
 
10.  Which of the tactics above are not covered explicitly by your firm’s code of ethics or 





11. Do you believe that your firm leadership expects you to use any of the tactics in #2 above in 
order to secure the best terms (price, performance, etc.) for the firm?    Yes   No  
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12. Of the tactics in #2 above, which ones would you likely be punished for using if you were 
discovered using it?  _________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Do you believe that one’s morals or personally-held values might prevent them from ever 
using some or any of the above tactics above?  Yes    No 
 
14.  Do you believe that younger sourcing professionals are more likely to use the tactics above 
than are older sourcing professionals?  Yes    No 
 
15.  Do you believe that people who prioritize self-interest above anything else are more likely to 
use the tactics above?    Yes    No 
 
16.  Would you be more inclined to use the tactics above on a supplier (i.e. a business) versus on 
a co-worker or any other individual?  Hence, is it more acceptable to use the tactics above on 
another firm as an agent representing your firm than it is for you to use the tactics above on 
another individual person from you personally (representing yourself)?   Yes    No 
 
17.  Do you believe that if the stakes are high enough, anyone will: 
lie:      Yes  No 
cheat:  Yes  No 
steal:  Yes  No 
mislead:  Yes  No 
withhold information:  Yes  No 
bluff:  Yes  No 
make idle threats:  Yes  No 
slightly alter facts:  Yes  No 
deceive:  Yes  No 
cover up:  Yes  No 
shirk responsibilities:  Yes  No 
violate a contract term:  Yes  No 
violate an unwritten understanding w/ a supplier:  Yes  No 
 
18.  Do you believe that, independent of the nature of what you are purchasing, there is a 
fundamental difference in the way sourcing professionals view suppliers such that some have 
a general tendency to always view suppliers as partners (relational), whereas some have a 
general tendency to always view suppliers only as third parties who are obligated to fulfill 
contractual terms (transactional)?   Yes    No 
 
19.  Read the following hypothetical scenario.   
 
Your organization has recently experienced a cash-flow crisis, and therefore, 
cash flow has become an important emphasis by senior leadership in all 
functional areas.  Each employee is expected to help improve the cash-flow 
crisis.  You could help by altering the payment terms in the contract with 
Supplier X. Currently, the contract states that payment terms are net 30 days, 
but you consider contacting Accounts Payable (or Finance) and advising them 
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not to pay invoices until at least 60 days from receipt of the invoice.  Your 
annual spend with Supplier X is substantial.  Over the course of a year, your 
firm’s delayed payments to Supplier X will likely cost them $300,000 in 
borrowing costs and lost short-term investment opportunities.  <br><br> 
 
[NOTE:  If you work in government, substitute a budget crisis for a cash-flow 
crisis.] 
 
What do think would be some consequences to your organization (negative & positive) of 






Think of your closest coworker in purchasing. What is the probability that this coworker 
would choose to delay the payments to net 60 days?   
1 - Very low probability 
2 
3 
4 - 50/50 
5 
6 
7 - Very high probability 
 
Was the scenario easy to read?  Yes   No 
Was the scenario easy to understand?  Yes   No 
Do you think it took too much time to read?   Yes   No 
 
20.  Read the following hypothetical scenario.   
 
Recently, your organization levied specific cost-savings goals on you.  You are 
leading a negotiation to purchase a large quantity of widgets.  Supplier X is 
your incumbent supplier.  There are at least two other viable sources for these 
widgets that can meet your organizations' needs. Though you are negotiating 
with all three, you don't intend to switch suppliers.  The incumbent supplier 
currently has one other contract with your firm to supply a separate product.  
This other contract expires soon, and the supplier expects it to be renegotiated.  
You believe that this other contract is a somewhat important source of revenue 
and profit to Supplier X.  You have heard that your organization's product line 
is changing; thus, your organization likely won't need to renegotiate this other 
contract. The supplier is unaware of this potential situation. You don't think the 
supplier can replace the revenue from the lost contract in the near term; thus, 
the supplier's overhead is likely to consume most of the profit on the 
immediate contract you are negotiating for widgets.  You expect that Supplier 
X will still make a 2% profit on the widgets if the other contract is dropped, but 
this is less than the 10% that Supplier X anticipates.  You consider not 
disclosing the possibility of your organization dropping the other contract. 
 
What do you think would be some consequences to your organization (negative & positive) 






Think of your closest coworker in purchasing. What is the probability that this coworker 
would choose to withhold the information about the possible lost contracts?   
1 - Very low probability 
2 
3 
4 - 50/50 
5 
6 
7 - Very high probability 
 
Was the scenario easy to read?  Yes   No 
Was the scenario easy to understand?  Yes   No 
Do you think it took too much time to read?   Yes   No 
 
21. Read the following hypothetical scenario.   
 
You are currently in the 4th year of a 5-year contract with a supplier/contractor.  The 
contract specifically states that you will conduct random inspections of products and/or 
services.  Thus, only a certain percentage of the work will be inspected, and all work 
has an equal chance of being randomly chosen for inspection.  However, during the last 
2 years, the suppliers’ quality has declined – often to deficient levels.  Recently, your 
supervisor has emphasized a need for higher quality output to your customers.  Your 
supplier's defective performance costs you time to correct the errors and delays your 
customer receiving what he or she needs.  You consider conducting inspections at non-
random dates/times in order to catch more deficiencies.  Discovering deficiencies early 
during inspections rather than later on significantly reduces the costs to your 
organization and improves the quality of the product or service that you deliver to your 
customers.  You also believe that the targeted, non-random inspections will uncover 
more defects, necessitating corrective rework that will be costly to the supplier.  You 
estimate that the rework will reduce the supplier's margin on the contract from 10% to 
2%.  The supplier has no way of knowing that inspections are no longer random.   
 
What do you think would be some consequences to your organization (negative & positive) 





Think of your closest coworker in purchasing. What is the probability that this coworker 
would choose to alter the inspections from random to targeted?   
1 - Very low probability 
2 
3 




7 - Very high probability 
 
Was the scenario easy to read?  Yes   No 
Was the scenario easy to understand?  Yes   No 
Do you think it took too much time to read?   Yes   No 
 
22.  Do you believe each of the following tactics is an ethical issue: 
lie:      Yes  No  Maybe 
cheat:  Yes  No  Maybe 
steal:  Yes  No  Maybe 
mislead:  Yes  No  Maybe 
withhold information:  Yes  No  Maybe 
bluff:  Yes  No  Maybe 
make idle threats:  Yes  No  Maybe 
slightly alter facts:  Yes  No  Maybe 
deceive:  Yes  No  Maybe 
cover up:  Yes  No  Maybe 
shirk responsibilities:  Yes  No  Maybe 
violate a contract term:  Yes  No 
violate an unwritten understanding w/ a supplier:  Yes  No 
 






23.  Had I presented the questions found in this document to you in a survey (vs. this interview 
format), do you think you would answer them honestly?  Yes   No 





24.  Consider the conceptual model below.  This depicts factors that may contribute to a buyer’s 
decision to act opportunistically toward a supplier.  Opportunistic acts are those that are 
motivated by self-interest, with an intent to do harm to a supplier.  Do you believe these factors 
are the primary decision drivers?  If not, what other factors might be relevant?  Hence, what else 










































































MANIPULATION CHECK SURVEY 
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Scenario Evaluation 
Please read the two scenarios below. 
 
Scenario 1: 
You are currently in the 4th year of a 5-year contract with a supplier/contractor. The contract specifically 
states that you will conduct random inspections of products and/or services. Thus, only a certain 
percentage of the work will be inspected, and all work has an equal chance of being randomly chosen for 
inspection. However, during the last 2 years, the suppliers’ quality has declined – often to deficient levels. 
Recently, your supervisor has emphasized a need for higher quality output to your customers. Your 
supplier's defective performance costs you time to correct the errors and delays your customer receiving 
what he or she needs. You consider conducting inspections at non-random dates/times in order to catch 
more deficiencies. Discovering deficiencies early during inspections rather than later on significantly 
reduces the costs to your organization and improves the quality of the product or service that you deliver 
to your customers. You also believe that the targeted, non-random inspections will uncover more defects, 
necessitating corrective rework that will be costly to the supplier. You estimate that the rework will reduce 
the supplier's margin on the contract from 10% to 2%. The supplier has no way of knowing that 
inspections are no longer random. 
 
Scenario 2: 
Recently, your organization levied specific cost-savings goals on you. You are leading a negotiation to 
purchase a large quantity of widgets. Supplier X is your incumbent supplier. There are at least two other 
viable sources for these widgets that can meet your organizations' needs. Though you are negotiating 
with all three, you don't intend to switch suppliers. The incumbent supplier currently has one other 
contract with your firm to supply a separate product. This other contract expires soon, and the supplier 
expects it to be renegotiated. You believe that this other contract is a somewhat important source of 
revenue and profit to Supplier X. You have heard that your organization's product line is changing; thus, 
your organization likely won't need to renegotiate this other contract. The supplier is unaware of this 
potential situation. You don't think the supplier can replace the revenue from the lost contract in the near 
term; thus, the supplier's overhead is likely to consume most of the profit on the immediate contract you 
are negotiating for widgets. You expect that Supplier X will still make a 2% profit on the widgets if the 
other contract is dropped, but this is less than the 10% that Supplier X anticipates. You consider not 
disclosing the possibility of your organization dropping the other contract.  
 
1) In each scenario above, you were presented with a situation where you needed to make a decision. 
List any fundamental differences you notice between the context (setting) of the decisions in the two 
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[Inserted salutation Mr. or Mrs.] [Inserted last name], 
 
I'm seeking help from industry.   I’m still on active duty, but now at the Univ. of North 
Texas working on my dissertation for a Ph.D. in marketing & logistics.   For the 
dissertation effort, I’m exploring why buyers behave opportunistically toward suppliers.   
I’m requesting your help in this regard.   
 
My goals are to make your support: 
• Quick  (15 minute survey completed by your sourcing professionals)  
• Simple (Web-based survey with email invitation) 
• Risk free  (completely anonymous respondents) 
 
Support needed:  Either 
1)  Help me forward an email survey invitation to your purchasing professionals that 
actively select suppliers and manage supplier relationships/contracts.   
OR 
2)  Provide a list of email addresses of your sourcing professionals such that I can invite 
them to the survey directly 
 
I will gladly fill you in on the specifics of the research if interested.  Also, I will commit to 
sharing research results with you and each respondent that requests a copy.  Would 
you be willing to assist my research efforts?  If so, roughly how many purchasing 



















[Inserted salutation Mr. or Mrs.] [Inserted last name],  
 
Thank you for participating in this research.  As a doctoral candidate at the University of 
North Texas, I am exploring the dynamics involved in buyer-supplier relationships.  
Participation from professionals, such as you, is very important for the success of this 
research.  Your perspective will help contribute to our incredibly-important discipline - 
purchasing and supply management.  Click on the link below to access the survey.  I 
am preferably looking for responses by mid-December.    
 
[Inserted survey hyperlink] 
 
What’s in it for you? 
In appreciation of your participation, I will be happy to send you a report identifying:  (1) 
factors influencing buyers to use certain tactics with their suppliers, and (2) information 
as to how supply chain professionals can optimize buyer-supplier relationships.  Please 
note that this report will contain descriptive statistics based on collective responses of 
all participating companies; no individual response data will be published.  Your 
response will be completely anonymous.  None of the information put in the survey can 
be traced back to any individual nor to any company/organization.   
 
Thank you for your time, and I sincerely hope that you will participate in this effort.  
Individuals such as you help researchers to advance both the theory and practice of 
purchasing and supply chain management.  If you have any questions, please contact 





Tim Hawkins, Maj, USAF, C.P.M., CPCM 
 
Note:  Should you experience any technical difficulty accessing the survey, take a look 
at the URL and ensure there are no blank spaces in the address.  Also, if you have to 




If you agree to take part in this study, you will be asked complete a questionnaire that 
will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.  Completion of the survey involves no 
foreseeable risks.  Participation is voluntary and you may stop at any time.  Your name 
will not be requested in this study, so your responses will be anonymous.  All research 
records will be kept confidential by the Principal Investigator.  No individual responses 
will be reported to anyone because data will be reported only on a  
group basis.  Completion of the survey constitutes your consent to participate.  If you 
have any questions regarding this study, please contact Tim Hawkins, Univ. of North 
Texas, College of Business Administration, Dept. of Marketing & Logistics, at 
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hawkinst@unt.edu, xxx-xxx-xxxx, or Dr. Terry Pohlen, pohlen@unt.edu  940-565-2367.  
This project has been reviewed and approved by the University of North Texas 
Institutional Review Board (IRB).  Please contact the UNT IRB at 940-565-3940 with 
any questions regarding your rights as a research subject.  You may print a copy of this 
















Dear [Inserted salutation Mr. or Mrs.] [Inserted last name],  
 
Thank you for your participating in my research study.  I need several more responses 
to achieve the required response rate.  For those of you who have not been able to 
respond just yet, please take a few minutes and complete the survey.  For those of you 
who have already responded, thank you much!   
As a reminder, I am conducting a study to better understand the dynamics involved in 
buyer-supplier relationships.   
 
In appreciation of your participation, I will be happy to send you a report identifying 
factors influencing buyers to use certain tactics with their suppliers. Just reply to this 
message to request the summary report.  Again, this report will contain descriptive 
statistics based on collective responses of all participating organizations; no individual 
response data will be published.  Your response will be completely anonymous.  None 
of the information put in the survey can be traced back to any individual nor to any 
company/organization.  Thank you for assisting me in this valuable study required for 
the  
completion of my degree. 
  
To access the online survey, please click the following link:  
  
[Inserted survey hyperlink] 
 
(or copy and paste to your Web browser.)    
 
Alternatively, if you prefer a hard copy of the survey and return envelope, please reply 
to this email.     
 





Tim Hawkins, Maj, USAF, C.P.M., CPCM 
Ph.D. Candidate 
Department of Marketing & Logistics 
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Examining Buyer-Supplier Relationships 
 
      Dear Respondent, thank you for participating in this survey, and supporting my dissertation research. 
The quality of this research begs input from experienced professionals such as yourself. Specifically, this  
research will help us understand some of the dynamics involved in  buyer-supplier relationships  
 
Some of the questions below pertain to tactics commonly used in communications with suppliers. Please 
answer the questions honestly and as accurately as possible.  Note that your response is completely 
anonymous -- answers cannot possibly be traced back to you. 
 
You will be presented 2 hypothetical scenarios, followed by a series of questions related to the scenarios. 
Then, after the page break, you will be presented several questions independent of the scenarios.  
 
Note that the term "supplier" is synonymous with the term "contractor."  Also note that "construction" may 
be considered "services."   
 
Question sets 1 and 2 below are specific to one supplier relationship of your choosing. Choose only one 
supplier (Supplier X) and answer both sets of questions with the chosen supplier in mind. Think of a 
supplier relationship/contract that you currently manage and have managed for at least the past three 
months. 
 
a1)  For the following five statements, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree. 
  
The vendor we chose gave us a better deal than most of their other customers.  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree 
 
In terms of our negotiating strength, we didn't have much "clout."  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree 
 
We had much bargaining power in this purchase situation.  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree 
 
The suppliers were really competing to make this sale to us.  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree 
 
The supplier was really motivated in making this sale to us.  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree 
                     
Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
b2) Please rate each statement below as it pertains to Supplier X. 
 
The relationship is based on mutual benefit and trust. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree 
 




□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree 
 
The relationship is flexible in accommodating one another if special problems/needs arise. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree 
 
The relationship extends across many complex responsibilities and multiple tasks. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree 
 
Staying together in the face of adversity/challenge is very important to both firms. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree 
 
Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
3) How would you classify the product or service that Supplier X  provides to your organization?  
 
□ Non-critical/Generics (Many Suppliers to choose from; Product/service they provide are NOT critical 
to your firm's profitability and/or effectiveness)   
□ Leverage/Commodities (Many Suppliers to choose from; Product/service they provide are critical to 
your firm's profitability and/or effectiveness)   
□ Bottleneck/Distinctives (Few Suppliers to choose from; Product/service they provide are NOT critical 
to your firm's profitability and/or effectiveness)   
□ Strategic/Criticals (Few Suppliers to choose from; Product/service they provide are critical to your 
firm's profitability and/or effectiveness)   
 
Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Again, consider only Supplier X chosen above. Read the following hypothetical scenario. Answer the 
following questions with respect to Supplier X and with respect to the scenario. 
 
Scenario: 
You are currently in the 4th year of a 5-year contract with a supplier/contractor. The contract specifically 
states that you will conduct random inspections of products and/or services. Thus, only a certain 
percentage of the work will be inspected, and all work has an equal chance of being randomly chosen for 
inspection. However, during the last 2 years, the suppliers’ quality has declined – often to deficient levels. 
Recently, your supervisor has emphasized a need for higher quality output to your customers. Your 
supplier's defective performance costs you time to correct the errors and delays your customer receiving 
what he or she needs. You consider conducting inspections at non-random dates/times in order to catch 
more deficiencies. Discovering deficiencies early during inspections rather than later on significantly 
reduces the costs to your organization and improves the quality of the product or service that you deliver 
to your customers. You also believe that the targeted, non-random inspections will uncover more defects, 
necessitating corrective rework that will be costly to the supplier. You estimate that the rework will reduce 
the supplier's margin on the contract from 10% to 2%. The supplier has no way of knowing that 
inspections are no longer random.  
 
Listed below is a series of possible consequences of this action. For each possible consequence, please 




4) Please rate the extent of desirability associated with each possible consequence. 
 
Higher quality - Supplier fixes their processes leading to fewer defects in the future 
 
□ -5 Completely Undesirable □ -4    □ -3     □ -2     □ -1    □ 0   □ 1    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5 Completely 
Desirable 
 
Increased labor costs to conduct more inspections 
□ -5 Completely Undesirable □ -4    □ -3     □ -2     □ -1    □ 0   □ 1    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5 Completely 
Desirable 
 
More defects discovered - Supplier's costs increase to fix more defects 
 
□ -5 Completely Undesirable □ -4    □ -3     □ -2     □ -1    □ 0   □ 1    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5 Completely 
Desirable 
 
More defects discovered - Your organizations' costs decrease since you accept fewer defects 
 
□ -5 Completely Undesirable □ -4    □ -3     □ -2     □ -1    □ 0   □ 1    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5 Completely 
Desirable 
 
Higher quality of the product or service that your organization delivers to its customers 
 
□ -5 Completely Undesirable □ -4    □ -3     □ -2     □ -1    □ 0   □ 1    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5 Completely 
Desirable 
 
Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
5) Please rate the probability that each consequence might occur.  
 
Higher quality - Supplier fixes their processes leading to fewer defects in the future 
 
□ 10%    □ 20%    □ 30%    □ 40%    □ 50%    □ 60%    □ 70%    □ 80%    □ 90%    □ 100%   
 
Increased labor costs to conduct more inspections 
 
□ 10%    □ 20%    □ 30%    □ 40%    □ 50%    □ 60%    □ 70%    □ 80%    □ 90%    □ 100%   
 
More defects discovered - Supplier's costs increase to fix more defects 
 
□ 10%    □ 20%    □ 30%    □ 40%    □ 50%    □ 60%    □ 70%    □ 80%    □ 90%    □ 100%   
 
More defects discovered - Your organizations' costs decrease since you accept fewer defects 
 
□ 10%    □ 20%    □ 30%    □ 40%    □ 50%    □ 60%    □ 70%    □ 80%    □ 90%    □ 100%   
 
Higher quality of the product or service that your organization delivers to its customers 
 
□ 10%    □ 20%    □ 30%    □ 40%    □ 50%    □ 60%    □ 70%    □ 80%    □ 90%    □ 100%   
 
Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
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6) Think of your closest coworker in purchasing. What is the probability that this coworker would choose 
to change the inspections from random to targeted/non-random?    
 
□ 1 - Very Low Probability    □ 2    □ 3    □ 4    □ 5    □ 6    □ 7    □ 8 - Very High Probability   
 
Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Again, consider only Supplier X chosen above. Read the second hypothetical scenario. Answer the 
following questions with respect to Supplier X and with respect to the scenario. 
 
Scenario 2: 
Recently, your organization levied specific cost-savings goals on you. You are leading a negotiation to 
purchase a large quantity of widgets. Supplier X is your incumbent supplier. There are at least two other 
viable sources for these widgets that can meet your organizations' needs. Though you are negotiating 
with all three, you don't intend to switch suppliers. The incumbent supplier currently has one other 
contract with your firm to supply a separate product. This other contract expires soon, and the supplier 
expects it to be renegotiated. You believe that this other contract is a somewhat important source of 
revenue and profit to Supplier X. You have heard that your organization's product line is changing; thus, 
your organization likely won't need to renegotiate this other contract. The supplier is unaware of this 
potential situation. You don't think the supplier can replace the revenue from the lost contract in the near 
term; thus, the supplier's overhead is likely to consume most of the profit on the immediate contract you 
are negotiating for widgets. You expect that Supplier X will still make a 2% profit on the widgets if the 
other contract is dropped, but this is less than the 10% that Supplier X anticipates. You consider not 
disclosing the possibility of your organization dropping the other contract.  
 
Listed below is a series of possible consequences of this action. For each possible consequence, please 
rate: 1) its desirability and 2) its probability of occurrence.  
 
7) Please rate the extent of desirability associated with each possible consequence. 
 
Decrease in supplier's performance (because your business is less profitable) 
 
□ -5 Completely Undesirable □ -4    □ -3     □ -2     □ -1    □ 0   □ 1    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5 Completely   
Desirable 
 
Positive recognition from your supervisor for avoiding costs 
 
□ -5 Completely Undesirable □ -4    □ -3     □ -2     □ -1    □ 0   □ 1    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5 Completely 
Desirable 
 
Easier negotiation (can ignore analysis of overhead pool) 
 
□ -5 Completely Undesirable □ -4    □ -3     □ -2     □ -1    □ 0   □ 1    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5 Completely 
Desirable 
 
Cost avoidance to your organization -- maintain a low unit cost of widgets 
 
□ -5 Completely Undesirable □ -4    □ -3     □ -2     □ -1    □ 0   □ 1    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5 Completely 
Desirable 
 
Decreased trust from your supplier 
 




Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
8) Please rate the probability that each consequence might occur. 
                 
Decrease in supplier's performance (because your business is less profitable) 
 
□ 10%    □ 20%    □ 30%    □ 40%    □ 50%    □ 60%    □ 70%    □ 80%    □ 90%    □ 100%   
 
Positive recognition from your supervisor for avoiding costs 
 
□ 10%    □ 20%    □ 30%    □ 40%    □ 50%    □ 60%    □ 70%    □ 80%    □ 90%    □ 100%   
 
Easier negotiation (can ignore analysis of overhead pool) 
 
□ 10%    □ 20%    □ 30%    □ 40%    □ 50%    □ 60%    □ 70%    □ 80%    □ 90%    □ 100%   
 
Cost avoidance to your organization -- maintain a low unit cost of widgets 
 
□ 10%    □ 20%    □ 30%    □ 40%    □ 50%    □ 60%    □ 70%    □ 80%    □ 90%    □ 100%   
 
Decreased trust from your supplier 
 
□ 10%    □ 20%    □ 30%    □ 40%    □ 50%    □ 60%    □ 70%    □ 80%    □ 90%    □ 100%   
 
Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
          
9) Think of a typical coworker in purchasing. What is the probability that this coworker would choose to 
withhold the information about the possible dropped contracts? 
 
□ 1 - Very Low Probability    □ 2    □ 3    □ 4    □ 5    □ 6    □ 7    □ 8 - Very High Probability   
 




Note: The remaining questions do NOT pertain to any of the previous scenarios, 
nor do they pertain specifically to Supplier X. Questions about suppliers pertain to 
all of your suppliers in general.  
 
g10) How familiar are you with each of the following music CDs? 
 
Offender After Dark 
 




□ 1 - Not at all familiar    □ 2    □ 3 - Somewhat familiar     □ 4     □ 5 - Very familiar   
 
 
f11) For the following statements, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree. 
 
               
The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.  
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□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
Most people are basically good and kind.  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a 
chance.  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
It is hard to get ahead without hurting someone here and there.  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
g12) How familiar are you with each of the following products? 
 
Microsoft Statistical Assistant 
 
□ 1 - Not at all familiar    □ 2    □ 3 - Somewhat familiar     □ 4     □ 5 - Very familiar   
 
New Life Spices 
 
□ 1 - Not at all familiar    □ 2    □ 3 - Somewhat familiar     □ 4     □ 5 - Very familiar   
 
13) For the following statements, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree. 
                 
My leaders exaggerate the extent of the damage caused to us by the supplier in order to extract 
concessions from them.  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
My leaders use situations to further their own interests at the expense of a supplier using whatever 
means. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
My leaders are not willing to make adjustments to a contract with a supplier in order to cope with a 
temporary crisis.  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
eMy leaders do not volunteer much information regarding their business to their suppliers.  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
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eSometimes, my leaders alter the facts slightly in order to get what they need from their suppliers.  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
14) For the following statements, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree. 
 
cTop management in my company has let it be known in no uncertain terms that unethical behaviors will 
not be tolerated.  
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
cIf a manager in my company is discovered to have engaged in unethical behavior that results primarily in 
coporate gain (rather than personal gain), he or she will be promptly reprimanded. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
cManagers in my company often engage in behaviors that I consider to be unethical. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
cIn order to succeed in my company, it is often necessary to compromise one's ethics. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
When dealing with suppliers, complete honesty is always the best policy. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
cIf a manager in my company is discovered to have engaged in unethical behavior that results primarily in 
personal gain (rather than corporate gain), he or she will be promptly reprimanded. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
It is okay to neglect my responsibilities when my suppliers are not likely to notice my noncompliance. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
     




□ 1 - Not at all familiar    □ 2    □ 3 - Somewhat familiar     □ 4     □ 5 - Very familiar   
 
Turned To Gold 
 
□ 1 - Not at all familiar    □ 2    □ 3 - Somewhat familiar     □ 4     □ 5 - Very familiar   
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16) For the following statements, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree. 
 
I feel pressure to perform well in my job. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
The possibility of failing to achieve targeted results at work is worrisome. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
If I don’t achieve targeted results people (e.g., co-workers, supervisors, employer) will notice. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
17) For the following statements, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree. 
 
One should always accurately represent one’s education, training, and experience. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
One should not knowingly participate in a conflict of interest without prior notice to all parties involved. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
My job is very demanding. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
In my job, I feel stressed by the requirement to deliver results. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
One must always be honest in serving consumers, clients, employees, suppliers, distributors, and the 
public. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
One should always adhere to all applicable laws and regulations. 
 
□ 1 Strongly Disagree    □ 2    □ 3     □ 4     □ 5    □ 6   □ 7 Strongly Agree  
 
Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 








□ 1 - Not at all familiar    □ 2    □ 3 - Somewhat familiar     □ 4     □ 5 - Very familiar   
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19) Do any of your organizational policies or regulations expressly prohibit deceiving suppliers? 
 
□ Yes    □ No  
 
Additional Comments: _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for your responses. The remaining few questions collect the necessary demographic 
data.    
 
20) Please select an industry  
 
□ Advertising/Public Relations     □ Biotechnology / Biomedical    □ Computers    □ Construction 
□ Consumer Products/Retail/Wholesale    □ Consulting     □ Education/Training 
□ EnergyEntertainment     □ Finance/Banking      □ Food & Apparel    □ Government-Federal/State/Local 
□ Insurance        □ IndustrialTech        □ Manufacturing       □ Medical/Healthcare      □ MilitaryNon-Profit 
□ Publishing      □ Travel/Hospitality     □ Telecommunications     □ Transportation    
□ Utilities Not currently employed. 
 
   If you selected other, please specify: ___________________ 
 
21)  What type of organization do you work for?  
 
□  Private sector (e.g. most businesses and individuals) 
□  Federal Government - Defense Department 
□  Federal Government - Non-Defense Department 
□  State Government 
□  Local Government (e.g., City,County) 
□  Not-for-profit sectorOther (please specify)  
          
   If you selected other, please specify: ___________________ 
 
22) What was your company's total sales revenue last year?  
 
□  Under $250,000      □  $250,000 - $999,999      □  $1 million - $2.4 million      □  $2.5 - $4.9 million   
□  $5 - $9.9 million      □  $10 - $19.9 million          □  $20 - $29.9 million             □  $30 - $49.9 million   
□  $50 - $99.9 million   □  $100 million or more      □  N/A - Government 
 
23) Are you a Certified Purchasing Manager (C.P.M.) or a Certified Professional Contracts Manager 
(CPCM)?  
 
□ Yes    □ No    □ Other (please specify): ____________      
 
24) What is your age?  
 
□  Under 18      □  18 - 24      □  25 - 34      □  35 - 44  □  45 - 54      □  55 - 64     □  65 or older 
 





26) Gender  
 
□  Male    □ Female   
 
 
Again, thank you for your dedication of time to this important research. Please feel free to contact the 
principal investigator, Tim Hawkins, at hawkinst@unt.edu or 817-919-8286 or my faculty advisor, Dr. 
Terry Pohlen, Associate Professor, Department of Marketing and Logistics at the University of North 
Texas, at pohlen@unt.edu or 940-565-2367.  
 
Tim Hawkins, Maj, USAF, C.P.M., CPCM, Ph.D. Candidate 
Department of Marketing and Logistics 
University of North Texas 
 
[Previous Page] [Submit Survey] 
         
   
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   













MISSING DATA MANOVA 
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Cases Missing BP Data Vs. Cases Not Missing BP Data 




























































































































































.991  320 .436 .879 





.973  320 1.269 .265 




CEV or Not 
.975  320 1.171 .319 
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.979  320 .961 .459 
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Cases Missing RN Data vs. Cases Not Missing RN Data 
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TESTS OF NON-RESPONSE BIAS 
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Test of Homogeneity of Variance - NCMA List Sample 
Dependent Variables Box’s M F p 
Buyer Power, Relational Norms, 
Machiavellianism, Leadership 
Opportunism, CEV, 
Honesty/Integrity, Pressure To 
Perform 
28.304 .892 .628 
 
Chi-Square Test of Independence - NCMA List Sample 
Variable χ 2 p 
Gender 0.01 0.907 
Age 5.24 0.263 
Business Sector 5.64 0.060 
Certification 3.10 0.212 
 
Non-Response MANOVA - NCMA List Sample 































Test of Homogeneity of Variance - Pilot Study 
Dependent Variables Box’s M F p 
Buyer Power, Relational Norms, 
Machiavellianism, Leadership 
Opportunism, CEV, 
Honesty/Integrity, Pressure To 
Perform 
61.041 1.676 .014 
 
Chi-Square Test of Independence - Pilot Study Sample 
Variable χ 2 p 
Gender 2.39 0.122 
Age 3.70 0.296 
Business Sector 6.42 0.011 










Non-Response MANOVA - NCMA List Sample 














































































































































Non-Response ANOVA - Pilot Study Sample 























































































































Test of Homogeneity of Variance - ISM List Sample 
Dependent Variables Box’s M F p 
Buyer Power, Relational Norms, 
Machiavellianism, Leadership 
Opportunism, CEV, 
Honesty/Integrity, Pressure To 
Perform 
31.621 .966 .516 
 
Chi-Square Test of Independence - ISM List Sample 
Variable χ 2 p 
Gender 1.42 0.233 
Age 6.37 0.173 
Business Sector 4.53 0.104 
Certification 0.98 0.613 
 
Non-Response MANOVA - ISM List Sample 





























Test of Homogeneity of Variance - Fortune 500 List Sample 
Dependent Variables Box’s M F p 
Buyer Power, Relational Norms, 
Machiavellianism, Leadership 
Opportunism, CEV, 
Honesty/Integrity, Pressure To 
Perform 
33.898 .853 .687 
  
Chi-Square Test of Independence - Fortune 500 List Sample 
Variable χ 2 p 
Gender 0.19 0.663 
Age 0.74 0.865 
Business Sector 2.19 0.139 
Certification 1.14 0.565 
 
Non-Response MANOVA - Fortune 500 List Sample 







































UNIVARIATE DETECTION OF OUTLIERS 
 197
Univariate Detection of Outliers 
Construct Number of Data 
Points With 
Standardized 




Scores > 3.5 
Number of Cases 
With >2 Items With 
Standardized 
Scores > 3.5 
Buyer Power 0 0 0 
Relational Norms 0 0 0 
CEV 0 0 0 
Pressure To Perform 5 5 0 
Leadership Opportunism 0 0 0 
Machiavellianism 1 1 0 













STATISTICAL TESTS OF NORMALITY 
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Statistical Tests Of Normality 
Item Mean S.D. Skewness Sk. S.E. Kurtosis Ku. S.E. 
BP1 4.65 0.088 -0.373 0.134 -0.601 0.268 
BP2 4.79 0.097 -0.617 0.134 -0.497 0.268 
BP3 4.81 0.088 -0.545 0.135 -0.374 0.268 
BP4 5.39 0.081 -1.044 0.134 0.979 0.268 
BP5 4.96 0.094 -0.704 0.135 -0.523 0.269 
RN1 5.22 0.085 -0.866 0.134 0.152 0.268 
RN2 5.32 0.079 -0.914 0.134 0.549 0.268 
RN3 5.23 0.080 -0.863 0.134 0.318 0.268 
RN4 5.43 0.083 -1.017 0.135 0.543 0.268 
RN5 5.38 0.075 -0.918 0.135 0.593 0.268 
CEV1 5.54 0.093 -1.159 0.134 0.379 0.268 
CEV2 6.04 0.085 -1.899 0.134 2.974 0.268 
CEV3 6.00 0.094 -1.858 0.134 2.390 0.268 
CEV4 5.89 0.098 -1.724 0.134 1.850 0.268 
CEV5 5.06 0.105 -0.713 0.134 -0.658 0.268 
PP4 5.02 0.090 -0.771 0.135 -0.009 0.269 
PP5 5.99 0.061 -1.211 0.135 1.476 0.269 
PP6 5.40 0.090 -1.130 0.134 0.654 0.268 
PP7 5.32 0.085 -0.922 0.134 0.311 0.268 
PP8 4.84 0.095 -0.599 0.135 -0.565 0.268 
L1 2.60 0.092 -0.957 0.134 -0.006 0.268 
L2 2.73 0.088 -0.993 0.135 0.281 0.268 
L3 3.39 0.092 -0.404 0.134 -0.761 0.268 
L4 2.92 0.099 -0.666 0.135 -0.708 0.268 
L5 2.74 0.093 -0.854 0.134 -0.163 0.268 
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Item Mean S.D. Skewness Sk. S.E. Kurtosis Ku. S.E. 
M1 2.10 0.066 1.374 0.134 1.988 0.268 
M2 3.03 0.073 0.534 0.134 0.251 0.268 
M3 2.54 0.081 1.054 0.135 0.594 0.268 
M4 4.15 0.094 -0.081 0.134 -0.820 0.268 
M5 3.53 0.102 0.228 0.134 -1.096 0.268 
M6 2.63 0.088 0.817 0.134 -0.380 0.268 
H1 5.41 0.093 -1.103 0.134 0.413 0.268 
H2 6.73 0.042 -4.405 0.135 24.535 0.268 
H3 6.62 0.043 -2.686 0.135 8.675 0.269 
H4 6.60 0.042 -3.082 0.135 14.300 0.268 
H5 6.55 0.062 -3.428 0.135 12.607 0.268 
SEU-Wk 5.25 0.093 0.400 0.134 0.306 0.268 
SEU-Strg 3.32 0.074 0.403 0.134 0.568 0.268 
AGE 3.63 0.052 -0.141 0.134 -0.487 0.268 
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